International trade and the organization of firms by Schymik, Jan Simon
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE
ORGANIZATION OF FIRMS:
GOVERNANCE, INCENTIVES, AND
COMPETITIVENESS
INAUGURAL-DISSERTATION
zur Erlangung des Grades Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. publ.)
an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
2014
vorgelegt von
JAN SIMON SCHYMIK
Referentin: Prof. Dr. Dalia Marin
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Florian Englmaier
Promotionsabschlussberatung: 13. Mai 2015
2
Datum der mündlichen Prüfung: 28. April 2015
Namen der Berichterstatter: Prof. Dr. Dalia Marin, Prof. Dr. Florian
Englmaier, Prof. Dr. Carsten Eckel
Acknowledgments
During the last years, I received immense support and encouragement from
various persons and I hereby would like to thank them. First and foremost,
I want to thank my supervisor Prof. Dalia Marin for her continuous support
and guidance throughout the process. Her inspiration and advice were instru-
mental for this dissertation and shaped my way to think as an economist.
I am very happy to have Prof. Florian Englmaier and Prof. Carsten Eckel
as my co-supervisors. I learned a lot from them and my work greatly benefited
from their comments and suggestions.
The Chair of International Economics provided not only a stimulating re-
search environment but also a place where I made friendships and received
a lot of personal support. Andreas Backhaus, Philippe Fromenteau, Philipp
Herkenhoff, Norman Loeckel, Henrike Michaelis, Michael Seitz, Alexander
Tarasov, Eva Tehua and Jan Tscheke - you made this place special to me and I
am extremely thankful for the laughter, joy, discussions and support.
Being part of the Department of Economics at the University of Munich as
well as the Munich Graduate School of Economics was a great experience and
gave me the opportunity to meet and collaborate with many very kind and
interesting people. Furthermore, I gratefully acknowledge financial support
from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft through SFB TR15.
This thesis would never have been written without the continuous encour-
agement from my family and I am very thankful for their support and that
they always believed in me. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my dearest
one, Maren, for her love and unlimited support.
3
Contents
I Preface 9
II Trade, Technologies, and the Evolution of Corporate Governance 12
II.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
II.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
II.2.1 Preferences, Skills and Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
II.2.2 Moral Hazard and Firm Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
II.2.3 Assignment and Managerial Compensation . . . . . . . 24
II.2.4 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
II.2.5 Skill-Biased Technological Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
II.2.6 The Open Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
II.3 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
II.3.1 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
II.3.2 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
II.3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
II.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
III Organizations as Competitive Advantage 50
III.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
III.2 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
III.2.1 Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
III.2.2 Production and Trade in Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
III.2.3 Decentralization, Ideas and Product Quality . . . . . . . 57
III.2.4 Firm Organization and Competitiveness . . . . . . . . . 59
III.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
III.3.1 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4
CONTENTS 5
III.3.2 Construction of Key Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
III.4 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
III.4.1 Offshoring and Market Shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
III.4.2 Decentralization and Product Quality . . . . . . . . . . . 77
III.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
IV Executive Compensation and the Global Division of Labor - Evi-
dence from Matched Manager-Firm Data 90
IV.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
IV.2 Background and Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
IV.2.1 Shifts in the Skill Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
IV.2.2 Hierarchies and the Matching of Workers . . . . . . . . . 94
IV.2.3 Agency Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
IV.3 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
IV.3.1 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
IV.3.2 Empirical Modeling Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
IV.3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
IV.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
A Appendix Chapter II 121
A.1 Theory Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
A.2 Data Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
B Appendix Chapter III 137
B.1 Data Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
C Appendix Chapter IV 148
C.1 Theory Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
C.2 Data Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
List of Tables
II.1 Corporate Governance, Trade Openness, and ICT . . . . . . . . 46
II.2 Equity Compensation, Trade Openness, and ICT . . . . . . . . . 48
III.1 Offshoring and World Market Shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
III.2 Offshoring and World Market Shares - IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
III.3 Decentralization, Quality and Innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
III.4 Decentralization, Quality and Innovation - IV . . . . . . . . . . . 87
IV.1 Trade in Tasks and Executive Pay Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
IV.2 First Stage Results - Executive Pay Structure . . . . . . . . . . . 111
IV.3 Trade in Tasks and Executive Pay Structure - IV . . . . . . . . . . 112
IV.4 Trade in Tasks and Manager-Worker Wage Inequality . . . . . . 115
IV.5 First Stage Results - Manager-Worker Wage Inequality . . . . . . 116
IV.6 Trade in Tasks and Manager-Worker Wage Inequality - IV . . . . 117
A.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
A.2 Description of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
B.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
B.2 Descriptions of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
B.3 Descriptions of Variables - Instrumental Variables . . . . . . . . 141
B.4 Offshoring and World Market Shares - Robustness I . . . . . . . 142
B.5 Offshoring and World Market Shares - Robustness II . . . . . . . 143
B.6 Offshoring and World Market Shares - Robustness III . . . . . . 144
B.7 Decentralization, Quality and Innovation - Robustness I . . . . . 145
B.8 Decentralization, Quality and Innovation - Robustness II . . . . 146
6
LIST OF TABLES 7
C.1 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
C.2 Description of Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
C.3 List of Covered Stock Market Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
C.4 List of Covered Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
C.5 Robustness Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
List of Figures
II.1 Determination of the Closed Economy Equilibrium . . . . . . . 28
II.2 Effects of a Trade Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
IV.1 Trade in Tasks and Pay-Performance Elasticity . . . . . . . . . . 108
IV.2 Growth of Intermediate and Final Goods Trade . . . . . . . . . . 119
IV.3 Dynamics of Executive Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A.1 CEO Wages, Skill-Intensity and Export Activity . . . . . . . . . . 133
B.1 Decentralized Organizations and Religious Beliefs . . . . . . . . 147
C.1 Distribution of Manager-Worker Wage Inequality . . . . . . . . 154
8
CHAPTER I
Preface
Globalization and technological change have been substantially changing the
nature of firms. As the global economy became more integrated, we have
experienced striking increases in the international activities of corporations.
More firms sell on world markets and source their inputs globally. Further-
more, the emergence of information and communication technologies has al-
tered skill demand. These developments have toughened the competition be-
tween firms and intensified the role of human capital as an important stake-
holder in firms.
This dissertation studies the responses of firms and workers to globaliza-
tion and technological change. It combines three independent contributions
to the fields of international trade and organizational economics. Each contri-
bution corresponds to an individual chapter and can be read independently.
Chapter II studies how international trade and technological change influ-
ence the quality of corporate governance standards within firms. In the theo-
retical part of the chapter, I use an open economy model with heterogeneous
firms and human capital and introduce a simple moral hazard problem as in
Acharya et al. (2013). Firm heterogeneity arises from the matching of man-
agers to production technologies which determines managerial compensation
in equilibrium. Firm owners can incentivize their managers with performance
payments or they can monitor them through investments into corporate gov-
ernance. I use this model to demonstrate that increases in trade openness
9
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and skill-biased technological change increase the demand for human capi-
tal which raises the reservation wages of the highest skilled managers in the
economy. This reduces the incentives of firm owners to invest in corporate
governance as the labor market forces them to incentivize managers with per-
formance payments instead of strict monitoring.
In the empirical part of the chapter, I use data on managerial entrench-
ment opportunities and equity compensation in a sample of public U.S. cor-
porations between 1990 and 2006 to test the predictions of the model. The
entrenchment index by Bebchuk et al. (2009) which contains information on
the governance quality of large U.S. public companies is an ideal source of
data to test the relationship between corporate governance and the industry
environment of firms. Furthermore, I obtain information on CEO equity com-
pensation in the U.S. between 1998 and 2006 from the BoardEx database. The
data suggest that increases in sectoral openness and the contribution of in-
formation and communication technologies reduce the quality of corporate
governance and increase the equity compensation of CEOs.
Chapter III is joint work with Dalia Marin and Jan Tscheke. In the chapter
we use representative survey data on 15,000 European manufacturing plants
to investigate how global sourcing and decentralized management affect the
export competitiveness of firms. In order to guide our empirical analysis, we
develop a simple theoretical framework where firms adjust their organization
in order to meet competitive pressures on foreign markets. First, firms can
reorganize production internationally and offshore part of the production to
other countries. This allows exporting firms to reduce their costs and to com-
pete on prices. Second, firms can reorganize towards a more decentralized
hierarchy which empowers knowledge workers in the firm. This incentivizes
workers to suggest new ideas and in consequence allows firms to compete on
product quality.
We evaluate the empirical relevance of the model predictions for the Eu-
ropean manufacturing industry. Our data contain rich information on the or-
ganization and international activities of manufacturing firms across seven
European countries. We construct the world export market share of each firm
for its respective set of industries and show that firms that source a larger frac-
tion of their inputs from abroad obtain larger market shares on global export
markets. We also find that firms with a decentralized management are more
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likely to offer products with higher quality compared to firms with a more
centralized management, particularly when firms are not family managed.
We identify the competitiveness effects of offshoring at the firm level with a
set of instruments that capture differences in comparative advantages of input
industries. Furthermore, we exploit regional variation in different measures
of religious beliefs and trust to instrument for the effect of a decentralized
organization.
Chapter IV analyzes how executive remuneration in industrialized coun-
tries is shaped by the international division of labor. Using unique linked
manager-firm data from BoardEx and Worldscope that contain detailed infor-
mation on the compensation of top executives in public European and U.S.
firms, I study how compensation contracts adopt to changes in intermediate
imports at the industry level. Globalization has been mentioned as one of
the main causes for the rise in executive compensation. In this chapter, I em-
pirically study how the increase in intermediate goods trade has influenced
monetary incentives for top managers during the last 15 years.
I find that increases in the exposure to trade in tasks made executive com-
pensation more elastic to changes in firm performance: executive compensa-
tion becomes more elastic to changes in firm earnings and stock market per-
formance when industries import a larger fraction of their intermediates. Fur-
thermore, the estimates suggest that the positive effect of trade in tasks on the
monetary incentives in executive compensation have increased the earnings
inequality between managers and workers within firms.
CHAPTER II
Trade, Technologies, and the Evolution of Corporate
Governance
II.1 Introduction
Public companies in the U.S. typically incentivize managers with performance
related payments instead of tight monitoring: between 1992 and 2008, the me-
dian share of performance payments in U.S. S&P 500 firms increased from 58
to 83 percent1 while improvements in corporate governance to monitor man-
agerial behavior have been rather absent.2 This chapter proposes an expla-
nation of this development, by showing that trade and technological change
lead to more competition for the most productive managers which can inter-
act with the way how firms provide incentives. Labor economists frequently
argue that globalization and skill-biased technological change have been ma-
jor triggers of increases in the level and the slope of compensation at the
very top of the income distribution.3 Furthermore, skill intensity and open-
1See Frydman and Jenter (2010) who document the historical development of U.S. execu-
tive compensation.
2The two most prominent U.S. corporate governance indices from Bebchuk et al. (2009)
and Gompers et al. (2003) indicate that the average corporate governance quality became
inferior during the last two decades while there is large variation in the quality of corporate
governance between firms.
3See for instance Baldwin and Cain (2000) who study the roles of trade and technology for
shifts in relative U.S. wages, Bell and Van Reenen (2013) who study the role of globalization
on extreme wage inequality in top management or Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005, 2009) who
12
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ness to international trade also seem to matter for managerial compensation
across industries: managers in skill intensive and open industries obtain a
wage premium.4 However, the understanding how real economic develop-
ments affect corporate governance outcomes is rather scant. Inspired by the
impact of trade and technological change on incentives and the managerial
skill premium, this chapter investigates how trade openness and skill-biased
technological change affect the quality of corporate governance as an alterna-
tive incentive device. If trade and technological advancements raise the role
of incentives inside firms, it is a priori surprising that firms do not try to in-
vest more in the quality of corporate governance over time to incentivize their
management with better control mechanisms.
In order to explain why firms do not incentivize with strict corporate gov-
ernance, I propose an open economy model with heterogeneous firms. The
model considers an economy that is endowed with a measure of heteroge-
neous production technologies and a measure of agents with heterogeneous
skill levels. Firms emerge after matching production technologies with agents
which are employed as managers and agents employed as production work-
ers. The quality of the production technology and the level of employed
managerial skill jointly determine the productivity of firms. Technologies
and managerial skills are both complements such that a positive assortative
assignment arises in equilibrium. I borrow here from Monte (2011) when I
model preferences, the endowments of the economy and the assignment of
workers to production technologies.
I subsequently introduce a stylized theory of the firm with simple incen-
tive contracts to establish a role for corporate governance. Principals offer
incentive payments and make an upfront investment into the quality of the
monitoring technology for the control of managers reflecting the strength of
corporate governance in a firm. In particular, I follow Acharya et al. (2013)
in modeling the contracting of performance pay and corporate governance.
The objective of a contract between a manager and the firm owner is twofold.
First, performance pay and governance should incentivize managers to take
study the effects of globalization on incentive provisions.
4Figure A.1 in the appendix plots average CEO compensation for 4-digit SIC industries
and illustrates that average compensation is larger in more skill-intensive and more open
sectors
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the desired action from the owner’s perspective. Second, the expected perfor-
mance pay should make the participation in the firm sufficiently attractive for
a manager given his endogenously formed reservation wage.
To determine the distribution of managerial wages in equilibrium, I bor-
row from the literature on the assignment of managers to firms5 and make use
of the positive assortative matching of managerial skills to production tech-
nologies. An assignment implies that the marginal cost of a slightly higher
skilled manager is equal to the marginal benefit of this manager in a compet-
itive labor market equilibrium. Therefore, managerial wages depend on the
productivity of managers and thus on the individual skill level, the produc-
tion technology of the firm and industry characteristics.
The chapter proceeds with two comparative static exercises. First, I con-
sider the effects of skill-biased technological change on corporate governance
investments and performance payments. More specifically, I model skill-biased
technological change as an increase in the effectiveness of production tech-
nologies benefiting higher skilled managers relatively more. Second, I extend
the model to an open economy version with two symmetric countries and
intra-industry trade. The open economy version of the model allows to con-
sider how trade integrations, modeled as a reduction of trade costs, affect cor-
porate governance and performance pay.
In the model, trade and skill-biased technological change raise competition
on managerial labor markets and thereby increase reservation wages of the
most productive managers in the economy. This increase in reservation wages
forces companies to compensate their managers with larger sums. Firms re-
spond to this effect with more performance payments and lower investments
into their corporate governance.
The analysis of the impact of real economic outcomes on both, executive
compensation and corporate governance structures, joins two prominent and
competing explanations for the rise of CEO compensation during the previ-
ous decades: managerial power versus market competition. Some economists
argue that the rise of executive compensation is due to more powerful man-
agers that can influence their compensation contracts and extract rents from
the firm more easily (see Bebchuk and Fried (2003)). Another strand of litera-
5See for instance Gabaix and Landier (2008) or Terviö (2008).
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ture claims that competition for managerial talent, raised by increases in mar-
ket capitalization, can account for the rise in executive payments to a large
extent (see Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Terviö (2008)). The model com-
bines those two strands by arguing that changes in the real economic envi-
ronment have triggered a shift in the demand for managerial talent. Thereby,
firms endogenously reduce investments in corporate governance which leads
to powerful managers and a rise of performance payments at the top.
Using data on managerial entrenchment opportunities and equity com-
pensation in a panel of large U.S. stock companies between 1990 and 2006
combined with information on trade openness and the importance of ICT at
the industry level, I can test the comparative statics predictions of the model.
The empirical results suggest that companies react to increases in trade open-
ness at the sectoral level, measured as the share of exports relative to the effec-
tive market size of the industry, with weaker corporate governance and more
equity compensation. Furthermore, the results suggest that the application of
information and communication technologies, measured as the contribution
of ICT services to the industry growth, led to similar albeit smaller effects:
companies adopted weaker corporate governance and paid more equity com-
pensation. I address potential sources of endogeneity by employing an in-
strumental variable strategy, where trade openness is instrumented with the
real effective exchange rate of the industry-weighted most important trading
partner countries.
The chapter covers a question at the intersection of organizational and in-
ternational economics and thus relates to various strands of the literature on
the effects of trade and technological change on firm organization and corpo-
rate finance.
It contributes to the literature that considers incentive compensation in
general equilibrium trade models. Wu (2011) and Chen (2012) focus on the
managerial incentive provision in firms with moral hazard in general equilib-
rium models of intra-industry trade and firm heterogeneity à la Melitz (2003).
Gersbach and Schmutzler (2014) show how the global integration of prod-
uct and labor markets increases the heterogeneity of CEO remuneration in a
model with Cournot competition. The focus of these models is the effect of
trade integrations on the dispersion of incentive contracts and compensation
levels.
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The chapter is also related to a literature that links the decision to delegate
authority inside firms to globalization and the technological frontier. Marin
and Verdier (2008b, 2012a,b) show that globalization affects the delegation
of formal and real authority in organizations. They embed the allocation of
formal decision authority à la Aghion and Tirole (1997) into models of inter-
national trade and explain how economic integration leads to the delegation
of power inside firms. Since agents are infinitely risk-averse with respect to
income, performance payments cannot be used to incentivize agents. Conse-
quently, their models do not allow to draw inferences on the choice between
managerial power and performance pay. Additionally, the quality of man-
agerial talent is homogenous such that variation in managerial power across
firms within industries is absent. Marin et al. (2015) investigate how the allo-
cation of power inside firms is affected by offshoring managers or produc-
tion tasks in a small open economy model. Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg
(2012) show that exporting firms increase the control span of managers and
the number of management layers within their hierarchies after trade liber-
alizations. Acemoglu et al. (2007) analyze how technology diffusion affects
firm decentralization. They argue that decision rights are more decentralized
when private information of agents is crucial. Consequently, the delegation
of authority is more likely when firms are relatively close to the technolog-
ical frontier such that technologies are not public knowledge. Compared to
their model, technologies play a different role in this chapter. While the qual-
ity of ideas and managerial skills are modeled as complementary inputs in my
model, the complexity of technologies and the quality of the managerial talent
is exogenous in their paper.
I add an integrated view to this literature that considers both, the choice
of corporate governance and performance payment which are subject to labor
market outcomes. This allows to draw novel conclusions about the effects
of trade and technological change on the substitution patterns between both,
payment and governance, to provide incentives.
The effects of product markets on either managerial power or incentive
compensation have also been analyzed in several empirical papers. Here,
the literature has primarily focused on the delegation of decision authority
as a particular dimension of managerial power. Bloom et al. (2010a) and
Guadalupe and Wulf (2010) use data on the organization of firms to show
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how more import penetration leads to flatter firm hierarchies and more de-
centralized decision making. Marin and Verdier (2012a) show that German
and Austrian multinationals have a more decentralized organization when
they are faced by a stronger trade exposure. Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005)
consider the appreciation of the British Pound as a quasi-natural experiment
to quantify the effect of product market competition on executive performance
pay within a panel of British manufacturing firms. They find that the implied
import competition shock led to a higher pay to performance sensitivity for
managers in more open sectors.
The chapter is also related to recent research on assignment models that
consider corporate finance decisions of the firm. Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013)
present a model where CEOs and firms form matches based on multiple char-
acteristics to explain low turnover rates in an industry equilibrium. Bénabou
and Tirole (2013) analyze the impact of labor market competition and skill-
biased technological change on the structure of compensation in a Hotelling
framework. They demonstrate that competition for talent shifts effort from
less easily contractible tasks, like long-term investments, towards more easily
contractible tasks. In addition Baranchuk et al. (2011), Edmans et al. (2009) and
Falato and Kadyrzhanova (2012) develop industry equilibrium models with
moral hazard problems to show how CEO compensation interacts with the
industry environment of firms. Dicks (2012) establishes a role for corporate
governance regulation in an industry equilibrium model with moral hazard
and assignment of CEOs to firms. Acemoglu and Newman (2002) consider
the impact of labor supply and demand on the corporate structure of firms
and show how the outside option of production workers affects production
worker monitoring.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section II.2 develops
the model in the closed economy and characterizes the equilibrium solution.
Section II.2.5 addresses the effects of skill-biased technological change in a
closed economy setting. Section II.2.6 deals with the open economy case and
considers the effects of globalization through a decline in trade costs. Section
II.3 describes the data, empirical modeling strategy and presents the evidence.
Section II.4 concludes.
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II.2 The Model
In this section I present the model in a closed economy setting. I follow
Acharya et al. (2013) in modeling the organization of firms subject to moral
hazard. This partial equilibrium model of the firm is subsequently intro-
duced into an industry environment with heterogeneous skills and technolo-
gies. Complementarities in the effectiveness of managerial skills and produc-
tion technologies lead to a positive assortative matching of managers to pro-
duction technologies in equilibrium. The structure of the general equilibrium
model borrows from Monte (2011).
The outline of the timing structure is as follows:
t = 0: All firms that want to enter the market make an upfront investment
into the level of corporate governance g ∈ [0, 1] that they want to es-
tablish at their firm. Better corporate governance leads to more efficient
control of their managers and thus to a closer alignment of the manager’s
incentives to the owner’s interests.
t = 1: All firms that want to enter the market need to hire a manager. Owners
make a “take it or leave it” contract offer to a manager, taking into ac-
count the value of the manager’s outside option. The prospective man-
ager receives the offer which specifies a performance payment and the
level of corporate governance investment chosen in t = 0. This level of
corporate governance allows a prospective manager to infer how likely
it is to pursue personal goals without being caught. Managers in more
weakly governed firms have a higher chance to remain uncaught when
shirking such that their incentives are less closely aligned with the own-
ers’ interests. Managers may decide to accept or decline the offer de-
pending on their respective outside option. Labor market clearing re-
quires that the remaining agents that do not get an offer for a CEO posi-
tion become production workers.
t = 2: After a manager accepts the offer, he chooses to either behave (exert
effort) or misbehave (shirk). Whenever the manager chooses to shirk,
the output production will fail and whenever the manager chooses to
expand effort, there is a positive chance that the firm produces output.
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The quality of corporate governance is introduced as a probability g with
that firm owners receive a signal on the expected production outcome.
If the signal indicates a failure of output production, firm owners can
displace a manager in order to obtain some liquidation value.
t = 3: After the production occurred, all agents are compensated and profits
are realized.
II.2.1 Preferences, Skills and Technologies
I continue with a description of the consumer preferences and the endowment
of the economy. Preferences can be described by a standard CES utility func-
tion over a set of differentiated varieties J
U =
[ˆ
j∈J
y(σ−1)/σj dj
]σ/(σ−1)
, (II.1)
where yj is the amount that is consumed of variety j and σ > 1 is the constant
elasticity of substitution. This implies that consumers spend xj = X
(
pj
P
)1−σ
on each variety that is produced, where P ≡
[´
j∈J p
(1−σ)
j dj
]1/(1−σ)
is the price
index in the economy and X the aggregate consumption expenditure. A firm
needs three inputs in order to exist: a production technology, a manager and
production labor in proportion to the firm’s output. All firms are single prod-
uct firms.
The economy is populated by a mass of agents L which can be employed
either as production workers or as managers. Agents differ in their manage-
rial skill but they are equal in the skills that they provide as production work-
ers. The distribution of managerial skills is described by L(s) = L/s, where
s ∈ [1, ∞) is an agent’s skill level and L(s) is the measure of agents with man-
agerial skills that are at least as good as the skill level s. Agents that fill an
occupation as production worker provide one efficiency unit of production
labor, independently of their managerial skills. The occupational choice be-
tween production work and managerial work will be endogenized later in the
model. Note that, unlike in Melitz (2003), where the production labor sup-
ply is fixed and similar to Wu (2011), the allocation of agents into production
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worker jobs and managerial jobs endogenously determines the supply of pro-
duction labor.
Besides the skill level of the employed manager, firm productivity is influ-
enced by the quality of the production technology. All production technolo-
gies are owned by a mutual fund (the principal) maximizing the individual
profits of firms and redistributing them equally across the population.6 The
quality distribution of technologies is given by G(z) = T/z, where z ∈ (0, ∞)
is the quality of a technology and G(z) is the measure of technologies that are
at least as good as a technology with quality z. This implies that the num-
ber of available (however, bad) technologies is sufficient to accommodate any
number of managers in equilibrium.
The production costs of a firm depend on the skill of the manager and
the production technology: managerial talents and technologies complement
each other regarding the production of output. This complementary relation-
ship is implied by the firm’s unit cost of production. In particular, if produc-
tion with a technology of efficiency z is run by a manager with skill s, unit costs
are ϕ (z, s) = w/ (zκsµ), where w is the production labor wage. The parameter
µ > 0 measures the influence of the manager’s skill and the parameter κ > 0
the impact of the production technology on firm productivity.
Let x
(
pj
)
− x(pj)
ϕ(z,s)pj
be the surplus (revenues net of production costs) of a
firm that chooses the price level pj for its variety. Standard optimization yields
that the firm charges a constant markup over production costs: pj = p (z, s) =
σ
σ−1
w
zκsµ . The revenue function xj and the optimal price p (z, s) can now be
used to state the surplus that a firm can obtain if it produces successfully,
denoted by Y (z, s), as
Y (z, s) = M
(
zκsµ
w
)σ−1
. (II.2)
The term M ≡ 1σ
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ XPσ−1 captures the size of the market from the
perspective of an individual firm. Markets are large if the elasticity of substi-
tution between varieties is low and the aggregate expenditure level X or the
price index P are large.
6This is a standard assumption in the literature on heterogeneous firms to abstract from
any wealth effects among economic agents.
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Note that a marginal increase in the managerial skill s increases the surplus
(II.2) for all firms but due to complementarities between skills and technolo-
gies the increase of surplus is larger, the better the quality of technology z:
∂2Y (z, s) / (∂s∂z) > 0. This property will be important when the assignment
of managers to production technologies is discussed at a later stage of the
chapter.
II.2.2 Moral Hazard and Firm Governance
In this section, I explain the contracting between the firm owner and a prospec-
tive manager in a partial equilibrium setting, where I treat the outside option
of the manager and the potential surplus of the firm as exogenous. I show that
the optimal level of corporate governance depends on the expected value of
the manager’s outside option. Specifically, I borrow from Acharya et al. (2013)
in modeling contracting with corporate governance investments under moral
hazard.
As discussed previously, firm owners make an upfront investment into the
level of corporate governance in t = 0 and hire a manager in t = 1 to become
active on the market. A contract between both parties consists of a perfor-
mance payment w ≥ 0 and the strength of corporate governance g ∈ [0, 1]
that the owner has implemented in t = 0. Investments in corporate gover-
nance generate linear personal costs Cwg.7 These costs reflect the owner’s
ex-ante effort cost to set up a system in order to monitor the manager ex-post.
The benefit of stricter corporate governance is that it increases the chance of
learning the productivity of the manager such that the manager may be dis-
placed more easily whenever he is unproductive.
The manager chooses an unobservable and hence incontractible action Z ∈
{manage, shirk} after a contract is signed. The action Z = {shirk} generates a
private non-pecuniary benefit B for the manager and no production output for
the firm. The action Z = {manage} instead generates no private benefits for
the manager but positive surplus Y > 0 for the firm with likelihood ε and zero
7I choose to express the owner’s costs and benefits of corporate governance in terms of the
production labor wage rate w in order to simplify the notation when I derive the equilibrium
solution in II.2.4. This simplifies the characterization of an equilibrium in the open economy
case and leaves the qualitative results of the comparative static analyses in II.2.5 and II.2.6
unaffected.
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production output Y = 0, otherwise. Whenever the positive surplus Y > 0 is
realized, the manager is compensated with his bonus w.
Before the surplus is realized, owners observe a signal x̃ ∈ {Y, 0} on the
expected firm surplus with probability g. After observing this signal, own-
ers can choose to displace the manager and liquidate the firm to obtain some
liquidation value Rw. This liquidation value induces firm owners to displace
managers whenever the signal on output production turns out to be negative.8
In order to make the analysis interesting, I make the following assumptions:
Assumption.
(1) Cw ∈ ((1− ε) Rw, (1− ε) Rw + B): the choice of g is non-trivial. If corpo-
rate governance investments were cheaper, the firm would always invest. If instead
corporate governance investments were more expensive, investments would never be
profitable.
(2) εY > B: incentivizing managers to exert effort is socially efficient.
(3) εY > Rw: owners have no incentive to displace the manager and obtain the liqui-
dation value Rw when they do not observe the signal x̃.
A contract between both parties needs to be incentive compatible and to
satisfy the manager’s participation constraint. To sum up, the owner’s prob-
lem is given by
maxw,g ε (Y− w) + (1− ε) gRw− Cwg (II.3)
s.t.
εw ≥ (1− g) B (II.4)
εw ≥W. (II.5)
Firm owners choose the performance payment w and the level of corporate
governance g to maximize their expected profits (II.3) subject to the man-
ager’s incentive compatibility constraint (II.4) and the participation constraint
(II.5). If the manager chooses the action Z = {shirk}, firm output is al-
ways 0 and the manager receives his private benefit B whenever he is not
displaced which occurs with probability 1− g. If the manager chooses the ac-
tion Z = {manage}, he is compensated with performance payment w when-
8An empirical counterpart of this liquidation value could be the owner’s benefits of a
merger or the acquisition by another firm.
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ever the firm produces output Y > 0 which happens with probability ε. The
incentive compatibility constraint (II.4) ensures that the manager’s expected
payoff from Z = {manage} is weakly larger than his expected payoff from
Z = {shirk}. The participation constraint (II.5) additionally requires that the
manager’s expected payoff from Z = {manage} is weakly larger than his mar-
ket wage W.
Note that ex ante, corporate governance and performance pay are substi-
tutes with respect to the provision of incentives. From the perspective of the
manager, a stricter level of corporate governance reduces his power to obtain
private benefits such that incentive compatibility is achievable with lower lev-
els of performance pay. Vice versa, more performance pay makes effort pro-
vision more attractive such that less control is required. This substitutive rela-
tionship is impaired by the participation constraint that imposes a minimum
payment requirement W.
The optimal choice of corporate governance and performance payment is
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal contract for a manager is:
w =
W
ε
g =
1− WB if W ≤ B0 if W > B.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, the optimal incentive contract depends on the value of the man-
ager’s outside option. If the manager has a valuable outside option W > B, the
incentive compatibility constraint becomes redundant since incentive pay is
already sufficiently large to incentivize the manager to choose Z = {manage}
such that investments in corporate governance are inefficient. If the manager
has a less valuable outside option W ≤ B, owners optimally choose the cheap-
est contract that keeps both constraints binding in equilibrium.
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II.2.3 Assignment and Managerial Compensation
Proposition 1 describes the choice of performance pay and the upfront invest-
ment in corporate governance for an exogenous outside option W. Next, I en-
dogenize the managerial wage function in order to describe how firms choose
their governance in equilibrium. I proceed in two steps. First, I describe the
positive assortative matching of production technologies and agents to form
firms. Then, I borrow from the assignment literature and obtain equilibrium
managerial payments. A satisfied participation constraint then prevents all
managers from switching firms.
Complementarities between the effectiveness of production technologies
and managerial skills and a competitive labor market lead to a positive assor-
tative matching of managerial skill levels and production technologies, as it is
standard in the assignment literature.9 The positive assortative matching of
managerial skills to production technologies implies that the measure of the
upper tail of the managerial skill distribution and the measure of the upper
tail of the technology distribution need to be of equal size for each matched
firm pair (s, z) such that
L/s = T/z ⇔ z = ts,
where t ≡ T/L is a relative measure of the technology size in the economy.
The equilibrium surplus (II.2) can be restated as a function of the managerial
skill s and industry-specific parameters:
Y (s) = M
(
tκsκ+µ
w
)σ−1
. (II.6)
In order to pin down the equilibrium function of managerial payments
W (s), I make use of a standard assignment equation as in Gabaix and Landier
9See for example Gabaix and Landier (2008) or Terviö (2008). Furthermore, consider the
following intuitive argument: Suppose there were two technology-skill matches (z1, s2) and
(z2, s1) that form firms in equilibrium with z1 < z2 and s1 < s2. The aggregate surplus could
be increased by making the CEO with skill s1 the head of the firm with production technology
z1 and the other CEO with skill s2 the head of the firm with z2 instead. Since any competitive
equilibrium is efficient, this is a contradiction.
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(2008) or Monte (2011):
∂εY (z, s)
∂s |z=z(s)
= W ′ (s) . (II.7)
Equation (II.7) implies that the marginal cost of a slightly better manager
equals the marginal benefit of a slightly better manager from the perspective
of the firm.10 Differentiating the surplus (II.2) with respect to s and plugging
z (s) = ts in, then gives
εM
(
tκ
w
)σ−1
µ (σ− 1) s(κ+µ)(σ−1)−1 = W ′ (s) . (II.8)
I integrate the left hand side of equation (II.8) over s and make use of the fact
that the marginal manager with skill sc is indifferent between an occupation
as production worker or as manager such that W (sc) = w. This gives the
equilibrium function of managerial payments:
W (s) =
ˆ s
sc
∂εY (z, ι)
∂ι |z=z(ι)
dι + w
= εM
(
tκ
w
)σ−1 µ
κ + µ
(
s(κ+µ)(σ−1) − s(κ+µ)(σ−1)c
)
+ w. (II.9)
Intuitively, the compensation of a manager increases with the skill difference
between this manager and the marginal manager with skill sc, the market size
M, the relative technology size t and the contribution of managerial talent to
firm productivity µ.
II.2.4 Equilibrium
In this section, I establish the conditions that determine the equilibrium and
characterize the choice of corporate governance and performance pay that
firms offer in the economy. The following three conditions need to be sat-
isfied in equilibrium. First, all firm owners offer the optimal mix between
performance pay and corporate governance according to Proposition 1 after
10Note, that the marginal cost of the CEO do not include any marginal corporate gover-
nance costs since corporate governance investments have been made in t = 0 and are there-
fore sunk in the hiring stage t = 1. See the Appendix for a discussion of the credibility of
reservation wages.
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taking the managerial payments (II.9) into account. Second, only firms with
non-negative expected profits are active on the market and hire a manager
(the zero cutoff earnings condition). Third, the labor market clears (the labor
market clearing condition).
Due to the positive assortative assignment, the marginal firm employs the
least-skilled manager with managerial skills sc. This manager must be in-
different between an occupation as production worker or an occupation as
manager such that his outside option is W (sc) = w. I make the following
assumption in order to focus on the more interesting equilibria where at least
some firms invest in corporate governance to monitor their managers:
Assumption. w < B: there are some firms in the economy that choose to invest in
corporate governance such that there is variation in the quality of corporate gover-
nance across firms.
According to Proposition 1, the contract offered by the marginal firm is
characterized by a performance payment w (sc) = w/ε and the highest level of
governance in the economy g (sc) = 1− wB . The following zero cutoff earnings
condition ensures that the marginal firm is indifferent between entering or
leaving the market
ε
M( tκsκ+µc
w
)σ−1
− w
ε
− (1− w
B
)
(C− (1− ε) R)w = 0. (II.10)
Since the market size M depends on the price index which again depends
on the cutoff skill level sc, I restate M in terms of the aggregate expenditure X
and the cutoff skill level sc. The CES price index can be written as function of
fundamentals and the managerial ability cutoff sc itself, using zc = tsc for the
marginal firm11:
P =
σ
σ− 1 t
−κw
(
ψ
εL
)1/(σ−1)
sψ/(σ−1)c , ψ ≡ 1− (σ− 1)(κ + µ). (II.11)
Here, I make the following assumption.
Assumption. (σ− 1)(κ + µ) < 1: the improper integral for the price index exists.
11See the Appendix for a more detailed derivation of the price index in the closed economy.
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Intuitively, this assumption implies that there is no single firm that is suffi-
ciently productive to push the price index towards zero.12 Plugging the price
index (II.11) and the expenditure level X into the zero cutoff earnings condi-
tion (II.10) and rearranging terms, yields the following function X(sc):
X =
σLwλ
ψ
s−1c , (II.12)
where λ ≡
((
1− wB
)
(C− (1− ε) R) + 1
)
is the net cost of corporate gover-
nance for the marginal firm.
The zero cutoff earnings curve is downward sloping since an increase in
the cutoff managerial skill sc increases the productivity of the marginal firm.
Therefore, the aggregate expenditures X must decrease in order to restore zero
earnings of this firm.
Next, I consider the labor market clearing condition. In contrast to the clas-
sical Melitz (2003) model with heterogeneous firms, the labor supply is not fix
in my model since the mass of production workers depends on the number
of managers and the number of firms in the economy, respectively. The labor
market clears when the aggregate expenditure on production workers that is
required to produce the aggregate output of all active firms equals the aggre-
gate earnings of those production workers:
ˆ ∞
sc
ε (x (i)−Y (i)) Li−2di = Lw(1− s−1c ). (II.13)
The left hand side of equation (II.13) integrates the difference between ex-
pected revenues and the expected surplus over all firms and thus corresponds
to the aggregate expenditure on production labor in the economy. The right
hand side of (II.13) corresponds to the aggregate earnings of production work-
ers. Solving the integral on the left hand side gives rise to a simple term for
the aggregate expenditure on production labor: ε σ−1σ X.
13 This simplifies the
labor market clearing condition to the following function X (sc):
X =
Lw
ε
σ
σ− 1
(
1− s−1c
)
. (II.14)
12Also see Monte (2011) for a more detailed discussion.
13See the Appendix for a detailed derivation of the aggregate expenditure on production
labor.
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Figure II.1: Determination of the Closed Economy Equilibrium in the (X, sc)
Locus.
6
-
1
X
sc
labor market clearing
zero cutoff earnings
The labor market clearing curve (II.14) is upward sloping in sc. Intuitively, a
rise in sc increases the supply of production labor. Therefore, the production
labor demand has to rise as well and thus the aggregate expenditure level X
needs to increase to keep the labor market in equilibrium.
Figure II.1 illustrates the zero cutoff earnings and the labor market clearing
curve graphically. Since both curve intersect once, there exists a unique equi-
librium solution for X and sc. The subsequent proposition summarizes the
closed form solutions of X and sc in the closed economy version of the model.
Proposition 2. The zero cutoff earnings condition and the labor market clearing con-
dition uniquely determine the equilibrium solution of the cutoff skill sc and the aggre-
gate expenditure X in the closed economy:
X =
σLλw
ε (σ− 1) λ + ψ
sc = 1 +
ε (σ− 1) λ
ψ
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Given the solution for X and sc, it will turn out to be convenient to state
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the managerial payment function as follows:
W (s) = λw
µ
κ + µ
((
s
sc
)(κ+µ)(σ−1)
− 1
)
+ w. (II.15)
In the next subsection, I make use of the managerial payment function to char-
acterize the distribution of corporate governance across firms in the economy.
II.2.4.1 The Distribution of Corporate Governance across Firms
Since the managerial wage function is increasing with managerial skills, firms
are heterogeneous in their upfront investments in corporate governance. Firms
that employ the managers with relatively little managerial skills choose to in-
vest into corporate governance since the equilibrium payments are insuffi-
cient to incentivize their managers. On the contrary, firms that employ the
managers with relatively high managerial skills also have to pay them more.
These firms use the payments to incentivize their managers which makes in-
vestments into better corporate governance inefficient for them.
The following function summarizes the strength of governance g as a func-
tion of the managerial skill s, taking into account Propositions 1 and 2 and the
payment function (II.15):
g =
1−
λw µκ+µ
(
( ssc )
(κ+µ)(σ−1)−1
)
+w
B if s ≤ s̃
0 if s > s̃.
(II.16)
Firms that employ a manager with skills above s̃ leave all the power to their
manager and choose not to invest in corporate governance. Firms that employ
managers with skill levels below s̃ choose to provide incentives with both
instruments, stricter monitoring and performance payments. Consequently,
the managers in smaller firms have less power to obtain their benefits from
shirking. According to Proposition 1, the critical skill level s̃ is defined as
εM
(
tκ
w
)σ−1 µ
κ + µ
(
s̃(κ+µ)(σ−1) − s(κ+µ)(σ−1)c
)
+ w = B. (II.17)
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Using the equilibrium values of X and sc from Proposition 2 leads to
s̃ =
(
1 +
(κ + µ) (B− w)
λµw
) 1
1−ψ
sc. (II.18)
Note that s̃ increases proportionally with sc. Thus, an increase of the cutoff
managerial skill puts pressure on managerial payments which leads to more
corporate governance investments in the economy since more managers need
to be further incentivized
For the subsequent comparative static exercises, I analyze the effects on the
share of firms in the economy that do not invest in corporate governance (g =
0) in equilibrium. This share is characterized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. The share of firms θ that do not invest in corporate governance is
equal to
θ ≡ Ls̃
−1
Ls−1c
=
(
1 +
(κ + µ) (B− w)
λµw
) 1
ψ−1
. (II.19)
θ is large if the costs of corporate governance λ are relatively high or the shirking
benefits of managers B are relatively small.
The following two sections of the chapter present comparative statics re-
sults of either skill-biased technological change or economic integration in an
open economy version of the model on the share of weak governance firms θ.
II.2.5 Skill-Biased Technological Change
This section provides comparative static results to illustrate the effects of skill-
biased technological change on managerial payments and firm investments
in corporate governance. There has been a debate in the economics literature
that technological change is to a large extent skill-biased in the sense that it
increases the effectiveness of technologies that disproportionally benefit the
productivity of firms that employ relatively high-skilled agents. For instance,
the availability of computers and related information technologies is particu-
larly relevant for workers that frequently use these technologies.14 This skill-
bias in technological change can be modeled as an exogenous increase in the
14See Autor et al. (1998) for empirical evidence.
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parameter κ which measures the influence of the production technology on
the overall firm productivity.15 A higher value for κ immediately translates
into a more dispersed productivity distribution since the productivity of firms
with higher skilled agents improves disproportionally.16 First, I consider the
effects of skill-biased technological change on the zero cutoff earnings condi-
tion. Then, I analyze how the effects on X and sc affect corporate governance
choices of firms and how the share of weak governance organizations θ in the
economy changes.
An increase in κ leaves the labor market equilibrium clearing condition
(II.14) unaffected since changes in the effectiveness of technologies neither
affect the aggregate production labor expenditure nor the earnings on pro-
duction labor. However, a larger κ affects the zero cutoff earnings condition
(II.12). A skill-biased increase in the effectiveness of technologies has two op-
posing effects on the surplus of the marginal firm. First, there is a positive
productivity effect since the marginal costs t
κsκ+µc
w decrease. Second, there is a
negative market size effect that is due to a lower price index because all other
firms also become more productive. Since an increase in κ disproportionally
benefits firms that employ relatively high skilled agents, the negative effect
on the price index dominates the positive productivity effect for the marginal
firm. To restore zero earnings for a given cutoff skill sc, the marginal firm
now requires a larger expenditure level X to cover the corporate governance
costs to enter the market. This mechanism turns the zero cutoff earnings curve
outward which unambiguously increases X and the cutoff skill sc in the new
equilibrium.
Consider next the effects of skill-biased technological change on the critical
skill level s̃ from equation (II.18). Skill-biased technological change has three
effects on managerial wages and the choice of governance within firms and
the skill level s̃.
First, an increase of κ strengthens the contribution of the production tech-
nology to firm productivity and therefore weakens the bargaining position of
the manager and decreases managerial wages (the bargaining effect). The de-
crease of managerial wages translates to a lower share of weak governance
15see Monte (2011)
16The elasticity of the firm productivity with respect to changes in κ is increasing in the
employed skill level s since e(κ) = κ ln(ts).
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firms in the economy since lower bonus payments require additional incen-
tives from stricter monitoring.
Second, an increase of κ increases the marginal productivity of managers
and thus has a positive effect on managerial wages which reduces the critical
skill s̃ and increases the share of weak governance firms θ (the productivity
effect).
Third, skill-biased technological change leads to a tougher selection (sc
rises) such that managerial wages fall and s̃ increases (the selection effect).
Note, that the selection effect only affects the cutoff skill level s̃ but leaves
the share of organizations with zero corporate governance θ unaffected since
s̃ rises proportionally with sc. Consequently, tougher selection from techno-
logical change affects the number of firms but leaves the share of firms with
weak governance unaffected. Nevertheless, the bargaining effect and the pro-
ductivity effect have an influence on θ. I restate equation (II.19) as follows:
θ =
(
λµw
λµw + (κ + µ) (B− w)
) 1
(κ+µ)(σ−1)
.
The bargaining effect is captured by an increase of the denominator λµw +
(κ + µ) (B− w) such that θ decreases. The positive productivity effect is cap-
tured by a decrease of the exponent 1
(κ+µ)(σ−1) such that θ rises. I show in
the appendix that the productivity effect outweighs the bargaining effect such
that ∂θ∂κ > 0. Proposition 4 states how skill-biased technological change affects
the share of firms that do not invest into corporate governance.
Proposition 4. Skill-biased technological change (κ ↑) increases competition for the
most productive managers and thereby raises the share of firms that do not invest in
corporate governance (θ ↑).
Proof. See Appendix.
II.2.6 The Open Economy
The current section establishes an open economy version of the model. I con-
sider two identical countries that participate in intra-industry trade. Economic
activities on the domestic market are denoted with a subscript d and export-
ing activities with a subscript x. An exporting firm needs to produce τ > 1
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units of a good for 1 unit to reach the foreign destination. Additionally, a firm
needs a fixed amount of production labor f to sell to the export market. For-
mally, a firm that employs a manager with skill s in the open economy faces
the following objective function:
max ε (Yd(s) + IxYx(s)− w(s))− Ix f w− (1− g (s)) (C− (1− ε) R)w, (II.20)
where Ix is an endogenous export participation indicator. Again, firms choose
the bonus payment w (s) and level of corporate governance g (s) according
to Proposition 1. Since exporting firms face identical demand elasticities on
both markets, the exporting price is a constant multiplier of the domestic price
adjusted by the variable trade cost: px(s) = τpd(s). Therefore, the operating
profits from exporting are
Yx (s) = τ1−σYd (s) = τ1−σ M
(
tκsκ+µ
w
)σ−1
.
Denote sd the managerial skill of the marginal local firm and sx the man-
agerial skill of the marginal exporting firm. Firms will choose to export when-
ever their productivity is large enough to cover the fix costs of exporting.
Thus, the marginal exporter obtains operating profits from exporting Yx(sx)
that are just sufficiently large to cover the fixed costs of entering the export
markets such that εM
(
tκsκ+µx
w
)σ−1
= τσ−1 f w. The managerial skill level of the
marginal exporter sx can be written as a function of the marginal skill level of
a domestic firm manager sd
sx =
(
τσ−1 f
λ
) 1
1−ψ
sd, (II.21)
where I assume that
[
τσ−1 f
] 1
1−ψ > λ in order to assure a meaningful exporting
behavior of firms with sx > sd. The open economy price index can now be
written as
P =
σ
σ− 1wt
−κ
(
ψ
εL
) 1
σ−1
s
ψ
σ−1
d
[
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
]1/(1−σ)
, (II.22)
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where ∆ ≡ τ
1
κ+µ f
ψ
1−ψ is an index that captures the distance between both coun-
tries. The additional term
[
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
]1/(1−σ)
captures the effect of foreign
competition on the price index. If the economic distance between the two
countries is small (low values for ∆ occur whenever f and τ are small), com-
petition from foreign exporters lowers the domestic price index. In the limit,
when both economies are very remote and ∆ approaches infinity, the price
index converges to its closed economy version (II.11).
An equilibrium in the open economy again requires that labor markets
clear. The aggregate expenditure on production labor now consists of three
components: expenditure on labor to produce for the domestic market, ex-
penditure on labor to produce for the export market and additionally, the ex-
penditure on production labor that is required to cover the fixed investments
f . The aggregate expenditure on production labor can again be found by inte-
grating the labor demand of an individual firm over all active firms and now
includes the additional labor expenditure to cover the fix costs of exporting f :
ˆ ∞
sd
εqd(s)
tκsκ+µ
Ls−2ds +
ˆ ∞
sx
εqx(s)
tκsκ+µ
Ls−2ds + f wLs−1x = Lw(1− s−1d ).
Similar to the closed economy case, expenditure on production labor can be
simplified to εX (σ− 1) σ−1 + f wLs−1x such that labor markets clear in the
open economy if
ε
σ− 1
σ
X + f wLs−1x = Lw
(
1− s−1d
)
.
Replacing sx with (II.21) leads to
X =
σ
σ− 1
L
ε
[
1−
(
1 + λ
1
1−ψ ∆−1
)
s−1d
]
. (II.23)
Equation (II.23) is the open economy version of the labor market clearing con-
dition in the closed economy (II.14). Here, the additional factor ∆−1 captures
the labor demand for exporting activities.
Consider the zero cutoff earnings condition in the open economy. The zero
cutoff earnings firm is only active on the domestic market and faces compe-
tition from foreign exporters through a smaller price index (II.22). Plugging
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(II.22) into (II.10) yields the open economy version of the zero cutoff earnings
condition:
X =
σLλw
ψ
[
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
]
s−1d . (II.24)
Equations (II.23) and (II.24) determine the equilibrium solution for X and sd
in the open economy which is summarized in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. The zero cutoff condition and the labor market clearing condition
uniquely determine the equilibrium solution of the domestic cutoff skill sd and the
aggregate expenditure X in the open economy:
X =
σLλw
(
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
)
ψ + ελ (σ− 1) + (ψ + ε (σ− 1)) λ
1
1−ψ ∆−1
sd = 1 +
ελ (σ− 1)
ψ
+
(
1 +
ε (σ− 1)
ψ
)
λ
1
1−ψ ∆−1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Plugging the equilibrium values for X and sd into the term for the market
size M leads to
M =
λ
ε
wσt−κ(σ−1)sψ−1d . (II.25)
The equilibrium function of managerial payments in the open economy now
requires a case distinction. Managers that are employed by exporting firms
obtain an additional wage premium εM
(
tκ
w
)σ−1 µ
κ+µ τ
1−σ
(
s1−ψ − s1−ψx
)
that
arises from serving a larger market. Since globalization allows them to addi-
tionally serve the foreign market, these CEOs have a higher marginal produc-
tivity and thus obtain a higher income:
W (s) =

εM
(
tκ
w
)σ−1 µ
κ+µ
(
s1−ψ − s1−ψd
)
+ w if s ∈ [sd, sx)
εM
(
tκ
w
)σ−1 µ
κ+µ
((
s1−ψ − s1−ψd
)
+τ1−σ
(
s1−ψ − s1−ψx
))
+ w if s ≥ sx.
(II.26)
With the open economy equilibrium from Proposition 5 and the open econ-
omy managerial payment function (II.26) it is straightforward to analyze the
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Figure II.2: The Effects of a Trade Integration (dτ < 0 and/or d f < 0) on the
Managerial Cutoff Skill Level sd.
6
-
1
X
sc
?
6
labor market clearing
zero cutoff earnings
d∆ < 0
effects of globalization on θ.
II.2.6.1 Trade Integration
Figure II.2 illustrates the effects of a trade integration on the domestic man-
agerial cutoff skill level sd. A reduction of economic distance ∆ between both
countries, either stemming from a decrease of the variable or the fix trade costs
dτ < 0 or d f < 0, has an effect on both, the labor market clearing and the zero
cutoff earnings condition.
If the two economies become more integrated, the labor market curve shifts
downwards. Intuitively, better exporting opportunities allow the labor mar-
ket to clear at a lower expenditure level. Simultaneously, more integration
shifts the zero cutoff earning curve upwards. A trade integration fosters im-
port competition such that the marginal domestic producer requires a larger
expenditure level to break even. These two effects lead to an unambiguous in-
crease of the domestic managerial cutoff skill sd. Furthermore, the cutoff skill
of the marginal exporting firm sx falls since a lower productivity level is suffi-
cient to cover the fix trade costs and a larger share of firms become exporters
since ∂ [sd/sx] /∂∆ < 0.
In the interest of a statement on the comparative statics of firm governance
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in an open economy, I distinguish two cases: first the case with low trade
openness (large ∆), then the case with high trade openness (small ∆). The
effect of a trade liberalization on managerial payments are substantially dif-
ferent in these two cases which has different effects on the choice of corporate
governance in equilibrium.
Low Trade Openness
Suppose that both countries are very remote such that the selection of firms
into exporting is only efficient for a small share of firms. In this scenario, the
export cutoff managerial skill level sx is very high such that the sorting of skill
levels is as follows:
sd < s̃ < sx.
Since only very few firms export, most managers cannot benefit from trade
liberalization since these managers do not obtain an exporter wage premium.
If the organizational cutoff skill level s̃ is smaller than the export cutoff man-
agerial skill level sx, all exporters (and additionally some non-exporters) are
weak governance firms. The organizational cutoff s̃ can again be evaluated
as the skill level of the manager that has an outside option with value B such
that this manager is the least productive manager that is hired by a firm that
chooses not to invest in corporate governance:
εM
(
tκ
w
)σ−1 µ
κ + µ
(
s̃(κ+µ)(σ−1) − s(κ+µ)(σ−1)d
)
+ w = B. (II.27)
This leads to an equilibrium share of firms with weak corporate governance
of
θ ≡ Ls̃
−1
Ls−1d
=
(
1 +
(κ + µ) (B− w)
λµw
) 1
ψ−1
(II.28)
which is identical as in closed economy version of the model. Obviously, θ is
not affected by changes in the openness of the economies.
In this scenario, economic integration only increases the market wages of
the managers that manage the most productive exporting firms. Only these
managers obtain an exporter wage premium that allows them to compensate
the downward pressure on managerial wages arising from tougher import
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competition. The remaining managers suffer from tougher selection via an in-
crease in sd and since s̃ increases proportionally, the share of weak governance
firms remains constant.
High Trade Openness
Next, suppose that both countries are relatively integrated such that many
firms serve the export market. In this scenario, the export cutoff skill level is
very low such that the sorting of skill levels is
sd < sx < s̃.
This sorting implies that the firm that employs the manager with the organi-
zational cutoff skill s̃ is an exporting firm. Consequently, the organizational
cutoff s̃ is defined as
εM
(
tκ
w
)σ−1 µ
κ + µ
((
s̃1−ψ − s1−ψd
)
+ τ1−σ
(
s̃1−ψ − s1−ψx
))
+ w = B
which leads to the following term for the share of organizations with weak
corporate governance θ:
θ =
((
(κ + µ) (B− w) + λµw
λµw
− λ
τ2(σ−1) f
)(
1
1 + τ1−σ
))− 11−ψ
.(II.29)
Now, the share of firms that do not invest in corporate governance depends
on the trade costs. A reduction in either the variable trade costs τ or the fix
trade costs f unambiguously increase θ. Intuitively, a reduction of trade costs
increases the market wages for a large share of the managers in the economy
since these become more productive and firms that compete for managerial
talent are willing to pay them more. This rise in wages is then used to in-
centivize their manager. Consequently, firms substitute away from incentive
provision via better corporate governance towards performance payments.
The following Proposition summarizes the previous discussion and ex-
plains how trade integrations affect the share of weak governance firms θ.
Proposition 6. A reduction of fix and/or variable trade costs unambiguously in-
creases the domestic cutoff skill level sd since the selection into market entry becomes
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tougher.
Relatively large firms in the market reduce their quality of corporate governance and
incentivize managers with pay-for-performance to compete for managerial skills.
The effect of a trade integration on the share of firms that do not invest in corporate
governance at all (θ) depends on the level of sectoral openness:
(i) If there is low trade openness such that sd < s̃ < sx, the share of organizations
with weak governance θ remains unaffected by a reduction of the trade costs.
(ii) If there is high trade openness such that sd < sx < s̃, the share of organizations
with weak governance θ increases when trade costs are reduced.
Proof. See Appendix.
II.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I test the comparative static predictions of the model using
data on entrenchment opportunities and equity compensation in large U.S.
stock companies. The empirical section continues with a brief description of
the data sources and the variable construction, followed by a description of
the estimation strategy and concludes with the discussion of the evidence. I
leave a more detailed discussion about the construction of the dataset for the
Data Appendix A.2.
II.3.1 Data Sources
In order to test how changes in trade openness and skill-biased technological
change over time affect the quality of corporate governance within firms, I
make use of firm level data and match it with information at the industry
level.
II.3.1.1 Firm Level Data
At the firm level, I make use of three different data sources. In order to mea-
sure the quality of corporate governance, I use of the entrenchment index (E-
index) from Bebchuk et al. (2009) which measures the quality of corporate
governance at the firm level across time. The index combines information on
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six governance provisions that capture managerial entrenchment opportuni-
ties: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills,
golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers as well as for
charter amendments. Bebchuk et al. (2009) argue that these six provisions are
the most relevant ones since they play a key role in the relation between cor-
porate governance and firm value. These provisions are also a subset of the
provisions used in the GIM-index by Gompers et al. (2003). Four of the six
provisions limit the voting power of shareholders (staggered boards, limits
to shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers,
supermajority requirements for charter amendments), while the two remain-
ing provisions (poison pills, golden parachutes) are salient measures taken in
preparation for hostile offers. The E-index is a score between 0 to 6, based
on the number of these provisions that a firm provides in a given year. The
captured entrenchment opportunities from weak corporate governance are as-
sociated with adverse effects on the behavior of managers and managerial in-
centives. Information on the six different governance attributes is provided
by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and includes S&P 500
firms and a set of additional firms. Observations span the time period between
1990 and 2006, with information on the E-index for the years 1990, 1993, 1995,
1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006.17
As a second data source, I use information about CEO equity compen-
sation in quoted U.S. corporations that is provided by BoardEx. BoardEx is
a business intelligence service provider that collects remuneration details on
business leaders across the world. I consider the equity-linked compensation
of CEOs in U.S. firms. The BoardEx panel spans the period between 1998 and
2006.18
I match the entrenchment and the equity compensation panels with the
Thomson Worldscope database, the third data source at the firm level. Thom-
son Worldscope provides balance sheet information and the main 4-digit SIC
industry of the companies in the two samples. In particular, Worldscope con-
17The E-index panel data are publicly available on Lucian Bebchuk’s website http://www.
law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml.
18Since BoardEx data are mostly formatted for business client applications, a preparation
of the data for academic purposes was needed before the data could be used for empirical
work. Please see the Data Appendix A.2 for more details on the necessary preparation steps
and underlying assumptions.
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tains annual information on employment, assets, and total investment returns.
II.3.1.2 Industry Level Data
The sectoral information that is used in the empirical analysis is obtained from
three different sources. I use the NBER CES manufacturing industry database
to obtain information on total factor productivity, value added and the con-
sumption of intermediate inputs at the 4-digit SIC industry level.
Additionally, I use the UN Comtrade database to obtain U.S. exports and
imports at the 4-digit SIC level. My sectoral measures of trade openness build
on those two data sources. The main measure ln(openness) is the natural loga-
rithm of the sectoral exports in % of the “effective market size” at the 4-digit
SIC level, where “effective market size” is the gross industry output less im-
ports. Since the measure of trade openness is only relevant and available for
firms in the manufacturing sector, the estimation sample in the trade related
regressions is reduced to all manufacturing firms.
In order to capture skill-biased technological change, I use information on
the contribution of information and communication technology (ICT) to the
growth of industry value added that is available from the EUKLEMS database.
The variable “contribution of ICT” has also been used by Michaels et al. (2014)
to estimate whether ICT has polarized the skill demand of labor. This variable
is based on a growth accounting exercise and is provided for 36 industries at
the 2-digit ISIC Rev. 3 level.
Table A.1 provides summary statistics of all variables in the corporate gov-
ernance and the equity compensation sample.
II.3.2 Estimation Strategy
The theoretical model predicts that large firms respond to increases in trade
openness and skill-biased technological change with weaker corporate gover-
nance. In order to test if the strength of corporate governance becomes weaker
when firms face a larger degree of sectoral openness or technological change,
the econometric model takes the following form:
e f jt = βsjt + x′f jtδ + u f jt. (II.30)
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The outcome of interest e f jt is firm f ’s entrenchment index in industry j at year
t. Larger values for e f jt translate to more provisions for executives, i.e. more
entrenchment opportunities (worse corporate governance). sjt measures trade
openness and the usage of skill-biased technologies at the sectoral level. Ac-
cording to the theory, entrenchment should be a function of the sectoral trade
openness ojt and skill-bias in technologies tjt. I measure ojt as the natural loga-
rithm of industry j’s exports in percent of (gross output - imports) of industry
j: ojt = ln
(
EXjt
GOjt−IMjt · 100%
)
. In order to proxy for technological change that
is skill-biased, I directly obtain tjt from EUKLEMS as the contribution of ICT
to value added growth in % at the sectoral level.19
One potential concern with openness and the contribution of ICT is that
they could be correlated such that the individual impact of each variable can-
not be estimated consistently when the other variable is excluded. Moreover,
including both variables can lead to bad control problems if one variable ex-
plains the other: for instance, ICT investments make industries more produc-
tive which can lead to changes in comparative advantages. I address these
concerns by showing specifications, where I include either both variables, ojt
and tjt or only one of them. Furthermore, I instrument sectoral openness
with a basket of weighted real effective exchange rates, where the weights are
industry-specific. Note that the theoretical model considered intra-industry
trade while the instrument is based on a comparative advantage argument.
However, as Bernard et al. (2007) have shown, heterogeneous firm models
with intra-industry trade can be extended to models with both, comparative
advantages and intra-industry trade, where trade flows are determined by
factor endowments and preferences for variety. The idea of the instrumental
variable is to use the weighted real effective exchange rates of Canada, Mex-
ico, the UK, China and Japan vis-à-vis the rest of the world, where the coun-
try weights are the industry specific shares of exports that go to each of these
countries (their average for the years 1991-1995).20 This instrument is relevant
for sectoral trade openness since it measures the international competitive-
ness of each U.S. industry vis-à-vis its main trade partners. Furthermore, the
19See for instance Autor et al. (1998) and Michaels et al. (2014) on the skill-bias of comput-
erization.
20See the subsection A.1 in the Data Appendix for more details on the construction of the
instrument.
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instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction to the extent that exchange rates
are formed at financial markets. In light of Propositions 6 and 4, I expect
negative effects of openness and ICT on corporate governance quality, thus
β > 0.21 The vector x f jt contains control variables and u f jt is the error term.
In all variants of the model (II.30), the vector x f jt includes firm and year
fix effects. Thus, although a large share of the variation in the entrenchment
index is across firms, the model links variation of entrenchment within firms
as a response to changes in the industry environment over time. This allows
to directly test the implications of Propositions 4 and 6: large firms respond
to trade liberalizations and technological change with more opportunities for
managerial entrenchment. Additionally, the firm fix effect model controls
for endogeneity arising from unobservable time-invariant firm and industry
characteristics that are correlated with the observables. The inclusion of year
fix effects controls for another potential source of endogeneity: unobservable
economy-wide corporate governance shocks that are correlated with the de-
velopment of trade openness and ICT.
To provide further evidence that sector variables are relevant for the man-
agerial labor market and drive managerial incentive compensation, I then es-
timate the same specifications in light of the model (II.30) with CEO equity
compensation w f jt as the dependent variable. Equity compensation w f jt is the
natural logarithm of equity-linked compensation in 1000 USD.
II.3.3 Results
Trade Openness, ICT, and Corporate Governance
Table II.1 reports estimates of model (II.30): within firm level adjustments
of corporate governance as a response to within industry changes in trade
openness and technological change. All standard errors are corrected for het-
eroscedasticity robustness.
Columns (1) to (4) in Table II.1 show the instrumental variable estimation
results that consider the effect of trade openness and ICT contribution on cor-
porate governance according to specification (II.30). The regressors of interest
are ln(openness) which is instrumented by the REER basket and the ICT con-
21Remember that larger values of e f jt correspond to weaker corporate governance.
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tribution in %. Not surprisingly, the real effective exchange rate variable is
positive and significant in the first stage estimations: larger exchange rates
of the trading partners are associated with larger comparative disadvantages
and consequently more imports from the U.S. The first stage Kleibergen-Paap
F-statistics are above 12.00 in all specifications which means that weak in-
strumentation is not a large concern. Column (1) includes openness as the
main explanatory variable. Additional controls are the total factor produc-
tivity at the sector level (4-digit SIC) and firm employment. The inclusion of
the total factor productivity variable controls for omitted variable biases since
openness and ICT could be correlated with factor productivity which itself
might drive firm governance. Employment is included as a measure of firm
size since the theoretical model suggests that larger firms are governed more
weakly.22 The openness regressor is positive and significant at the 5% level.
Column (2) additionally includes the ICT contribution as an explanatory vari-
able. The ICT contribution regressor enters the model with a positive sign at
the 10% significance level. Column (3) then again excludes ICT but uses total
assets and the total investment return as additional controls for firm size and
performance. The reason to include investment returns as additional control
variable is twofold: first, it controls for managerial or total firm performance
and second, the corporate governance literature argues that there is a corre-
lation between corporate governance and stock returns. However, the coeffi-
cient of investment returns remains insignificant in all specifications. Taking
into account the evidence on this correlation and the time period this result is
not surprising: while Gompers et al. (2003) find that an investment strategy
that was based on buying firms with strong shareholder rights and selling
firms with weak shareholder rights earned abnormal returns during 1991 and
1999, Bebchuk et al. (2013) find that this correlation did not persist for the
subsequent period. They explain their findings with the gradual learning of
investors. The preferred model specification is then presented in column (4):
openness and ICT enter the model with significantly positive signs after in-
strumenting openness and controlling for firm size in terms of employment
and assets, investment returns and industry factor productivity. Note that the
22I include employment to control for changes in firm size over time, although the negative
correlation between firm size and corporate governance quality in the theoretical model is
across firms.
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size and significance of the coefficients for openness and ICT remain at a simi-
lar level throughout all IV specifications (1) to (4): the coefficient for openness
varies between 1.022 and 1.185 and is significant at the 10% level; the coef-
ficient for the contribution of ICT is 0.123 and significant at the 5% level in
column (2), respectively 0.112 and significant at the 10% level in column (4).
The estimated coefficients for openness suggest that an increase of the sectoral
openness from its mean (2.47) by the within firms standard deviation (0.38)
increases the entrenchment index in a firm within this sector by between 0.15
and 0.17 points which is about one third of the within firms standard devia-
tion of the entrenchment index (0.50). The coefficients for the contribution of
ICT suggest that an increase of the ICT variable by one within firm standard
deviation (0.69) from its sample mean (0.98) increases the entrenchment index
by between 0.06 and 0.07 points.
Columns (5) to (8) present the evidence based on ordinary least squares es-
timations of the specifications from columns (1) to (4). Trade openness enters
all specifications with a significantly positive sign at the 10% significance level
although the size of the coefficients are much smaller (between 0.0967 and
0.0976). One reason for the smaller ordinary least squares coefficients might
be due to measurement errors in fix effects models. If the openness variable is
a combination of the true signal which is highly correlated over time and an
error component that is serially uncorrelated, the inclusion of firm fix effects
increases the variance of the error component while it decreases the variance
of the signal.23 Also the coefficients of the ICT contribution are much smaller
and remain insignificant in the least squares estimates.
Trade Openness, ICT, and Equity Compensation
Table II.2 provides additional evidence on the effects of trade openness and
ICT on the managerial labor market. The table reports estimates of within
firm level adjustments of CEO equity compensation as a response to within
industry changes in trade openness and technological change. All standard
errors are again corrected for heteroscedasticity robustness. The specifications
are identical to those presented in Table II.1 but now the dependent variable is
23See Angrist and Pischke (2009) for a more detailed discussion on measurement errors and
fix effects.
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the natural logarithm of the CEO’s equity-linked compensation as a measure
of incentive compensation.24 The coefficient for openness in the IV models (1)
to (4) varies between 1.821 and 2.050 and is at the 1% level significantly dif-
ferent from zero. The estimated coefficient of the ICT contribution is equal to
0.481 in column (2) and 0.494 in column (4) and also significant at the 1% level
in both specifications. The first stage coefficients of the real effective exchange
rate basket are a bit larger in the equity compensation models compared to
the corporate governance models (0.0094-0.0098 versus 0.0073-0.0082). The
estimated coefficients for openness suggest that an increase of the sectoral
openness from its mean (1.55)25 by the within firms standard deviation (0.28)
raises the CEO equity compensation from its mean by between 36 and 41 per-
cent. The estimates for the ICT contribution variable in the IV models suggest
that an increase of the ICT contribution by one within firm standard deviation
(0.68) from its sample mean (0.75) increases the CEO equity compensation
from its mean by between 36 and 37 percent.
The evidence based on ordinary least squares estimations is again pre-
sented in columns (5) to (8). In the OLS estimations the coefficients for open-
ness are again much smaller and not significantly different from zero. The
coefficients for the ICT contribution are only a bit smaller compared to the IV
coefficients (0.237-0.252 versus 0.481-0.494) and significant at the 1% level.
II.4 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes how corporate governance decisions within firms are af-
fected by real economic outcomes. I integrate a stylized model of performance
pay and corporate governance investments into a general equilibrium model
with heterogeneous skills and technologies to study the relation between cor-
porate governance, trade and technological change. Since technologies and
skills are complementary in terms of productivity, a positive assortative as-
signment of skills to technologies arises in equilibrium. The most productive
24An advantage of equity-linked compensation as measure of performance payments is its
direct link to the firm value. However, using equity-linked compensation underestimates
pay-for-performance since it excludes direct bonus remuneration.
25Since the equity panel includes a similar but yet different set of firms and the years 1998-
2006 instead of 1990-2006, the sample means and standard deviations differ compared to the
corporate governance panel. See Table A.1 for summary statistics.
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firms endogenously choose an organization where governance is weak and
managers can extract rents because investments into stronger corporate gov-
ernance become inefficient incentive mechanisms when firm owners are con-
straint to pay high wages by the managerial labor market.
The model provides an explanation of a puzzle in the development of CEO
compensation: while incentive compensation has become more and more promi-
nent over time, incentive provision via better control inside the firm has fallen
behind. This pattern can be explained by changes in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment of firms through globalization or technological change. Trade liber-
alizations and skill-biased technological change toughen the competition for
managerial talent and thereby induce firms to allow for more managerial en-
trenchment on average.
I test these predictions with data on managerial entrenchment opportuni-
ties and equity compensation in a panel of large quoted U.S. companies and
find positive effects of sectoral openness and the contribution of ICT to indus-
try growth on managerial entrenchment in firms and equity-linked compen-
sation of managers.
CHAPTER III
Organizations as Competitive Advantage
III.1 Introduction
Little is known about the effect of organizational choices on the international
competitiveness of firms within their markets. This chapter links the organi-
zation of firms to their export activity using representative firm level data for
the European manufacturing sector. Two important margins of organizational
adjustment are offshoring and decentralization of decision making. Firms that
reorganize production internationally and offshore part of the production to
other countries can reduce their costs and compete on prices. Firms with a
more decentralized hierarchy can empower their knowledge workers to sug-
gest new ideas and compete on product quality.
During the last decade, much of the literature on international trade has
centered around the heterogeneity of firm export activities.1 More productive
firms are more likely to enter export markets, obtain more sales from exports,
export more products and sell higher quality goods.2
This chapter is joint work with Dalia Marin and Jan Tscheke. We have benefited from the
access to the EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit database, managed by Bruegel and funded by the
EU 7th Framework Programme ([FP7/2007-2013] under grant agreement no. 225551), as well
as by UniCredit.
1See Bernard et al. (2012) for a literature review.
2Melitz (2003); Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) show that firms with lower production costs
are more likely to become exporters and sell more on international markets. Bernard et al.
50
CHAPTER III. ORGANIZATIONS AS COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 51
Furthermore, the increasing availability of firm level data during recent
years has pushed research in organizational economics to new empirical grounds.
This allowed for a linkage between differences in organizational choices and
firm productivity.3
This chapter aims at the largely untapped overlap between these two strands
of the literature, linking the organization of firms to their export activity. This
allows us to shift the focus away from exogenously given productivity dis-
tributions towards actual firm level decisions that determine the competitive
position of firms within international markets. Naturally, it is important for
policy makers to understand the specific channels linking firm decisions to
international competitiveness.
We provide firm level evidence on the role of firm organization on inter-
national competitiveness based on representative data of nearly 15,000 Euro-
pean manufacturing plants with detailed information about their exporting
and organizational behavior.4 We show that both, offshoring and decentral-
ized management, are important determinants of firm competitiveness and
thus relevant for European policy makers.
We motivate our empirical analysis with a stylized theoretical framework
that links organizational decisions to market shares and the product quality
that firms offer. Firm success in foreign markets is based on two determinants:
production costs and product quality. We propose two channels of adjust-
ment for these determinants that have been widely discussed in the literature.
First, firms in our model can import intermediates inputs which reduces their
production costs. Second, firms may switch towards a more decentralized
hierarchy where strategic decisions are made at lower levels of the hierar-
chy. Decentralizing decision rights empowers knowledge workers and raises
their creative efforts. Flatter chains of command thus promote creativity and
incentivize the creation and implementation of new ideas, which ultimately
translates into higher quality competitiveness.
(2011), Eckel and Neary (2010) and Nocke and Yeaple (2008) show that lower production
costs increase the scope of exported products. Hottman et al. (2014) provide evidence on the
quality channel in export sales.
3See Bloom et al. (2010b) for a literature review.
4Our data span information from manufacturing plants in 7 European countries (Austria,
France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, UK) and are representative for the manufacturing
sectors in each of those countries.
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Based on the model, we test the following predictions: First, offshoring
and better product quality increase the competitive position of a firm within
its specific market. Second, decentralization of decision authority leads to
improvements in product quality. And third, the effect of decentralization on
quality is particularly strong if the conflict of interest within firms is large.
In order to measure competitiveness, we link our data to balance sheet in-
formation and trade flows at the industry level to construct the actual market
share of each individual firm in its specific world market. Our data reveal that
firms which import a larger share of their intermediates also capture a larger
market share on export markets. We exploit variation in wages paid by inter-
mediate good producers in typical sourcing regions and variation in the skill
intensity of input production across different output industries in Europe to
identify how offshoring affects export competitiveness. After controlling for
firm size, labor productivity, product quality, sector and regional fix effects,
we find that an exporter importing 30% of its inputs (the average import in-
tensity in our sample) has a market share in global markets about three times
as high as an exporter that sources purely domestically.
We then analyze how more decentralized chains of command can help
firms to become more competitive. Our results suggest that the probability
of outperforming the national competition in terms of quality is on average
about 70 percentage points higher for non-family firms with a decentralized
organization than for their centralized competitors. Similar results hold for
the probability of product innovations. In order to identify the effects of de-
centralized management on product quality, we exploit regional variation in
religious beliefs and trust across Europe.
This chapter relates to several literatures. First, we establish an empirical
relationship between the international sourcing of intermediates and the com-
petitive position of European firms in world markets. This relates our work to
the literature on offshoring, plant productivity and exporting. The changing
nature of world trade flows from trade in final goods towards vertical special-
ization and trade in intermediate goods has been documented by Hummels
et al. (2001) and Hanson et al. (2005).
Previous empirical studies by Halpern et al. (2011) and Amiti and Kon-
ings (2007) have identified a link between intermediate imports and firm level
productivity. Our theoretical framework borrows from Grossman and Rossi-
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Hansberg (2008) who show theoretically that offshoring can increase firm pro-
ductivity as it gives firms the opportunity to exploit differences in factor costs
across borders. Antràs et al. (2006) show theoretically that offshoring increases
firm productivity as globalization improves the matching opportunities for
knowledge workers in industrialized countries.
Additionally, various theoretical and empirical studies have investigated
the link between offshoring and exporting. Kleinert and Zorell (2012) ana-
lyze the export-magnification effect of offshoring in an extended Melitz (2003)
framework. Empirically, Bas (2012) finds that reductions in input tariffs also
increase the probability of exporting for Argentinean firms. Kasahara and
Lapham (2013) structurally estimate the relationship between importing and
exporting using Chilean plant-level data and find that importing intermedi-
ates increases the probability of exporting.
We add to this literature with a link between intermediate imports and an
actual measure of firm export competitiveness. Our empirical findings sug-
gest that better importing opportunities lead to reallocations of market shares
towards offshoring firms.
Second, we show that decentralized management improves product qual-
ity. Thus, we relate to the literature that analyzes the productivity effects of
firm organization. Several empirical papers on management practices have
established a connection between the quality of management and total fac-
tor productivity differences between firms (see e.g. Bloom and Van Reenen
(2007); Bloom et al. (2012) and Bloom et al. (2014) for a survey). Furthermore,
Marin and Verdier (2008a) show theoretically that heterogeneity in the organi-
zation of decision making gives rise to firm heterogeneity. Marin et al. (2015)
show that offshoring affects the organization of firms and their productivity.
Acemoglu et al. (2007) find that firms who compete in innovations are more
likely to decentralize.
Third, we argue that product quality and innovativeness are important de-
terminants for firm competitiveness. Related papers are Hallak and Sivadasan
(2013) and Antoniades (2012) who develop models of international trade with
firm heterogeneity in product quality and find that exporters sell higher qual-
ity products. Hottman et al. (2014) estimate a structural model of heteroge-
neous multiproduct firms and find that variation in quality and product scope
explain the majority of variation in firm sales. Eckel et al. (2011) construct
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a model of endogenous quality choices in multiproduct firms and find that
firms in differentiated sectors compete more on quality. Our work builds on
their insights but we argue that firms can compete on quality by choosing a
decentralized organization.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section III.2 intro-
duces the theoretical framework. Section III.3 describes our data sources. The
empirical modeling strategy and estimation results are presented in section
III.4. Section III.5 concludes.
III.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a simple theoretical framework that links the orga-
nization of the firm to its export competitiveness. Firms have two options to
adjust their organization to meet competitive pressures. First, firms can off-
shore part of their production to low cost countries and reduce costs which
increases their price competitiveness. Second, firms can reorganize towards
more decentralized hierarchies and empower knowledge workers.5 The em-
powerment of knowledge workers stimulates new ideas which increases the
quality competitiveness of firms. We use this framework to formulate testable
predictions about the competitive advantages of offshoring and decentralized
organizations. Since our analysis is focused on the relationship between off-
shoring, headquarter organization and export competitiveness, we make a
number of simplifying assumptions. First, we condition our theoretical anal-
ysis on exporting firms in a partial equilibrium and do not explicitly model
entry and exit into markets. Furthermore, our model treats export destina-
tions as a single market and all firms are considered single-product.
III.2.1 Demand
Consider a firm i in sector s that supplies its product to destination market
k. Consumers in each market have a Cobb-Douglas upper-tier utility function
that nests CES sub utility functions for different sectors s. The elasticity of
5In our data, firms are decentralized when managers can take autonomous decisions and
are centralized when the CEO/owner takes most decisions. In line with the theoretical mech-
anisms we have in mind, we will sometimes refer to the manager as the knowledge worker or
the agent, and to the CEO/owner as the principal.
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substitution across different varieties within each sector is σ > 1.6 Firm i faces
the following demand for its product in market k:
xksi =
(
qi
pi
)σ
IksPσ−1ks , (III.1)
where xksi is the quantity demanded in market k, qi is a firm specific quality
parameter and pi is the firm’s price. The parameter Pks is a quality weighted
sectoral price index and Iks the income share spent on sector s in destination
k. The quality weighted price index is given by Pks ≡
[´
ω q
σ
ω p
1−σ
kω
]1/(1−σ)
and
is an inverse measure of the degree of competition in market k and sector s.
Each firm’s competitive position in the market is its market share that can
be expressed as follows:
Mksi ≡
xksi pksi
Iks
∈ [0, 1]. (III.2)
We directly observe Mksi for different markets in our data and will now link
it to organizational decisions to formulate testable predictions. In the light of
the cost and quality channel that we propose, we can rewrite the market share
as a function of marginal costs and quality alone:
Mksi =
qσi c
1−σ
i
Kks
, (III.3)
where Kks measures the total amount of cost weighted quality in the market,
and is defined by:
Kks ≡
ˆ
Ωks
qσi c
1−σ
i di. (III.4)
It is easy to see from equation (III.3) that the market share is strictly increasing
in quality and decreasing in marginal costs. In the following two sections we
are going demonstrate how marginal costs and quality at the firm level are
determined.
6The sub utility functions in destination k are of the form uks =
[´
Ωks
qix
σ−1
σ
i di
] σ
σ−1
, where
Ωks is the set of varieties in sector s and market k.
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III.2.2 Production and Trade in Tasks
We follow Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) in modeling the firm’s de-
cision to offshore production tasks to low cost countries. The production of
one unit of output requires a continuum of intermediate tasks of measure 1
that we index by the difficulty to conduct them abroad γ ∈ [0, 1]. The firm
can perform each task in the production process either at home or import it
from abroad (i.e. offshore the task). Tasks with a relatively high index value γ
have higher cost requirements when they are offshored relative to tasks with
a lower index γ. This is captured by the function t (γ) that is assumed to be
increasing and continuously differentiable.
The cost level in sector s of firm i’s home country is given by Cs. This
determines the marginal cost of a non-importing firm in sector s. Additionally,
we suppose that there is an offshoring destination where the cost index is
C∗s < Cs. The offshoring potential of firm i is determined by its offshoring
technology θi > 0. The lower θi, the easier a firm can offshore production tasks
abroad. When the task with index value γ is offshored abroad, it increases
production costs by a factor θit (γ), where t′(γ) > 0. This implies that it is
more costly to offshore difficult tasks. The unit production costs of firm i are
then given by:
ci = Cs (1−Oi) + C∗s
ˆ Oi
0
θit (γ) dγ. (III.5)
It is profitable to offshore task γ if and only if there is a cost advantage
when the task is conducted offshore, i.e. if Cs > θit (γ)C∗s . Tasks with an index
γ ∈ [0, Oi] are offshored while the other tasks are conducted at home. Here, Oi
is the marginal task where the firm is indifferent between offshoring the task
or not, hence it solves Cs = θit (Oi)C∗s . We can rewrite the unit production
cost of firm i as:
ci =
Cs
Bi
, (III.6)
where the use of imported intermediates leads to a cost-reduction factor that
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captures the firm-specific productivity gains from offshoring tasks abroad:7
Bi ≡ Bi(Oi) = 1−Oi +
´ Oi
0 t (γ) dγ
t (Oi)
≥ 1. (III.7)
This cost-reduction factor increases in the share of tasks offshored Oi and be-
cause the market share is decreasing in marginal costs, firm competitiveness
is strictly increasing in offshoring.
III.2.3 Decentralization, Ideas and Product Quality
We now endogenize the firm-specific product quality and link it to the orga-
nization of decision rights within the firm’s headquarter. Firms innovate to
improve their quality and the process of innovation is modeled in two stages.
In the first stage knowledge workers invest into the creation of quality en-
hancing innovations. In the second stage promising ideas are implemented.
We assume that the principal/CEO decides who implements the innovation
before the agent starts looking for new ideas.8 We call firms decentralized when
the knowledge workers are responsible for the implementation of ideas. Sim-
ilarly, centralized firms are the ones where the CEO decides about the imple-
mentation of ideas.
Because the principal chooses ex-ante who will be responsible for the im-
plementation if an idea is found, we implicitly assume that the authority over
the implementation choice is ex-ante contractible. Furthermore, in order to
abstract from any aspect regarding performance payment, we assume that
knowledge workers are infinitely risk averse with respect to income and re-
ceive a fix wage r to satisfy their participation constraint.
Before the principal makes his choice of organization, he observes a firm
specific signal φi > 1 about the value of potential ideas.9 If an idea is found in
the first stage and successfully implemented in the second stage, it increases
the quality of the firm by the factor φi. If no innovation occurs, product quality
remains at its basic level which is denoted by Ei.
7We borrow the expression of the cost-reduction factor from Marin et al. (2015).
8Inderst (2009) considers a similar stylized model of the firm to analyze how incentive
contracts affect the organization.
9e.g. by market research.
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Knowledge workers search for ideas with effort e and face a personal cost
of effort g (e) = g2 e
2 with a sufficiently large g such that there is an interior
solution for e ∈ (0, 1), the probability of finding an idea.
The principal faces a trade-off between higher agent initiative and the cost-
efficient production. We assume that knowledge workers only care about how
an idea is implemented and whenever an idea is implemented in their pre-
ferred manner, they obtain private benefits b. We model the conflict of interest
between principal and agent by simply assuming that, with probability 1− δi,
the knowledge worker prefers to implement the idea in a way that leads to an
increase of production costs by the factor ϕi > 1. With probability δi there is
no conflict of interest. The optimal allocation of decision authority can easily
be found by solving the model backwards.
Decentralization
Suppose that knowledge workers have found an idea such that the firm’s
product quality is qi = φiEi. Since the implementation choice was delegated
to the knowledge workers, they will choose to implement the idea in their pre-
ferred way and receive the private benefits b. The CEO thus expects the fol-
lowing payoff after an idea is found: δiπ (ci, φiEi) + (1− δi)π (ϕici, φiEi)− r.
Next, consider the knowledge workers’ incentives to search for an idea
during the previous period. They find an idea with probability ed and then
always receive the private benefits b on top of the fix wage r. If knowledge
workers do not find an idea they only receive the fixed wage. Optimizing ex-
pected outcomes leads to the optimal search effort ed = b/g for decentralized
firms.
Given the search effort ed, the principal of a decentralized firm expects the
following ex-ante payoff:
ed [δiπ (ci, φiEi) + (1− δi)π (ϕici, φiEi)] + (1− ed)π (ci, Ei)− r. (III.8)
Centralization
Next, consider the case when the CEO decides to control the implementa-
tion of the idea himself. Suppose the knowledge workers have found an
idea. Since the principal may now choose how the idea is implemented, he
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will always choose the low cost implementation and payoffs are given by
π (ci, φiEi)− r.
Note that the agents now have less incentives to search for an idea since the
principal may ex-post choose to implement the idea in a way that is not in the
agents’ interest. Their optimal effort choice is now given by ec = (δib) /g =
δied.
Given the search efforts ec, the CEO of a centralized firm expects the fol-
lowing ex-ante payoff:
δiedπ (ci, φiEi) + (1− δied)π (ci, Ei)− r. (III.9)
Choice of Decision Authority
We can now state a condition under which the CEO prefers a decentralized
organization in order to foster the initiative of knowledge workers. We simply
compare the payoffs under both forms of organization, i.e. (III.8) and (III.9).
After plugging in the effort levels ed = b/g and ec = (δib) /g and rearranging
terms, the condition for decentralization simplifies to a direct comparison of
profit levels. Firms are decentralized if
π (ϕici, φiEi) > π (ci, Ei) . (III.10)
Given the residual demand function (III.1) and the constant markup pric-
ing rule, a firm chooses to decentralize if φσi > ϕ
σ−1
i .
III.2.4 Firm Organization and Competitiveness
We are now in a position where we can relate the firm’s organizational choices
to the market share. The expression for the market share (III.3) can be rewrit-
ten as:
Mksi =
Eσi c
1−σ
i
Kks
ηi(Di), (III.11)
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where the function ηi (Di) captures the cost and quality effect of the chosen
level of hierarchy on the market share:
ηi =

[
1 + ed
(
δiφ
σ
i + (1− δi) φσi ϕ
1−σ
i − 1
)]
i f Di = decentralized[
1 + δied
(
φσi − 1
)]
i f Di = centralized.
Equation (III.11) shows that the market share resembles the competitive posi-
tion of firm i as a function of cost, quality and the decentralization decision.
Here, ci resembles the marginal cost level after offshoring, but before taking
account of the cost-increasing potential of a decentralized management. Ei is
the firm specific quality level before taking account of the quality-enhancing
effect of a decentralized management. We summarize the model description
with the following results:
Prediction 1: The effect of offshoring on market shares is strictly positive.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that ηi(d) > ηi(c) ⇐⇒ φσi >
ϕσ−1i . Thus, whether a reorganization of the internal hierarchy leads to an
increase or a decrease of the market share depends on the optimality of the
organizational decision. If the value of innovations φi outweighs potential
cost inefficiencies ϕi, then decentralization leads to higher competitiveness,
but only then.
Prediction 2: The effect of decentralization or centralization on the market share
is a priori ambiguous.
Comparing the optimal effort level under centralization and decentraliza-
tion, we obtain ed = bg > ec =
δib
g for the probability of innovation. Note that
the actual impact of decentralization on innovativeness depends on δi. Re-
member that δi is the probability of agent and principal preferring the same
implementation strategy. The incentivizing effect of decentralization is zero
if there is no conflict of interest to begin with, because then the knowledge
worker will always obtain his private benefit, irrespective of decision author-
ity.
Prediction 3a: The effect of decentralization on quality and innovation is posi-
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tive.
Prediction 3b: The effect of decentralization on quality and innovation is dimin-
ishing in the congruence of interests between CEO and knowledge workers.
In the empirical section, we will analyze how the discussed organizational
choices affect the observed market shares Mksi and observed product quality
using information from our firm sample. Furthermore, we analyze whether
decentralization is associated with innovativeness and quality qi at the firm
level. We also check if the size of the effect depends on the conflict of interest
within firms.
III.3 Data
In the following section we describe our data sources and the construction of
key variables. We refer to the Appendix B for a more detailed description of
the variable construction. Our firm level data stem from two main sources: the
EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit (EFIGE) survey and Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus
database.
III.3.1 Data Sources
The EFIGE survey dataset is at the core of our analysis. Coordinated by the
European think tank Bruegel and supported by the Directorate General Re-
search of the European Commission it is the first pan-European firm level
data that combines information on firms’ international activities with detailed
information on organizational characteristics. The data consist of a represen-
tative sample of almost 15,000 surveyed firms with more than 10 employees in
seven European economies: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom,
Austria and Hungary.10 Consequently, the representative nature of the survey
sample allows us to make statements that are representative for the manufac-
turing sector in major European economies. The data were collected in 2010
and cover the years from 2007 to 2009. However, most information is collected
10The data are representative in terms of the firm size distribution at the country level for
the manufacturing industry.
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as a cross-section for the year 2008. The collection of information has been per-
formed through a survey carried out by a professional contractor that is the
fourth largest market research company in the world. See Altomonte et al.
(2012) for more details on the survey method.
We match the firms in the EFIGE dataset with Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus
database. The match with Amadeus gives us two important types of informa-
tion. First, we obtain detailed balance sheet data and second, we use infor-
mation on the set of relevant industries at the 4-digit US SIC level where the
firms are active in.
Finally, we use the UN Comtrade data. Comtrade measures trade flows at
the industry level which we can use to construct the firm specific export world
market size within the industries where each firm is active in. Given the ex-
port information from the EFIGE survey, turnover data from Amadeus and
the size of the world export market from Comtrade, we can construct firm
specific export world market shares for each firm in the sample. We use these
market shares to measure the competitive position of each firm within its re-
spective market. We relate it to the firms’ intensities of global sourcing to test
how importing cheap intermediates can improve the international competi-
tiveness of a firm.
Furthermore, EFIGE provides information on the innovation activity and
product quality that firms offer. We link this information to the internal orga-
nization of decision making in firm headquarters to estimate if decentralized
management improves the firms’ product quality.
III.3.2 Construction of Key Variables
Export Market Share
We propose the export market share as a natural measure of export compet-
itiveness. If firms want to stay ahead of their competitors in global markets,
it is not sufficient to look at their export sales alone. What matters is how
much they export relative to their peers. When constructing the market share,
the difficulty is to get the peers right. Specifically, we want to account for the
fact that many firms are active in more than one industry. Thus, we define
the export market share as the ratio of total firm exports relative to all exports
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available to the world in the firm specific set of industries.
We use detailed industry information from Amadeus in order to assess
the specific industry mix of each individual firm. While the average firm in
our sample is active in about three distinct 4-digit US SIC industries, some
firms provide up to 44 different industry codes. Because supposedly not all
industries are equally important to the firm, we need to make assumptions
about the relative importance of each industry. Here we use information from
Amadeus and EFIGE for guidance. Amadeus divides the set of industries
into primary and secondary industries. In the EFIGE survey, firms were asked
about the percentage of turnover that their core business/product represented
in the year 2008. Relating primary industries to the core area of business, we
use this percentage share in order to weight primary industries and secondary
industries differently. Thus, primary industries are weighted with the share
of turnover attributed to the core business, while secondary industries are
weighted with the remainder. Within the primary and secondary category,
industries are equally weighted.
The peer exports to the world are constructed by applying this firm spe-
cific weighting scheme to total industry exports for an individual firm’s set of
industries. Total exports by industry are obtained from UN Comtrade WITS
by summing up industry imports of all countries, excluding the firm’s home
country. For the numerator, we use survey information on the percentage of
annual turnover exported in 2008 and multiply that by turnover information
obtained from Amadeus.11
Offshoring
The theoretical mechanism we presented in section III.2 is very simple. Firms
become more productive by sourcing cheaper inputs from abroad. We stick to
these simplicity in the empirical section by assuming that offshoring is simply
the share of intermediates purchased from abroad. This also implies that we
do not care whether imported inputs origin from within or outside the bound-
aries of the firm. To be specific, our measure of offshoring is the response of
firms to the following question in the EFIGE survey: What percentage of the total
purchased intermediate goods (from anywhere) did the intermediate goods purchased
11In the appendix we present the construction of the export market share in more detail.
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from abroad represent?
Decentralization
With respect to the organization of internal hierarchies, we use the follow-
ing survey question in order to determine whether a firm is decentralized
or not: With reference to strategic decisions which of the following statements bet-
ter describe your firm situation? Firms are considered centralized when they
choose centralized: the CEO/owner takes most decisions in every area. Firms that
choose decentralized: managers can take autonomous decisions in some business ar-
eas are considered to be decentralized. In our stylized model the CEO/owner
was represented by the principal while managers were represented by the
agents/knowledge workers. As we believe that the implications of our model
easily transcend into more general settings, we are not worried with the slightly
imperfect matching between managers and knowledge workers.
Product Quality and Innovations
Our theoretical model proposes a one to one matching between innovation
and quality. Whenever decentralization leads to innovation, product quality
increases. In the empirical section we discard with this simplification and try
to assess the effect of decentralization on both characteristics separately. For
quality, we use a subjective measure from the EFIGE survey. Firms were asked
to think of the product category your main product belongs to. If we rank the maxi-
mum quality available in the market for this product equal to 100, how would you rate
the quality of your own product?. Because this measure is prone to cultural noise,
we normalize the survey measure at the country level. For innovation, we use
a dummy equal to one when firms carried out any product innovation in years
2007- 2009. Alternatively, we use the same dummy for process innovations.
III.4 Estimation
Our theoretical model predicts that the export market share of firms is a func-
tion of the firm specific cost and quality level, relative to the average costs and
quality in the market. In the theoretical framework, we mapped quality and
costs to specific organizational decisions to see how organizations determine
CHAPTER III. ORGANIZATIONS AS COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 65
firm competitiveness. The empirical setup is thereby guided by two insights
from our theoretical framework. First, offshoring reduces costs and thereby
unambiguously increases market shares. Second, decentralization triggers a
trade-off between higher costs and higher quality. Thus, the relationship be-
tween market shares and decentralization is ambiguous. Quality itself is the
factor that we expect to have an unambiguously positive effect on compet-
itiveness and we expect that decentralized management improves product
quality. This gives rise to two empirical models that we will subsequently
introduce in more detail.
III.4.1 Offshoring and Market Shares
In this part of the empirical analysis we provide evidence supporting a link
between offshoring and export market shares. The core empirical specification
looks as follows:
mKsi = α + β1off i + β2quali + β3deci + β4Fi + β5XKs + εKsi. (III.12)
Our empirical specification closely resembles the theoretical determinants
of the market share. The dependent variable mKsi is our empirical measure
of firm i’s export market share in industry s and destination K. The key vari-
able of interest in the empirical model (III.12) is the offshoring intensity off i
at the firm level. We proxy off i by the ratio of intermediates purchased from
abroad relative to all intermediates purchased within each firm i. The theo-
retical model also predicts export market shares to increase with the degree
of product quality quali that a firm offers. Our measure of product quality
is a subjective survey question that ranks the product quality of each firm
i relative to its competitors. As cultural influences usually play an impor-
tant role in these subjective evaluations, we normalize the measure of product
quality at the country level and only employ the variation in quality within
the firms’ home countries (i.e. within each country the mean is 0 and the
standard deviation is 1). Furthermore, we replace our quality measure with
product innovation in the robustness section. The evaluation of product qual-
ity from the firm perspective might introduce measurement error since we
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are originally interested in the quality perceived by consumers. Due to the
lack of a proper instrument, we will treat quality as a control variable rather
than a variable of interest. deci is a dummy that indicates if managers can au-
tonomously take strategic decisions in some business areas. This dummy is
supposed to capture the potential costs and benefits of a decentralized orga-
nization as described in our theoretical framework by the term ηi(Di). The
vector Fi contains additional firm level controls such as firm size and pro-
ductivity in order to account for remaining firm heterogeneity. Finally, XKs
includes a set of fixed effects at the country, region or sector level to capture
different market conditions. We will consider destination K to be simply the
world market.12 The variable εKsi is the error term.
We will first show our baseline results from ordinary least squares esti-
mates. Then we proceed by addressing potential biases from endogeneity.
Our identification strategy is based on measures of comparative advantage
and cost saving potentials of offshoring at the industry level that we will use
to instrument for offshoring at the firm level.
III.4.1.1 Baseline Results
Table III.1 shows the ordinary least squares estimates of the empirical model
(III.12). Column (1) gives a first impression of the link between offshoring
and the export market share of a firm: we ignore the set of firm controls and
regress the market share on offshoring, normalized quality and fixed effects
only. Both, offshoring and quality appear to be positively correlated with the
market share and are highly significant.
The empirical literature on firm heterogeneity in trade has established strong
connections between various firm characteristics: importing firms export more
frequently, but also tend to be larger and more productive on average (see
Bernard et al. (2012) for an empirical overview or Melitz (2003) for a theoret-
12Given that we consider the world market as destination, the only way to control for desti-
nation fixed effects is by accounting for the fact that the world market is different for German
firms than it is for French firms. We therefore include shipping country fixed effects rather than
destination effects in most specifications. Note that this also controls for all other unobserved
differences between the countries in our sample. We use the 11 NACE Clio sectors provided
in EFIGE to control for sector conditions because our instrumental strategy does not allow for
finer sectoral controls. The results in Table III.1 are robust to the inclusion of 3digit-industry
controls (US SIC).
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ical framework that shows how in principal all those factors might be driven
by a single factor). In principle then, it might be size or productivity rather
than imports driving the export competitiveness of firms. In specification (2),
we therefore control for size and productivity, using log employment and log
labor productivity, in order to account for the most obvious factors that might
confound our results.13 Our coefficient of interest remains statistically signif-
icant at the 5% level but diminishes to less than half of its original size. This
indicates that the size of the measured effect in specification (1) was driven to
a considerable extent by the failure to account for unobserved heterogeneity
across firms. As expected, controlling for productivity and size increases the
explanatory power of the model considerably, raising the adjusted R2 from
0.011 to 0.073.
Column (3) includes decentralized management as a further control. As
suggested by our simple theory and the literature on firm organization, the
type of decision making within a firm can have a big impact on firm perfor-
mance (see Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Bloom et al. (2012)). However, accord-
ing to our theory, the optimal organization of firms depends on the relative im-
portance of quality and costs such that a priori we would not expect a specific
sign for the coefficient on decentralization. Still, we should expect the dummy
variable to control for firm specific cost and quality opportunities that are not
captured by the measures of offshoring or the subjective quality, respectively.
Effectively though, the inclusion of decentralization does not alter our results
by much and the coefficient remains statistically insignificant.
Column (4) replaces the country dummies with finer regional controls at
the NUTS-1 level.14 Regional controls can be important as they help to absorb
omitted factors at the regional level that are related to market access costs. For
example, regions at the border might be especially prone to offshoring as well
as exporting. Other differences between regions, such as the degree of indus-
trialization, income or local institutions could also be important determinants
of export performance at the firm level and should be controlled for. Table
III.1 shows that our results are robust to these regional controls.
13Our estimation results are robust to using total factor productivity in most specifications,
though the number of observations is significantly higher for labor productivity.
14The specification is also robust to region fix effects at the even more disaggregated NUTS-
2 level. We obtain the NUTS-region for each firm by combining the regional information
provided in EFIGE together with zip codes from Amadeus.
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Note though, that regional fixed effects do not control for unobservable
regional effects when the effects are specific to certain industries. In order to
control for this type of unobserved covariance, we interact region and indus-
try controls in column (5). The offshoring coefficient increases slightly.
Column (6) tries to address potential bad control problems.15 In our case,
offshoring is itself a candidate variable to explain labor productivity (the value
added per employee). As we measure value added as turnover net of the
value of intermediates purchased, the ratio of intermediates obtained as cheap
imports clearly will have a direct impact on labor productivity. Once we con-
trol for labor productivity, our coefficient of interest supposedly measures the
effect of offshoring on market shares conditional on a specific level of labor pro-
ductivity. But as the level of labor productivity itself changes with offshoring,
this potentially introduces a sort of selection bias into the model. Therefore we
reestimate the model without the inclusion of labor productivity. The qualita-
tive results remain robust and the coefficient on offshoring changes only little.
Nevertheless, we prefer to keep labor productivity as a control in our model as
we assume that endogeneity from omitted variables outweighs endogeneity
from bad controls.
Including both exporters and non-exporters in our sample raises one fur-
ther concern, namely that the correlation we measure is driven solely by the
export status. Thus, given entry into exporting, offshoring might not have an
impact on export performance at all. To rule that out, columns (7) and (8) re-
peat specifications (3) and (5) respectively, but only include exporters. This
reduces the sample size considerably and much of the precision of our esti-
mates is lost. Note though, that the coefficient on offshoring is still positive
and significantly different from zero at the 10 and 5 percent level respectively.
The magnitude of the effect slightly increases.
III.4.1.2 Instrumenting for Offshoring
The specifications of our empirical model are subject to different potential en-
dogeneity problems. One problem could be omitted variable bias from un-
observable firm characteristics that are correlated with both international ac-
tivities, offshoring and exporting. Presumably, the inclusion of size and pro-
15See Angrist and Pischke (2009), p.64 ff for a detailed presentation of the problem.
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ductivity as control variables does not fully account for all dimensions of firm
heterogeneity. Furthermore, reversed causality arises if exporting itself has a
positive impact on the firm’s propensity to engage in offshoring leading to an
upward bias of the offshoring coefficient. While empirical evidence for this
channel is rare, the broader body of literature on international trade deliv-
ers reasons to be aware of the possibility. One argument that raises concerns
about reversed causality is the learning-by-exporting hypothesis.16 If export-
ing has a positive effect on the productivity of firms, this might very well help
exporters to overcome possible fix costs of importing. A related argument
could also be derived from the literature of network economics in trade. Ex-
porters may have an advantage to find suppliers in a foreign market simply
because they already possess valuable contacts to local business networks.17
Finally, some of our explanatory variables could be measured with error. Clas-
sical measurement error would bias our coefficients towards zero.18
We try to respond to these concerns by employing different instrumental
variables. The underlying estimation strategy is to use variation in the com-
parative advantage or the cost saving potential at the input industry level in
order to instrument for offshoring at the firm level in the output industry. In
our main specifications, we use two different instruments for offshoring: The
low-skilled labor intensity at the input industry and input industry specific
wages in Eastern Europe.
The low-skill intensity of intermediate production is the share of low-skilled
labor that is used at the input industry level (low-skilled labor compensa-
tion in total labor compensation). The measure is obtained from the WIOD
database and measures the skill intensity in input industries.19 On the one
hand, the low-skilled labor intensity resembles an endowment-type compar-
ative advantage argument. Assuming that the endowment with skills is rel-
16See De Loecker (2007, 2013) for empirical evidence.
17See Chaney (2014) on the effects of international social networks on exports.
18Note that measurement error in the market share is less of a problem in terms of consis-
tency, as long as the error is uncorrelated with any of the explanatory variables. Since our
construction of the dependent variable allows for multiple sources of measurement error, we
will show results for alternative measures of openness in the robustness section of this chap-
ter.
19We make use of the February 2012 release of the WIOD database. For each industry, we
use the midpoint between the German and the Austrian value. Our instrumental strategy is
robust to using the country specific values as well as values for Eastern European countries
instead of the German Austrian midpoint (unreported).
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atively high for the countries in our data, traditional Heckscher-Ohlin type
arguments would suggest low-skilled labor intensive intermediates to be im-
ported more frequently. On the other hand, the instrument might also proxy
the complexity of intermediates. This notion of complexity relates the skill
intensity at the task level to the offshoring costs t (γ) and θi in our theoretical
model and we would expect less complex intermediates to be offshored more
frequently.
Our second instrument are the input industry specific wages in Eastern
Europe. These input wages are supposed to capture the cost saving potential
from offshoring. The instrument relates to the cost index C∗s in the offshoring
regions in our model.
We expect a positive correlation between the offshoring intensity at the
firm level and the low-skill intensity of the input industries and a negative cor-
relation between the input industry wages in Eastern Europe and offshoring.
We weight input industries according to input coefficients from the OECD
STAN data to determine the relevant input industries for each industry where
the firm is active in.20 Again, we use information from Amadeus to determine
the firms’ relevant primary and secondary industries. Weighting of the indus-
tries of activity applies as for the market shares. For each of those industries,
we then determine the share of inputs provided by any other industry from
the input-output table. Finally, we use these shares in order to construct our
instruments as a weighted average of input industry level information.
In order for our instruments to be valid, they need to satisfy the exclusion
restriction. For this purpose, they need to be conditionally uncorrelated with
the export market shares of firms and other unobserved firm characteristics
that determine both, offshoring and export performance.
One concern could arise if low-skill intensive input industries supply in-
puts with lower quality that translate to lower output quality and thus directly
affect firm market shares. We account for this by including our proxy quali that
absorbs variation in the output quality of a firm. Another problem could arise
if the wages in specific input industries in Eastern Europe determine world de-
20We use input coefficients for Germany in 2005 and apply them to all countries for simplic-
ity. The STAN database provides input-output coefficients at the 2-digit ISIC Rev.3 level only.
Both, the industries of activity for each firm as well as the information for the input industries,
will therefore be restricted to the 2-digit level for the construction of our instruments.
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mand. However, as our dependent variable is the export market share rather
than the export value, this does not necessarily violate the exclusion restric-
tion. Additionally, we use wages in input industries in India and China rela-
tive to domestic wages as an alternative instrument in the robustness section.
Then, the exclusion restriction of our second instrument could be violated.
An alternative concern is that firms with large market shares are also monop-
sonists in factor markets and can enforce low wages in input industries. As
we focus on wages in relatively aggregated input industries (2-digit ISIC), the
bargaining power of an individual firm on the Eastern European labor mar-
ket seems rather negligible. Furthermore, we also use input wages in China
and India in the robustness section which should be even less determined by
individual firms.
The specifications presented in Table III.2 are the IV analogs of Table III.1.
Results from the first stage are shown at the bottom of the table. Both instru-
ments are highly significant and the coefficients have the expected signs. The
first stage F-test of excluded instruments are above any of the Stock-Yogo crit-
ical values of weak identification in all specifications. As we use both instru-
ments simultaneously, we are able to test for overidentification of our model
(the Sargan-Hansen test). Reassuringly, the Hansen J-statistics do not reject
the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments in any of the specifications ex-
cept for the first one where we do not control for firm heterogeneity.21
Comparing the outcome of the instrumental variable regression with the
results from Table III.1 shows that our coefficient of interest has increased sig-
nificantly in size across all specifications. This indicates that attenuation bias
might have been a serious issue in our previous ordinary least squares esti-
mates. Offshoring remains highly significant in explaining the export market
share in the full sample. The correlation is weaker for the restricted sample
of exporters but still remains significant at the 10% level. The coefficient does
not vary too much between the individual specifications. As a benchmark,
specifications (3) and (5) both yield a coefficient of around 0.5. Taking that co-
efficient at face value would imply that the average non-offshoring exporter
21The specification (1) is very weakly controlled. Adding firm controls already raises the
p value of the test to 0.57. Note that the Hansen J-statistic only tests the validity of one
instrument against the other. Thus, it will not indicate problems if both instruments turn out
to be flawed. On the other hand, if the exclusion restrictions is met for at least one of the
instruments, our identification strategy should deliver causal effects.
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could increase its market share by almost 230% when the firm purchased the
same share of intermediates from abroad as the average offshoring export firm
does (about 30%).22 While tripling the market share appears to be a huge ef-
fect indeed, the underlying increase in the offshoring variable from 0% to 30%
is very substantial. In terms of the market share, we are talking about an ab-
solute increase in a range between 0.67 to 2.2 per mille.
III.4.1.3 Robustness
Tables B.4 (OLS), B.5 (IV) and B.6 (IV) present results to evaluate the robust-
ness of our estimations. We choose specification (4), from Table III.1 and Table
III.2 respectively, as our baseline specification. In Tables B.4 and B.5 we pro-
vide the following robustness checks: we control for more disaggregated in-
dustry fix effects, exchange the control variables, use alternative measures of
offshoring and alternative dependent variables. In Table B.6 we deal with the
robustness of instruments and consider how autocorrelation within standard
errors affect the significance of our estimates. The robustness checks in Tables
B.4 and B.5 are symmetric unless otherwise noted.
In specification (2) we begin by adding industry dummies at a finer level
of detail. As our instruments varies at the industry level our IV results are not
robust to the inclusion of industry dummies at the 2-digit US SIC level. As it
can be seen from the first stage F-statistic this is due to the loosened grip of our
instruments after absorbing industry variation across very narrow industries.
The OLS estimates however are robust to the inclusion of industry fix effects
up to the 3-digit US SIC level.
Specifications (3) to (6) successively replace the main control variables of
our model with alternative measures. Thus, we use average total factor pro-
ductivity for the years 2001 to 2007 in order substitute for our constructed
measure of labor productivity in specification (3).23 We then replace log em-
ployment by log turnover in specification (4). Subjective quality is replaced
by an indicator of product innovation in specification (5). Specification (6) in-
terchanges the full set of control variables. Using turnover as a size control in
22The less precise estimate for exporters in specification (7) yields an increase in the market
share of slightly more than 200%, while the smallest coefficient, specification (1), implies an
increase of almost 170%.
23We are thankful to Bruegel for providing us with this measure.
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the OLS regression leads to a coefficient that is indistinguishable from zero.
We believe that this might be due to measurement error and the strong con-
nection between turnover and the market share. Other than that, our results
hold well and the absolute size and significance of the measured effect does
not vary substantially across specifications.
In specifications (7) to (10) we replace our explanatory variable and see
whether our results are robust to alternative measures of offshoring. The
underlying hypothesis is that the effect we measure should not depend too
strongly on the specific type of offshoring. As long as costs can be reduced
by sourcing inputs from abroad, we expect a significant effect on our mea-
sure of competitiveness. While we use intermediates purchased from abroad
as a share of all intermediates as our core measure of offshoring, specifica-
tion (7) shows the results from using intermediates from abroad as a share of
turnover instead. Specifications (8) to (10) proceed by replacing intermediate
purchases in terms of turnover by FDI, service offshoring and outsourcing in
terms of turnover, respectively. The OLS coefficients remain positive but only
partly significant. Using our instruments yields positive and significant esti-
mates across all measures of global sourcing. Naturally, the actual size of the
coefficients changes. Nevertheless, the implied effect remains very close to the
original effect in the case of intermediates relative to turnover. An analogous
thought experiment to the one we invoked earlier implies a 223% increase in
market shares. The effects are much larger for FDI, service offshoring and out-
sourcing, but we will not elaborate on these differences as our instruments are
relatively weak for these alternative measures of offshoring.
Specifications (11) and (12) replace the dependent variable by the share
of exports in turnover and the export volume, respectively. This reduces the
risk of potential measurement error in the dependent variable and loosens the
constructional bond between dependent variable and instrument by taking
the firm specific industry-mix out of the left-hand side variable. The estimates
show that our results are robust to using these alternative measures of ex-
port performance. The IV results are less clear cut, with a rejected Hansen
test for the export share and huge standard errors for the export volume.
Note though, that substituting the East European wage instrument, which is
measured in absolute terms, by wages relative to the firm’s home country in-
creases the Hansen p-value for both specifications and renders the coefficient
CHAPTER III. ORGANIZATIONS AS COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 76
of interest significant even for the export volume (not reported).
In Table B.6 we elaborate more on the robustness of our instruments and
check whether our results hinge on standard errors being robust to heteroscedas-
ticity only. Specification (1) again repeats the baseline regression. In specifi-
cation (2) we want to check whether our results are still robust when using
the mean over Chinese and Indian input industry wages rather than wages in
Eastern Europe. As the Chinese and Indian markets are less tied to the coun-
tries in our sample, the risk of reversed causality from firm’s export perfor-
mance to labor market conditions in the offshoring region should be reduced
by using wages from these regions. The offshoring coefficient reduces in size
but remains robust apart from that. In specification (3) we use wages in China
and India relative to the firm’s country of origin, as this might be the relevant
characteristic from the firm’s point of view.
Specifications (4), (5) and (6) introduce an alternative instrument based
on an idea by Hummels et al. (2014). The alternative instrument relates to
worldwide export supply in firm i’s input industries and is measured as the
weighted sum of all intermediate exports from any country in the world to
all other countries, excluding the firm’s home country on both sides. The first
stage has the expected sign and the new instrument works in combination
with either of the original instruments. As the Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions is not rejected for any of the combinations of instruments, we con-
clude that all instruments are valid as long at least one of the instruments we
propose is valid.
Specifications (7), (8) and (9) finally experiment with the autocorrelation
structure of standard errors. Up to now, we showed results for heteroscedas-
ticity robust standard errors, because to us it is not obvious what type of clus-
tering to expect. As our variable of interest is measured at the firm level and
we exploit cross-sectional variation between firms, autocorrelation of stan-
dard errors is not obvious. Nevertheless, standard errors could be autocorre-
lated between firms within one geographical region as firms with high levels
of intermediate imports might cluster within border regions. Alternatively,
standard errors could also be clustered within industries or at the industry-
region level. We allowed for clustered standard errors at the regional level
(NUTS-2), at the industry level (3-digit US SIC) and at the industry-region
level. Our results are robust to all three types of clusters but standard errors
CHAPTER III. ORGANIZATIONS AS COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 77
tend to increase whenever we cluster at the industry level.
Overall, the coefficients remain relatively stable across all specifications
and our results are robust to most of the alterations we proposed.
III.4.2 Decentralization and Product Quality
Let us now turn to the second prediction of the model. We want to analyze
if there is a positive association between firms with a decentralized manage-
ment and the quality of the products that these firms produce. Theoretically,
we consider anything the firm can do in order to increase demand for a given
price to be a realization of quality. In the empirical section we will focus on
two broad measures of desirability: the quality of products relative to the mar-
ket average as perceived by the firm and an indicator whether firm i has car-
ried out a product innovation in the years 2007 to 2009.
We will use both, product and process innovations in the regressions. Note
though, that the notion of non-price desirability applies mainly to product in-
novations, while process innovations, though still related to the incentive cre-
ating effects of decentralization, are probably more relevant for the reduction
of costs.
The measure of perceived quality is an indicator, directly taken from the
survey, that varies from 0 (the worst product in the market) to 100 (the best).
We will use a transformation of this indicator, which is centered around 0 for
each country, with the standard deviation set to 1. This normalization helps
us to prevent cultural differences in perception from driving our results.
The core empirical specification looks as follows:
qcsi = λ + µ1deci + µ2(deci × coii) + µ3Fi + µ4Xcs + ωcsi, (III.13)
where qcsi is one of our three measures of firm specific product quality or
innovation. The variable deci is our dummy indicating decentralized organi-
zations and coii is a measure of the conflict of interest within firms. The vector
Fi contains firm controls, Xcs includes industry and country or regional con-
trols and ωcsi is the error term.
Two considerations determine the set of controls in equation (III.13). First,
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our theoretical model predicts the probability of a quality innovation to be
higher for decentralized firms because knowledge workers show more initia-
tive in those organizations (as ed = b/g > δ(b/g) = ec). This fact resembles
the higher search effort of managers once they know they can choose their
preferred implementation after an idea is found and lets us expect a positive
coefficient µ1 > 0 for the regressor deci. Note though, that the size of this
positive effect depends on δ. In our theoretical model, δ measures the prob-
ability of manager and principal choosing the same implementation strategy.
From the manager’s point of view, a high δ implies that he has good chances
of obtaining the private benefit from his preferred implementation, even if
the principal chooses the strategy in a centralized organization. Therefore,
the advantage of a decentralized organization in terms of higher search effort
should be relatively low for high values of δ as knowledge workers expand
similar efforts under both types of organizations. We try to capture this with
the interaction term deci × coii, where coii is an inverse measure of the conflict
of interest. We expect the coefficient µ2 to be negative.
The choice of a good proxy for the congruence of interests δ is crucial to
measure the interaction effect deci × coii. As the majority of firms in our data
are private limited liability corporations who are to a substantial part family
owned firms, we exploit the ownership structure of the firms to proxy for coii.
We proxy coii by the share of managers (including top and middle manage-
ment) that is related to the family who owns the company. The underlying
assumption is that the probability of congruent interests between owner and
manager should be higher when both share the same family ties. In accor-
dance with our theory, we expect µ1 to be positive and µ2 to be negative.
Second, as organizational choices are not assigned randomly, we need to
control for relevant factors determining whether firm i is prone to being de-
centralized or not. At the firm level, we add the share of high and medium
skilled workers among all workers in order to proxy for the firm specific level
of human capital and thus the value of empowerment due to decentraliza-
tion. The underlying assumption is that innovative activities are more fre-
quent among skilled workers and that the gains from higher effort should
therefore be more important to firms with a skilled labor force. We further
add a dummy indicating whether the firm is young (less than 6 years old),
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assuming that younger firms might be more dependent on innovations.24 Be-
cause we do not want our proxy coii to pick up other specifics of family firms,
we further add a dummy indicating whether the CEO himself is part of the
family. As larger firms naturally tend to be more decentralized, we will also
control for the number of employees. Finally, we include our measure of la-
bor productivity in order to control for other dimensions of firm heterogeneity
that affect product quality.
In order to control for the sectoral fix effects, Xcs contains 11 NACE Clio
sector dummies.25 Xsc also contains a set of country or regional fix effects.
In some specifications we will use interacted sector and region fixed effects
as in the regressions for the export market share. Note though, that we will
instrument decentralization by regional characteristics below, preventing us
from using regional fix effects. We will use regional control variables instead
when it comes to instrumentation.
III.4.2.1 Baseline Results
Table III.3 shows the results from running ordinary least square variants of
equation (III.13). Specifications (1) to (3) use the normalized measure of per-
ceived quality, specifications (4) to (6) show the results for product innovation
and specifications (7) to (9) use process innovations as the dependent variable.
Specification (1) shows the results when we omit to control for regional
effects. As expected, the coefficient on decentralization is positive and sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 5% level. We fail to establish significant
results for the interaction term but the point estimate delivers the right sign.
Firm size appears to be an important covariate in this specification.
Specifications (2) and (3) show whether regional effects are decisive drivers
of our results. The estimates in Table III.3 indicate that our coefficients are rela-
tively robust when controlling for unobservable characteristics at the regional
or sector-regional level. This is an important finding as we will not be able
to control for regional unobservables once instrumenting at the regional level.
Additionally, it might be counted as a good sign for the exclusion restriction
we propose.
24See Acemoglu et al. (2007) for empirical evidence on the relation between firm age and
decentralized management.
25The specifications are robust to using 3-digit US SIC industry controls.
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The results are very similar but more robust when using product innova-
tion instead of perceived quality as our dependent variable.26 Product inno-
vations are very close in spirit to the theory we proposed. Product innovations
are usually thought to be improving the objective characteristics of the prod-
uct, potentially leaving production costs unaltered. The utility of costumers
then rises without the necessity of a decrease in prices. This is exactly the
notion of quality we proposed in the theoretical section.
Note that while their absolute size has not changed by much, the coeffi-
cients on the interaction are now significant up to the 1% level, suggesting
that an increase in the share of family executives renders the impact of decen-
tralized management less important. Finally, the existence of a family CEO as
well as the share of high- and medium skilled employees do now appear to
be significant covariates of the model.
In specifications (7) to (9) we replace product by process innovations. In-
novations in the production process are often related to the cost of the product
rather than to its qualitative characteristics. While this is less in line with the
theoretical model we proposed, the effort argument remains valid for any type
of innovation and therefore we should in general expect to find similar effects
in line with our model.
Nevertheless, the results are slightly different for process innovations. The
coefficient on the interaction turns out indifferent from zero in a statistical
sense. Furthermore, family firms are not as different from other firms when it
comes to process innovation. The coefficient on the share of high and medium
skilled workers is now negative. Instead, labor productivity shows up to be
an important covariate of innovation for the first time.
It is not quite clear what explains these deviations, especially the missing
effect on the interaction. As you will note in the next section, some of the dif-
ferences in the results for product and process innovations will disappear as
soon as we try to identify effects with our instrumentation strategy. The inter-
action effect for example will show up again significantly and with a negative
sign. Others, like the coefficient on the share of high-skilled workers, remain
significantly different for process innovations. One explanation would be that
26Here we are showing results for the linear probability model. Running Probit estimations
does not alter the results significantly but makes the interpretation of the coefficients much
harder, given that we are dealing with an interaction term.
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process innovations are more important for production intensive firms, where
the share of low-skilled rather than high-skilled employees is supportive of
innovation.
We will briefly return to the differences for varying dependent variables
when we have seen results from the instrumental variable estimations.
III.4.2.2 Instrumenting for Decentralization
Again, the set of control variables we added to equation (III.13) might not
suffice to prevent omitted variable bias. Additionally, measurement error ap-
pears to be important given the survey nature of our data. Finally, innovation
itself potentially has a substantial impact on the organization of firms, leading
to reverse causality issues.27
The literature on firm organization proposes different determinants for de-
centralization in firms. For example, Bloom et al. (2012) propose the rule of
law, product market competition, hierarchical religion and the level of trust
in a region as potential determinants for decentralized management within
firms.
Rule of law or the degree of product market competition are probably im-
portant determinants of innovation and quality in their own right and thus
not exogenous in our empirical model. We focus on the other two determi-
nants: regional variation of religious faith and trust levels across Europe and
argue that this variation is better suited for instrumentation given that a direct
impact on product quality is less likely. If the notion of trust and religion were
relevant determinants of product quality or innovation, then the effect would
rather work via trust levels within firms. However we try to account for that
by controlling for the conflict of interest within firms.
In our main specifications we use measures of religion rather than trust
because we assume that religious beliefs are less likely to be shaped by the
professional setting which again could have a direct impact on product qual-
ity. We will add trust as an instrument in the robustness section.28
27The survey specifically asks firms to indicate whether product or process innovation im-
plied organizational innovation. Almost a third of the firms gave an affirmative answer.
28Our measure of trust in a region is the share of people responding “most people can be
trusted” when asked whether generally speaking, most people can be trusted or alternatively,
“one can’t be to careful in dealing with people”.
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Our instruments are constructed at the regional level (NUTS-1) where re-
gional averages are obtained from the 2008 European Values Study (EVS).29
We will use instruments from the EVS for both endogenous variables, the
level of decentralization and its interaction with family managers. As you
will see in the robustness section, using religion, our instrument for decentral-
ization, interacted with the share of family members as an instrument for the
interaction term has two disadvantages. First, the covariation between the in-
struments and decentralization is very weak when both instruments contain
the same variable from the value survey. And second, testing overidentifying
restrictions with a larger set of instruments shows that the simple interaction
between religion and the share of family members is not exogenous. Results
appear to be less problematic when using two distinct instruments based on
religion for both endogenous variables, acknowledging that the relevance of
the instruments is then based on decentralization alone.
Our first measure of religion is the share of people that mentioned “reli-
gious faith” when asked about especially important qualities which children
can be encouraged to learn at home. La Porta et al. (1997) and Bloom et al.
(2012) also propose the regional influence of “hierarchical religions” as a de-
terminant for decentralization which we will use as our second instrument.30
We argue that both instruments are relevant by arguing that religious believes
might be negatively correlated with a taste for autonomy and positively with
the submission to authority.
Figures B.1a, B.1b and B.1c in the appendix show the regional variation
in the average values of decentralization and our instruments. Three facts are
noteworthy: First, much of the variation can be found between countries. This
explains why the inclusion of country fixed effects renders our instruments
weak. Second, there is indeed a correlation between decentralization and our
instruments. For example, Italy is clearly a country where religion is highly
important and the level of decentralization is relatively low. Also the levels of
decentralization are much higher for Germany and the UK where hierarchical
29The EVS is a large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal value survey, covering 47 Eu-
ropean countries or regions with a number of roughly 70, 000 interviewees. We use Version
3.0.0 of the Integrated Dataset (Study No. ZA4800). Note that our results are robust to using
instruments at the NUTS-2 level, though the instruments become weaker.
30We refer to Roman Catholic, Muslim or Orthodox believes when talking about hierarchi-
cal religions.
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religions play less of a role. Third, religious faith and hierarchical religions
are clearly not the same thing. This is important because we need distinct
variation in order to employ both instruments at the same time.
Our exclusion restriction requires that religious beliefs have no direct im-
pact on the product quality that firms offer, other than through their influence
on firm organization. Again, our claim is that the exclusion restrictions holds
after controlling for the relevant covariates. One concern is that religious be-
liefs could be associated with economic activity and income. This association
was proposed by the sociologist Max Weber who claimed that there is a pos-
itive link between protestant ethic and economic activity.31 However, Cantoni
(2013) does not find evidence for this effect in German-speaking regions. Fur-
thermore, empirical findings by Becker and Woessmann (2009) suggest that
the effect of protestantism on economic growth vanishes once they control for
human capital accumulation. This effect should be absorbed by our control
for human capital at the firm level. We also control for per capita income to
absorb variation in demand that stems from variation in income. A problem
with the exclusion restriction would persist if religious beliefs affect the pref-
erences for quality besides through differences in income.
Table III.4 shows the results from the instrumental variable regression. Re-
sults from the first stage are shown at the bottom. As expected, the coefficients
on both measures of religion are negatively correlated with decentralization
and are highly significant. This is true for decentralization in the level as well
as in the interaction with the conflict of interest proxy. The Angrist-Pischke
F-statistic indicates strong instruments in both first stages and the Kleibergen-
Paap F-statistic shows that the instruments are overall not weak.
Specification (1) shows results for the normalized measure of product qual-
ity. Neither the level effect nor the interaction effect appear to be significantly
different from zero. This is due to the normalization of perceived quality,
which virtually forces the cross country variation of our measure to zero.
Given that our instrumental strategy then can work through within-country
variation only, the explanatory power of our variable of interest is largely re-
duced. Specification (2), where we use the non-normalized version of per-
ceived quality, confirms this interpretation. Now the level effect is positive
31See “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”.
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and highly significant, though the interaction is still insignificant.
The problem with using non-normalized quality as perceived by the firm
is that our coefficient might pick up cultural differences in perception between
countries rather than differences in actual quality. Country fixed effects would
help here, but are not viable given that we use regional variation for identi-
fication. In specification (3) we add regional controls to account for at least
some of the unobserved heterogeneity across countries and regions. Follow-
ing Bloom et al. (2012) we control for GDP per capita, population and an index
of the rule of law.32
In principal, we could include all three measures at the regional level. Un-
fortunately, too much controls at the regional level restrict the amount of vari-
ation left for identification. Consequentially, our instruments are rendered
weak when we include all three measures at the regional level. We therefore
tried to use either the Eurostat variables or the governance index at the re-
gional (NUTS-2) level and included the remaining control(s) at the country
level. When both variants turned out to deliver similar results, we decided to
stick with quality of governance at the regional level. Assuming that rule of
law is potentially easier to causally connect to the organization of firms, we
preferred to rule out the alternative channel that firms are more decentralized
and produce higher quality because contracts are better enforceable. As col-
umn (3) shows, adding regional controls reduces the size of the coefficient on
decentralization slightly but in turn renders the interaction significant at the
10% level.
Though our regional controls might pick up some of the cultural differ-
ences between countries it is clear that none of the controls is predestined
for that task. We therefore transformed the normalized measure of perceived
quality into a dummy that indicates whether the perceived product quality of
a firm is above the country mean in specification (4) and (5). The advantage of
this transformation is that it amplifies the response of the dependent variable
with respect to a given regional variation in instrumented decentralization.
As Table III.4 shows, both coefficients are now highly significant and have
the expected signs. Again, including regional controls slightly diminishes the
32GDP per capita and population are taken from Eurostat while we take the European Qual-
ity of Governance Index (EQI) from 2010 as our measure of the rule of law. See Charron et al.
(2014).
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coefficients but does not alter the general finding.
In specifications (6) to (9), we show results for product and process innova-
tions with and without country controls respectively. The expected results are
valid for both types of innovation. The coefficients are very similar for prod-
uct and process innovations but smaller than for product quality. Still, the size
of the coefficients increases a lot when compared to the ordinary least squares
estimates, indicating that our previous results might have been attenuated by
measurement error in the explanatory variable.
To provide an idea about the magnitude of the coefficients, we calculate
the effect of decentralization on quality and innovation if our results were to
be interpreted literally. This exercise is to be taken with caution because we
have included an interaction term and the estimated effects depend a lot on
the point of evaluation. Using specification (5) and evaluating the effect at
the average number of family members (13.7%) for firms where the CEO is
not a family member, decentralized management increases the probability of
producing quality above the country mean by 70.1 percentage points.
III.4.2.3 Robustness
In Tables B.7 and B.8 of the appendix, we test the robustness of our results for
quality and production innovation respectively. We evaluate the robustness
of our estimates with respect to different instrumentation, industry fix effects
and clustering of standard errors. The point of departure is specification (5)
of Table III.4 for quality and specification (7) for product innovations. As the
results are similar for both dependent variables, the following discussion ap-
plies to both dependent variables.
In specifications (2) to (6) in both tables, we try different combinations of
instruments. Specification (2) replaces religious faith by trust. The results
remain qualitatively similar but now the first stage results indicate that our
instruments are slightly weak, predominantly due to the interaction. Using
the three instruments jointly in specification (3) improves the strength again
and allows us to test overidentifying restrictions. The Hansen J-statistic im-
plies that all three instruments are exogenous, given that at least two of them
are valid instruments.
In specification (4) we try to instrument the interaction deci × coii with
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IVdec × coii. Remember that we used two instruments for decentralization in
order to instrument for both, decentralization and the interaction with the
share of family members among executives. Often researchers would interact
the exogenous part of the interaction (family members) with the instrument
for the endogenous part in order to obtain an instrument for the interaction.
But as the results in Tables B.7 and B.8 show, applying this to religious faith
renders our instruments weak and the coefficients of interest insignificant.
We therefore add the other instruments in specification (5) and do now
obtain satisfying F-statistics and significant coefficients with the right sign.
However, the Hansen overidentification test indicates a strong endogeneity
problem with this set of instruments. Fortunately, the number of instruments
allows us to run statistical tests on subsets of instruments. Doing this indi-
cates that the instrument causing problems is precisely the interaction with
the share of family members.
In specification (6) we go one final step further and add the share of family
members to the list of endogenous regressors. An additional instrument is
obtained by interacting our main instruments, religious faith and hierarchical
religion. The results persist in terms of significant coefficients although the
instrumentation becomes weak.
Overall, our results are relatively robust with respect to different instru-
mental approaches. The standard approach for the instrumentation of interac-
tions is problematic in our case, as both components appear to be endogenous.
The size of the coefficients varies for different specifications but the qualitative
predictions are always met.
Finally, in specifications (7) to (9) we include industry dummies at a finer
level of detail, exchange covariates and see whether two-way clustering at the
region-industry level has any effect on our results. As it seems, neither of
these changes has a big impact on the measured effects, neither in size nor in
significance.
III.5 Conclusion
In this study we analyze how firm organization affects the international com-
petitiveness of firms with representative data on 15,000 European manufactur-
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ing plants. We motivate our empirical analyses with a stylized model where
firms can source inputs internationally to lower their costs and decentralize
decision making to foster ideas and produce higher quality products. In order
to identify the effects of offshoring, we exploit variation in foreign input wages
and input skill intensity to instrument for offshoring at the firm level. We iden-
tify the effects of decentralized management by instrumenting the decentral-
ization choice with regional variation in religious beliefs and trust. We find
that the average offshoring firm obtains a world market share that is about
three times larger than the average market share of non-offshoring firms. Fur-
thermore, we find that decentralized management increases the probability of
producing quality above the country mean by 70.1 percentage points in firms
where the CEO is not a family member. However, this effect becomes smaller
as firms are managed by a larger fraction of managers with family ties.
CHAPTER IV
Executive Compensation and the Global Division
of Labor - Evidence from Matched Manager-Firm
Data
IV.1 Introduction
The compensation of managers is a controversial and complex subject. The
fast growth of executive compensation between 1970 and 2000 has triggered
intense debates about the nature of the pay-setting process and its outcomes
for society.1 Although the explosion of earnings slowed down in the U.S. after
the end of the twentieth century,2 the high level of inequality between execu-
tive earnings and average wage bills remains an arguable topic. At the same
time, the shape of compensation contracts and the nature of incentives remain
opaque from a public perspective.
One cause of the rise in executive compensation that has been discussed
1See Frydman and Jenter (2010) for a survey on executive compensation in the U.S.
2Kaplan (2013) shows that the average level of CEO compensation in U.S. public compa-
nies was approximately at the same level in the year 2010 as it was during the end of the 1990s.
He argues that real compensation in other occupations such as top lawyers or sport stars has
been growing much faster since 2000. This statement is also supported by the BoardEx com-
pensation data used in this chapter: while real executive compensation has been increasing in
Europe, executive compensation remained rather flat in the U.S. between 1998 and 2012 (see
Figure IV.3 for the development of executive compensation in the U.S., the U.K. and continen-
tal Europe).
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in the literature is globalization. A number of theoretical papers illustrate
the relationship between international trade and executive pay and show that
globalization induces “superstar” effects shifting gains from trade dispropor-
tionately towards top earners (e.g. Wu (2011), Monte (2011), Manasse and
Turrini (2001), Marin and Verdier (2012b), Gersbach and Schmutzler (2014)).
Furthermore, Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009) provide empirical evidence that
increases in the global integration of goods markets affect the compensation
of managers through tougher import competition.
An important similarity of these papers is their focus on the superstar ef-
fects of final goods trade.3 However, the nature of international trade has been
changing vastly during the last two decades. While international trade was
traditionally based on the exchange of final goods, the key feature of modern
world trade is trade in intermediate inputs (see Figure IV.2 and for example
Hummels et al. (2001) and Hanson et al. (2005)). Improvements in informa-
tion technologies, better infrastructure and the growth of emerging economies
like Eastern Europe, India and China have contributed to the fractionation of
value chains across the world economy. This rise of “trade in tasks” has trig-
gered changes in labor markets of industrialized countries and modern pro-
duction is characterized by international teams, both within and across firm
boundaries (e.g. Antràs et al. (2006)).
How does executive compensation interact with the global integration of
production and the rapid growth of intermediate goods trade? The goal of
this chapter is to provide evidence on changes in executive compensation fol-
lowing shifts in the international division of labor.4
To address this question, I employ matched manager-firm data, covering
executive boards in public companies that are listed among one of the major
stock indices in the U.S. and Europe. I link the compensation of executives to
their exposure to intermediate goods trade using information at the firm spe-
cific industry level. In order to isolate changes in task trade that are exogenous
to executive compensation and uncorrelated with potential omitted variables,
I follow Hummels et al. (2014) and Autor et al. (2013a) and exploit variation
3One exception is Marin et al. (2015) who study the responses of relative wages to trade in
production and managerial tasks.
4I will apply the terms international division of labor, trade in tasks, offshoring and intermediate
goods trade interchangeably in the remainder of the chapter.
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in the global export supply of inputs in the rest of the world to instrument
for the offshoring intensity.5 Variation in the world supply of inputs captures
changes in the comparative advantages of sourcing countries that might arise
from changes in production prices, production variety or product quality. The
world export supply of inputs is a persuasive source of variation as it dif-
fers across inputs, countries and time. Furthermore, it is arguably exogenous
to executive compensation. As the matched manager-firm data contain in-
formation on executive payments and firm level performance, I can directly
estimate how performance sensitivity and wage inequality react to changes in
offshoring.
I find that managers face stronger monetary incentives when their com-
panies are more exposed to trade in tasks. Executive compensation becomes
more elastic with respect to firm performance when a larger fraction of inter-
mediates is imported. This result is valid for short term indicators of firm per-
formance such as annual earnings but also robust to stock market responses,
capturing expected future cash flows.
As changes in the incentive structure of compensation due to trade in tasks
might not be exclusively specific for managers, I proceed by analyzing how
task trade has contributed to wage inequality between executives and the
workforce in a firm. The estimates reveal that the effects of trade in tasks
on the incentive provision have contributed to more wage inequality between
executives and the workforce within firms.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section IV.2 sur-
veys the literature and discusses theoretical channels that link offshoring to
the compensation of managers. Section IV.3 presents the data, discusses the
empirical modeling strategy and presents the results. Section IV.4 concludes.
IV.2 Background and Related Literature
Trade in tasks is likely to affect executive compensation in various ways. First,
the rise in offshoring alters the demand for different tasks and can therefore
affect the level of executive compensation and relative wages between managers
5The world export supply is the total supply of an input from origin countries to the world
market net of the supply to and from the importing country under consideration.
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and workers. Second, the rise in offshoring has changed the nature of hierar-
chies in firms, as teams can form across countries. This development creates
new matching opportunities for workers in industrialized countries and thus
affects patterns of specialization. Changes in the hierarchical organization of
firms are then also likely to affect executive compensation and relative wages.
Third, agency problems in firms could change if production occurs across na-
tional borders. Consequently, this can affect the role of incentives in manage-
rial compensation contracts. In this section, I discuss the implications of these
three channels on managerial compensation and relate them to the literature.
IV.2.1 Shifts in the Skill Demand
The geographic separation of production has altered the demand for different
tasks at different geographical production locations. From a theoretical per-
spective the direction of wage movements is ambiguous and likely depends
on the type of labor that is offshored and the onshore composition of tasks
and skills. For instance, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) propose a the-
ory of global production and investigate how falling offshoring costs affect
factor prices. They show that offshoring labor induces three different effects
leading to ambiguous overall effects on wages. First, falling offshoring costs
increase firm productivity, working to the benefit of workers. Second, an am-
biguous relative price effect occurs when offshoring alters the terms of trade.
Third, offshoring of labor increases labor supply in the importing countries.
If jobs of the least educated workers are also the most offshorable ones, one
might expect a widening of the wage gap between managers and production
workers.6
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) estimate the influence of trade in tasks and
technological advancements on the wage gap between high and low skilled
U.S. workers between 1979 and 1990. They argue that offshoring explains
about 40 percent of the increase in relative wages during that period resulting
in real wage losses for low skilled workers. Becker et al. (2013) analyze the re-
lation between offshoring and the onshore composition of tasks and skills in
German multinationals. They find that offshoring shifts the wage bill towards
6To the extent that offshoring is associated with reductions in consumer prices, less skilled
workers may still benefit from increases in real wages.
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the more non-routine and more interactive tasks benefiting highly educated
workers. Along this line of argument, Hummels et al. (2014) and Baumgarten
et al. (2013) investigate the relationship between offshoring and wages for dif-
ferent skills and occupational tasks at the individual level.7 Both argue that
the wage effects of offshoring vary across task characteristics. Hummels et al.
(2014) find that offshoring has the largest positive effect on tasks that require
communication and language, followed by social sciences and maths. No-
tably, all these skills are categorical for managerial tasks. Overall, shifts in
the skill demand due to offshoring are likely to have an impact on earnings
differentials between top managers and workers within firms, an hypothesis
that can be tested with the data at the manager-firm level.
IV.2.2 Hierarchies and the Matching of Workers
The rising globalization of goods production has also contributed to changes
in the nature of firms. The geographical separation of production promotes
the formation of cross-country teams. Antràs et al. (2006) propose a hier-
archical assignment theory based on Garicano (2000), where heterogeneous
workers form hierarchical teams across borders. While the less skilled agents
specialize in production activities, the more skilled agents focus on problem
solving, i.e. management. They model offshoring as the opportunity of agents
in industrialized countries to match with agents from other countries that dif-
fer in skill endowments. The availability of more matching opportunities due
to globalization implies that offshoring leads to higher wage inequality in the
domestic country if the sourcing partner country specializes on the relatively
unskilled tasks or if communication costs are low. Antràs et al. (2008) use this
model to illustrate that offshoring firms may introduce layers of middle man-
agers in host countries to foster the transmission of knowledge across coun-
tries and to shield the top management in the home country. In that spirit,
Gumpert (2014) argues that falling communication costs increase the leverage
of managerial knowledge leading to a larger wage premium on knowledge in
multinational headquarters.
7Hummels et al. (2014) use data covering the universe of workers in Danish private sector
firms, Baumgarten et al. (2013) employ representative German individual data from the Socio-
Economic Panel.
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IV.2.3 Agency Problems
Trade in tasks is likely to affect agency problems within firms through a num-
ber of different channels. First, task trade can affect the effectiveness of man-
agerial effort. If offshoring implies that managerial decisions are scaled up,
yielding improvements of managerial effectiveness, it is rational for princi-
pals to provide more incentives to managers in order to raise managerial ef-
fort. Second, trade in tasks can also affect the uncertainty of managerial per-
formance. On the one hand, the opportunity to import inputs from foreign
sources could reduce the uncertainty of firm performances if trade in tasks
can be used to hedge against risks regarding the supply or quality of interme-
diates. On the other hand, global sourcing can increase the uncertainty about
managerial performances if production processes become more complex. If
shareholders observe managerial effort with more noise due to more uncer-
tainty, compensation is likely to react less sensitive to the noisy performance
signal. In the Appendix C.1, I illustrate these effects in a textbook principal-
agent framework with linear contracts, normally distributed performance sig-
nals and exponential utility.
An alternative channel through which offshoring influences incentive pro-
visions is product market competition. Data from input-output tables suggest
that a large fraction of inputs is within the same industry as the output good
which implies that the imported intermediates naturally compete with do-
mestic goods.8 Furthermore, increases in the availability of cheap inputs raise
the productivity of downstream firms and thus also leads to tougher com-
petition between domestic producers. Theoretical papers by Schmidt (1997)
and Raith (2003) analyze the role of competition on managerial incentives.
Raith (2003) studies competition effects on incentive contracts in an equilib-
rium model with free firm entry and exit. Tougher competition increases the
role of production costs which induces principals to provide stronger incen-
tives that make agents work harder. Schmidt (1997) considers the implicit
effects of competition on the behavior of managers. On the one hand, compe-
tition might make managerial effort more valuable from the principal’s per-
spective leading to steeper incentive compensation. On the other hand, when
8A fact that explains the large correlation coefficient of 0.7 between task trade and the
degree of downstream import competition in the manager-firm sample.
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managers themselves fear tougher competition due to a greater threat of job
loss, this might implicitly incentivize them to work harder inducing principals
to offer flatter payment schemes.
Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005) and Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009) investigate
the effects of tougher import competition on managerial incentive provisions
from an empirical perspective. They find that increases in import competition
within the same output industry contribute to steeper compensation contracts
for managers. Their estimation results indicate that controlling for the degree
of downstream import competition might be important if one wants to iso-
late the relationship between executive compensation and a larger supply of
upstream inputs.
IV.3 Empirical Analysis
IV.3.1 Data Sources
Compensation and Firm Level Information
The results in this chapter are based on the BoardEx database that contains
information on executive compensation. BoardEx is a business intelligence
service company that collects remuneration details on business leaders across
the world. The employed sample covers top executives in public companies
listed in one of the major stock indices in the U.S., U.K. or continental Europe
but the coverage of BoardEx also includes managers from other American or
Asian countries. The sample almost compiles the full population of executive
board members of index quoted companies in the U.S. and the U.K.9 Table C.3
in the Data Appendix lists the covered stock market indices and Table C.4 lists
the covered countries in the sample. The sample spans the period from 1998
to 2012. The compensation data is split into direct compensation, including
fixed and variable components, and equity-linked compensation.
Since the original data are mostly formatted for business client applica-
tions, the following steps were taken in preparation to make the data usable
9As BoardEx collects these data sequentially and updates them on a rolling basis, there is
some selection bias as there is less information on compensation during the most current and
the first sample years. The regressions account for this by controlling for individual manager
fix effects.
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in an empirical study.10 First, since the focus of the chapter is on executives in
Europe and the United States, all observations from supervisory directors and
other countries were excluded from the sample. Second, compensation data
from individual managers that simultaneously held several positions within
a firm in a given year were aggregated. Third, information from quarterly
announcements was excluded when annual reports were available to avoid
double entries. In a further step, reporting periods were converted from ac-
counting periods that vary across firms to consistent calendar years. A final
step involved currency conversion and deflation to real U.S. Dollars with the
base period in January 2000.
The managerial remuneration data are matched with firm level informa-
tion from the Thomson Worldscope database. Worldscope provides detailed
financial statement and profile data on public companies. It includes public
companies domiciled outside of the United States and also contains a com-
plete coverage of U.S. companies that are filing with the Securities Exchange
Commission (with the exception of closed end investment companies). The
total universe of covered companies represents approximately 95% of global
market capitalization. Since BoardEx covers managers in quoted companies
across the world, Worldscope allows to match firm information to most of the
managers in the sample. I use information on assets, earnings, market capi-
talization, employment, the wage bill and industry information at the 4-digit
SIC level with up to 8 industries per firm.
Measuring Trade Exposure
The trade data in this study stem from the World Input Output Database
(WIOD). WIOD tracks the flow of intermediate and final products across coun-
tries and industries.11 Specifically, I make use of the international supply and
use tables that provide trade information for each individual country and 35
NACE industries. The tables are available on an annual basis between 1995
and 2011.12 The 35 industries span all types of economic activity including
agriculture, mining, construction, utilities, manufacturing industries and ser-
10I am indebted to Thomas Neuber who provided great assistance in the preparation of the
compensation data.
11The data is available at http://www.wiod.org
12See Timmer (2012) for a detailed description of the data.
CHAPTER IV. EXECUTIVE PAY AND TRADE IN TASKS 98
vice industries. Furthermore, WIOD provides information of the gross output
and final goods consumption as well as socio-economic accounts that contain
information on value added and employment at the industry-country level.
Measuring the exposure of an individual manager i to trade in tasks in a
given year t is a crucial step for identification. The constructed measure of
trade in tasks takes into account that a firm may operate in various industries.
It is a firm specific average across all the industries of a firm’s business seg-
ments. To obtain the offshoring indicator for an individual output industry s, I
define the industry level task trade exposure as the share of imported interme-
diates relative to the total intermediate consumption in the firm’s home coun-
try c during year t and take its deviation with respect to the country-industry
mean between 1998 and 2011 /Ottsc. This variable measures variation in the ex-
posure to trade in tasks at the output industry level. Taking deviations from
the country-industry mean instead of using the levels helps to ensure that the
estimated task trade coefficients do not capture other unobserved differences
at the country-industry level.13
Since firms operate in different output industries, I match the 4-digit SIC
industries of each firm to the 2-digit NACE output industries as they are used
in WIOD. These industries are then weighted at the firm level according to the
firm’s individual exposure measured by the composition of its business activ-
ities (the fraction of sales that each business segment contributes to the total
sales of the firm λ f s).14 Since these industry weights might change endoge-
nously over time due to production decisions, I obtain fix industry weights
based on the pre sample year 1997. One potential concern of these time invari-
ant industry weights is that they might introduce measurement error when
the production activities of a firm considerably change during the sample pe-
riod.
13The included manager fix effects in the estimations absorb differences of the task trade
level. This approach is similar to industry trade exposure measured by Cuñat and Guadalupe
(2009).
14Business segments in Worldscope do not correspond perfectly to the mentioned SIC in-
dustry codes of each firm since some distinct segments might operate within identical SIC
industries. In order to use the sales from business segments to weight industries, business
segments with identical SIC codes had to be consolidated first.
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To summarize, the proxy for trade in tasks is computed as follows:
task tradesct = ∑
s
λ f s
[
imported inputssct
total inputssct
− /Ottsc
]
, ∑
s
λ f s = 1.
One further potential concern with the trade in tasks measure arises from
the fact that task trade is strongly correlated with import competition at the
output industry level. As input-output tables suggest, a large fraction of in-
puts typically stems from the same downstream industry which implies a high
correlation between both measures.
Previous literature has identified a causal impact of import competition
on wages (Autor et al. (2013b)) and in particular on executive compensation
(Cuñat and Guadalupe (2005, 2009)). Therefore, it is appealing to be able to
isolate the effects of task trade that appear beyond a pure increase in competi-
tion. I disentangle the effects of trade in tasks from pure competition effects by
controlling for the degree of import penetration within downstream industries
s in some empirical specifications. My measure of a firm’s exposure to import
competition is the import penetration at the country-industry-year level. Im-
port penetration is calculated as total imports relative to the sum of domestic
output and total imports, where total imports is the sum of imported interme-
diates and imported final goods. Equivalently to the trade in tasks variable,
I take deviations from the country-industry means of import penetration be-
tween 1998 and 2011 /Oipsc and weight industries according to the firm weights
λ f s:
imp pensct = ∑
s
λ f s
[
importssct
gross outputsct + importssct
− /Oipsc
]
.
IV.3.2 Empirical Modeling Strategy
The empirical models analyze how executive compensation adjusts to changes
in the extent of task trade. The first set of specifications investigates adjust-
ments in the payment structure of executive compensation with regard to the
strength of performance related payments. In the second set of specifications,
I estimate how wage inequality between managers and workers within a firm
changes due to trade in tasks.
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Trade in Tasks and Payment Structures
The basic empirical model evaluates the effect of offshoring on the compensa-
tion structure of a manager i in firm f within sectors s in country c at year t. I
run regressions of the following form:
wi f sct = β0 + β1 task tradesct + β2 task tradesct× per f f t + δ′Fi f sct + ui f sct. (IV.1)
This empirical model estimates the effects of offshoring on the level and the
steepness of compensation contracts, where β1 captures the level effect of task
trade on executive compensation and β2 measures the influence on the per-
formance elasticity of compensation. The dependent variable executive com-
pensation wi f sct is measured as the natural logarithm of the total annual com-
pensation in real 1000 U.S. Dollars, where the base period is January 2000.
The variable task tradesct is the exposure of a firm to imported intermedi-
ates as discussed in subsection IV.3.1. I proxy the firm performance in a given
year per f f t with the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and tax pay-
ments (EBIT) or alternatively the natural logarithm of the market value of the
outstanding shares.
The vector Fi f sct includes a set of fix effects and control variables. All es-
timations include individual manager fix effects ηi. These manager fix effects
control for unobservable and time invariant factors such as the ability or indi-
vidual management style.15 Furthermore, the individual effects capture time
invariant characteristics at the firm, industry and country levels where the
manager is employed.16 Additionally, all estimations include year fix effects
interacted with fix effects of the region where the firm is located. Regions
are the United States, the United Kingdom and continental Europe. The pur-
pose of these region-year fix effects is to control for unobservable shocks at
the macroeconomic level that are correlated with executive compensation and
15See Bertrand and Schoar (2003) who identify manager fix effects from executive turnovers
as a measure of management style.
16One potential concern could arise if there is a large turnover rate of managers between
firms in the data such that the individual fix effects capture mere averages of firm, country
and industry characteristics where the managers are working in. However, the turnover rate
of managers in the data is rather small as only about 9% of the managers in the sample are
switching jobs between occupations. Alternatively, to evaluate the robustness of the estima-
tion results, I also estimate specifications that include firm fix effects instead of individual fix
effects. The results are qualitatively similar.
CHAPTER IV. EXECUTIVE PAY AND TRADE IN TASKS 101
trade in tasks. Consequently, the exploited source of variation is across time
within the managers in a firm after netting out differences in the average level
of task trade and executive compensation at the region-year level. Moreover,
the vector Fi f sct contains the natural logarithm of value added and employ-
ment at the country-industry level (industries are again weighted according
to the firm weights λ f s). At the firm level, the vector Fi f sct includes the re-
spective firm performance variable per f f t (natural logarithm of EBIT or mar-
ket capitalization) and the natural logarithm of total assets to control for firm
size.
Trade in Tasks and Wage Inequality between Workers and Managers
The estimated effects of trade in tasks in model (IV.1) could hold for any set
of occupations in a firm. In order to investigate whether the effects on the
compensation structure are distinct for managers, I estimate the same specifi-
cations as in (IV.1) but instead use the relative wage between a manager and
the average salary per worker as the dependent variable. The basic empirical
model for the wage inequality between an executive i and the average salaries
and benefits paid at the firm f within sector s in country c at year t is:
gi f sct = γ0 + γ1 task tradesct + γ2 task tradesct× per f f t + θ′Fi f sct + vi f sct. (IV.2)
The aim of this empirical specification is to measure if increases in task trade
drive a wedge between the earnings of managers and workers in a firm and if
this depends on the level of firm performance. The coefficient γ1 captures the
level effect of task trade on earnings inequality and γ2 measures how trade
in tasks changes the relationship between firm performance and earnings in-
equality. The employed dependent variable gi f sct is the aggregate compensa-
tion of an executive i relative to the average salary and benefit payments per
employee in a firm f at year t. Since the distribution of this relative wage mea-
sure is highly skewed, I use the relative wage in natural logarithms. Again,
the vector Fi f sct includes the controls which resemble those in model (IV.1).
All models control for individual and region-year fix effects. Furthermore, I
control for total assets and performance at the firm level and for value added
and employment at the sector level.
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Sources of Endogeneity and Discussion of the Instrument
The identification in the models (IV.1) and (IV.2) arises from variation in task
trade over time. There is rich variation of trade in tasks and executive com-
pensation in the panel and all empirical models control for various changes
in firm and industry characteristics as well as unobserved heterogeneity from
time invariant manager, sector and country characteristics. However, the use
of variation is still subject to possible endogeneity issues.
One potential concern is reversed causality. Reversed causality arises if ex-
ecutive compensation contracts determine offshoring decisions in an industry.
One could argue for example that changes in the level and structure of execu-
tive pay affect the incentives for managers to exploit differences in labor costs
by importing more inputs from low wage countries. Reversed causality could
also arise if increases in the performance sensitivity of executive payments
could evoke adverse behavior of managers. For example, managers might try
to segregate production chains in order to make their decisions and effort pro-
vision more opaque which increases agency problems inside firms and thus
affects compensation (see for example Biais and Landier (2013) who endoge-
nize the severeness of agency problems by technological choices of managers).
Endogeneity might also arise from unobservable demand or productivity
shocks that affect the share of imported intermediates and labor market out-
comes and are not captured by the control variables.
An additional source for biased estimates are measurement errors in the
employed trade in tasks variable. One source for this measurement error
could come from the firm specific weighting of industries. If the calculated
industry weights do not mirror the economic exposure of firms to industries
as firms might adjust their production activities over time, this will lead to an
attenuation bias.
In order to address these concerns and establish a causal link between
trade in tasks and executive compensation, I instrument task tradesct with the
world export supply of inputs supplysct.17 A valid instrument should be cor-
related with trade in tasks but conditionally uncorrelated with changes in firm
productivity and executive compensation.
17This idea is based on Hummels et al. (2014) who also instrument offshoring with the
world export supply of inputs.
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The variable supplysct is the total value of intermediate goods that is pro-
duced in the world (excluding country c) and exported to other countries
(again excluding country c) in a year t. These inputs are weighted accord-
ing to input coefficients for each output industry s in the country c. I obtain
fix input coefficients from the year 1995. Similar to the trade in tasks and
import competition variables, I weight the output industries at the firm level
according to the firm specific industry weights λ f s.
The instrument captures developments of comparative advantages of the
input producing countries, weighted according to the historical relevance of
those inputs for the output industries of a firm where a given manager is em-
ployed. These shifts in input specific comparative advantages should only
have an impact on the compensation of executives through the task trade
channel which ensures that supplysct is a valid instrument.
IV.3.3 Results
Trade in Tasks and Payment Structures
I use the total sum of executive compensation that contains the sum of direct
compensation (both, fix and variable) and equity-linked compensation in nat-
ural logs (in 1000 real January 2000 USD) as the preferred dependent variable
and estimate how it adjusts to changes in firm performance and task trade.
A typical executive contract specifies fix and variable parts of compensation.
From the perspective of an econometrician it is difficult to directly disentangle
the strength of incentives from the level of fix and variable payments. Even if
detailed information on the individual payment components such as the base
salary, bonus payments, equity payments, retirement savings etc. is avail-
able, they are spurious measures of incentives. For example, promotions are
an instrument to incentivize executives and typically, promotions also imply
the adaptation of the fix payments. On the other hand, a bonus payment or
the disbursement of shares can be offered as a sign-in bonus without creating
strong incentives for managers. 18
To estimate the empirical model in equation (IV.1), I employ EBIT and mar-
18The robustness section also presents results with respect to equity-linked part of compen-
sation.
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ket capitalization as two alternative measures of firm performance.19 EBIT is
a useful proxy for firm performance as it measures realized firm profits in the
current year and thus gives a direct impression on the short term performance
of a manager. The correction for any interest or tax payments is helpful as
those payments are rather exogenous from the perspective of managers and
thus provide little information on managerial effort. Furthermore, since inter-
est and tax payments can be deferred, they would introduce potential sources
of endogeneity and add more noise on the performance measure.
Changes in market capitalization provide an alternative signal on changes
in firm performance. As market capitalization is the expected present value
of all future cash flows going to the shareholders, it proxies long term firm
performance and thus also captures the value of managerial decisions that
have been taken with respect to future profits (such as R&D and investment
decisions that might only pay off at a later stage). One potential concern with
market capitalization as performance measure arises if firms decide to do a
share buy-back that is based on outside debt financing. This would reduce
the firm’s market capitalization and raise its leverage without any relation to
performance.
Empirical studies on executive compensation have used both measures to
evaluate the performance sensitivity of compensation and I will present re-
sults based on both proxies.20 All specifications control for firm assets, value
added and employment at the industry level, individual manager fix effects
and region specific year fix effects.
I cluster the standard errors of the regressors at the firm level to allow for
autocorrelation within firms throughout all specifications. As some managers
in the sample transfer between firms, I cluster on the firm where a manager
has been working for the longest time to ensure that managers are nested
within clusters and do not move between clusters.
Table IV.1 presents ordinary least squares estimation results with the ef-
fects of trade in tasks on executive compensation in accordance with the em-
pirical model (IV.1).
19EBIT are “earnings before interest and tax payments” and market capitalization is defined
as the average stock price times the number of issued stocks.
20For example Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) also use performance variables based on
either accounting or stock market measures to estimate incentives in executive compensation
contracts.
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Generally, the results suggest that increases in task trade are associated
with significantly higher executive compensation. An effect that arises be-
cause compensation becomes more sensitive to firm performance when the
firm is more exposed to trade in tasks at the industry level. Columns (1) to (3)
present results using EBIT to proxy for firm performance, columns (4) and (5)
use market capitalization instead.
Column (1) provides a first impression of the association between compen-
sation and trade in tasks. The coefficient for per f suggests that the average
elasticity of executive compensation with respect to EBIT is 0.058. Hence, an
increase of EBIT from its mean by one standard deviation within managers
(i.e. from 610.12 to 1800.09 real million USD) raises the total level of executive
compensation by 6.5%. The coefficient estimate for the regressor task trade
suggests that trade in tasks has a sizable effect on total executive pay: an in-
crease of imported intermediates by 1 percentage point (relative to the total
consumption of intermediates) raises compensation of executives by 0.8% on
average.
In order to evaluate if trade in tasks raises executive compensation via rises
in fix payments or through an increase in the performance sensitivity, I include
the interaction term task trade × perf in the remaining columns (2) to (5). The
coefficient is positive and sizably significant in all columns. In column (2), the
estimated coefficient of 0.363 for β2 suggests that the average rise of the expo-
sure to trade in tasks between 1998 and 2011 has contributed to an increase of
the average compensation elasticity with respect to EBIT of about 39% from
0.050 to 0.070.21
As it has already been discussed in the data description IV.3.1, task trade
is strongly correlated with import competition since many inputs are within
the same industry as the output good. The intention of column (3) is to sep-
arate competition effects from the estimated effects for trade in tasks. Cuñat
and Guadalupe (2009) have shown that compensation becomes more elastic
with respect to firm performance if firms face tougher competition at the in-
dustry level. In order to account for this effect, I include import pen and import
pen× perf to control for downstream import penetration. The trade in tasks
21Calculation: the annual mean of the task trade variable increased from -0.019 in the year
1998 to 0.034 in the year 2011. This translates to an increase of the elasticity from 0.050 (=
0.0569 + 0.363 × (-0.019)) to 0.070 (= 0.0569 + 0.363 × 0.034), i.e. 39%.
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regressors remain at a similar size and the competition regressors turn out
to be insignificant. This result suggests that the effect of foreign competition
on agency problems is relatively small once we control for intermediate good
imports.
Columns (4) and (5) replicate the specifications from columns (2) and (3)
but use market capitalization as the proxy for firm performance. The esti-
mated coefficients yield qualitatively similar results. In column (4), the coef-
ficient estimate of 0.204 for β2 suggests that the average rise of the exposure
to trade in tasks between 1998 and 2011 has contributed to an increase of the
average compensation elasticity with respect to stock market capitalization of
about 8% from 0.135 to 0.146.
To address endogeneity from omitted variables or reversed causality and
to correct for attenuation bias from measurement errors, I estimate the effect
of trade in tasks with two stage least squares, where I instrument task trade
with the variable supply, the world export supply of intermediate goods. As
task trade is the endogenous regressor in the empirical model, the interaction
supply × per f is used as an instrument for the interaction term task trade ×
per f . Table IV.2 presents the estimation results of the first stage regressions.
The first stage estimates show that input supply is strongly associated with a
larger share of imported intermediates. As there are either one or two endoge-
nous regressors, Table IV.2 reports the Angrist-Pischke version of first stage
F-statistics22 which are between 59.62 and 588.61 in all specifications and thus
the null hypothesis of insignificant instruments can be rejected for any com-
mon significance level. Furthermore, the joint Kleibergen-Paap F-statistics be-
tween 104.20 and 588.61 reject the null hypothesis of weak identification for
any common significance level.
The instrumental variable results from the second stage regressions are
provided in Table IV.3. The specifications resemble those presented for the or-
dinary least squares estimations in Table IV.1. Columns (1) to (3) again present
results using EBIT to proxy for firm performance and columns (4) and (5) use
market capitalization instead. The two stage least squares estimation results
are qualitatively similar to the ordinary least squares estimates. However, the
22Instead of testing whether the equation is identified as a whole, the Angrist-Pischke statis-
tic tests the null hypothesis whether one of the endogenous regressors is under- or weakly
identified (see Angrist and Pischke (2009)).
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estimated coefficients for task trade and task trade× per f tend to be larger in
absolute terms compared to their ordinary least squares counterparts which
could be due attenuation bias.
Column (1) estimates the direct effect of trade in tasks on the level of ex-
ecutive compensation. A one percentage point increase of the fraction of im-
ported intermediates raises executive compensation by 1.34%. The estimated
elasticity of compensation with respect to changes in EBIT is 0.058 and thus
very close the coefficient estimate from ordinary least squares.
Column (2) estimates the influence of task trade on performance sensitiv-
ity. The coefficient estimate of the interaction task trade × perf suggests that
a one percentage point raise in task trade increases the performance payment
elasticity by 0.005. In column (3) I include import pen and import pen× perf
to control for effects from tougher import competition. The affect of foreign
competition on executive compensation appears to be insignificant but the co-
efficient for task trade × perf increases from 0.539 to 0.810.
Columns (4) and (5) again use market capitalization as performance mea-
sure. The estimates in column (4) suggest that a one percentage point increase
in task trade increases the performance payment elasticity by 0.03. Similar to
the specification with EBIT in column (3), this effect is enhanced when con-
trolling for import competition in column (5).
Figure IV.1 provides an illustration how the growth of intermediate goods
trade has shaped incentives in executive compensation over time. The graph
plots the effects of trade in tasks on the development of the compensation
elasticity to firm performance over the sample period. The graphs are based
on annual sample averages of task trade and the estimated IV coefficients in
columns (3) and (5) of Table IV.3 to calculate β̂2task trade + δ̂per f , where δ̂per f
is the coefficient estimate for ln per f . The solid line plots the effect of trade in
tasks on the elasticity of compensation to changes in EBIT. On average, the in-
crease of intermediate imports between 1998 and 2011 has led to considerable
increases in managerial incentives. While a 1% increase of EBIT raised exec-
utive compensation by 0.04% in 1998, the growth of task trade increased this
effect by 109% to an 0.084% compensation increase in 2011. The dashed line
plots the effect of trade in tasks on the elasticity of compensation to changes
in market capitalization. While a 1% increase of market capitalization raised
executive compensation by 0.13% in 1998, the growth of task trade increased
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Figure IV.1: Trade in Tasks and Pay-Performance Elasticity
The graph illustrates the effects of the increase in intermediate goods trade on managerial
incentive compensation over time. The calculation of the effects is based on the estimates
of the coefficients for task trade × ln perf and ln perf from columns (3) and (5) in Table IV.3.
The solid line plots the effect of trade in tasks on the evolution of the payment elasticity with
respect to changes in EBIT. The dashed line plots the effect of trade in tasks on the evolution
of the payment elasticity with respect to changes in market capitalization.
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this effect by 26% to an 0.16% compensation increase in 2011.
Trade in Tasks and Wage Inequality between Workers and Managers
Table IV.4 presents the ordinary least squares estimates of model (IV.2). Ta-
ble IV.5 presents first stage results and Table IV.6 the second stage estimations
from two stages least squares. The number of observations is smaller com-
pared to the estimation sample for the model (IV.1) as the dependent variable
gi f sct requires additional information on employment and the aggregate wage
bill at the firm level. All specifications only differ in the dependent variable
compared to those in model (IV.1). The measures of firm performance are
either the natural logarithm of EBIT in columns (1) to (3) or the natural loga-
rithm of market capitalization in columns (4) and (5). Again, all specifications
control for firm size (assets), industry value added, industry employment,
region-year fix effects and manager fix effects. Standard errors are clustered
at the firm level to allow for autocorrelation of the error terms within firms.
Column (1) in Table IV.4 estimates the average effect of trade in tasks on
the wage inequality between executives and the aggregate workforce. The co-
efficient for task trade is not significantly different from zero. The elasticity
of manager-worker wage inequality with respect to EBIT is 0.0229 (the coeffi-
cient for ln per f ) and is significant at the one percent significance level. This
suggests that increases in EBIT also raise the wage inequality between man-
agers and workers. Potentially, this results from performance payments for
managers. The average salary at the firm level reacts less to changes in firm
performance as executive compensation (the corresponding coefficient esti-
mate for the compensation of executives in Table IV.1 was 0.0582).
Column (2) additionally includes the interaction term task trade × per f .
The interaction term reveals that trade in tasks affects the wage inequality
between workers and managers via the performance channel. While the level
effect is negative (-1.796) and significant at the 5% level, increases in task trade
raise wage inequality for sufficiently high levels of EBIT (the coefficient for the
interaction term is 0.419 and significant at the 1% level). This again suggests
that performance related payments for executives are an important determi-
nant of the wage inequality between executives and average firm wages. As
the estimates of the executive payment structure in model (IV.1) already have
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revealed that trade in tasks increases the elasticity of executive compensation
with respect to firm performance, this drives a wedge between the salaries of
managers and workers since the latter are less compensated for performance
at the firm level. Column (3) controls for changes in import penetration.
The estimates for import competition are insignificant and the coefficients for
task trade× per f and task trade remain at a similar level.
Column (4) and (5) use market capitalization to measure the performance
of firms based on stock market responses. The estimation results suggest sim-
ilar conclusions. The coefficient of task trade× per f is again positive and sig-
nificant at the 5% level, while the level effect task trade remains negative at
-1.916 and is also significant at the 5% level. Column (5) includes the control
variables for import competition. The inclusion of import penetration turns
the coefficients for task trade× per f and task trade toward zero and increases
their standard errors such that both coefficient remain not significantly differ-
ent from zero. Also the import penetration coefficients remain insignificant.
Tables IV.5 and IV.6 present the two stage least squares estimation results.
As the specifications of the explanatory variables are similar to those in model
(IV.1), the first stage estimations in Table IV.5 only differ in the smaller sample
size. Table IV.6 presents the second stage estimation results. The average level
effect of task trade in column (1) again turns out insignificant and the elasticity
of wage inequality with respect to firm performance equals 0.0226 and is sig-
nificant at the 1% level. The inclusion of the interaction term task trade× per f
in column (2) indicates that trade in tasks increases wage inequality via the
performance channel: the coefficient for the interaction term equals 0.901 and
is significant at the 1% level while the level effect is -3.750 and is significant at
the 5% level. This suggests that the increase in task trade over time had two
implications for the wage inequality between workers and managers within
firms. First, it reduced wage inequality as the average salaries tended to in-
crease faster than the fix part of executive compensation (the coefficients for
task trade in column (2) and (3) are smaller in Table IV.6 than in Table IV.3).
Second, as trade in tasks makes executive compensation more elastic with re-
spect to firm performance, wage inequality between managers and workers
becomes larger. These results also remain valid if market capitalization is em-
ployed as performance measure in columns (4) and (5). While the interaction
term task trade× per f is positive and significantly different from zero, the level
CHAPTER IV. EXECUTIVE PAY AND TRADE IN TASKS 114
effect of task trade is negative.
Robustness
I conduct two robustness exercises to evaluate the robustness of the presented
evidence. The first robustness check replaces the compensation variable and
uses information on equity-linked compensation as the alternative dependent
variable. Since equity is the largest component of executive compensation
and potentially the majority of it is paid to incentivize managers, I focus here
solely on equity to estimate the effects of trade in tasks on incentives. The sec-
ond robustness check employs firm fix effects instead of individual manager
fix effects. Although individual fix effects control for any time invariant het-
erogeneity at the individual level such as ability, there is room for alternative
interpretations of the regression estimates. For example, if the identification
works within managers that switch jobs from smaller to larger firms (in terms
of EBIT or market capitalization), the performance term per f captures a wage
premium that is paid for managers when they switch occupations towards
larger firms. Such a wage premium from job turnovers also creates incentives
for managers as these become more motivated to expend effort in order to be
hired by larger firms. However, the estimated coefficients do not only cap-
ture the direct response of compensation due to performance improvements
within firms but also the indirect incentives from movements of managers be-
tween firms. Furthermore, a positive interaction term task trade× per f could
be interpreted as a larger wage premium from job turnovers in more task trade
intensive sectors. The application of firm fix effects isolates the former effect
as identification works between managers within a firm across time. Table C.5
in the Appendix presents the robustness estimates.
Columns (1) to (4) present estimations with equity compensation as the
dependent variable. The positive effect of trade in tasks on the performance
elasticity of executive compensation remains valid. However, the coefficient
estimates for the interaction term task trade× per f tend to be larger for equity
compensation compared to the effects on total executive compensation. This
is consistent with the interpretation that task trade increases the monetary
incentives that managers face.
Columns (5) to (12) show evidence from estimations with firm fix effects
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instead of manager fix effects. Consequently, the source of variation that is
exploited in these specifications is variation across managers and time within
individual firms. The results are qualitatively similar to the estimations with
manager fix effects.
IV.4 Conclusion
Using data on the compensation of executives in European and U.S. compa-
nies, I analyze how the exposure to intermediate good imports affects execu-
tive compensation.
In order to identify the effects of trade in tasks on executive compensa-
tion, I exploit variation in the world export supply of intermediate goods to
instrument for changes in intermediate good imports.
I find that more trade in tasks leads to more incentives in the compensation
of executives. Increases in the share of imported intermediates at the industry
level make executive compensation more elastic to changes in firm earnings
and market capitalization.
Additionally, the estimates suggest that increases in the share of imported
intermediates raise the earnings inequality between executives and the firm
workforce, in particular when firms have higher earnings or market capital-
ization.
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Figure IV.2: Growth of Intermediate and Final Goods Trade (in millions of
USD)
The graphs plot imports of intermediate and final goods (in million USD) in continental Eu-
rope (blue), the U.K. (red) and the U.S. (green). European imports include intra-European
trade.
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Figure IV.3: Dynamics of Executive Compensation
The graph plots the evolution of average total executive compensation in natural logarithms
of real 1,000 USD (base period is January 2000) after netting out individual manager fix effects
to correct for selection effects. Although the average level of compensation is absorbed by the
fix effects, the slopes allow to compare the dynamics of compensation in the U.S., U.K. and
continental Europe.
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A.1 Theory Appendix
The Optimal Choice of Governance and Performance Pay
The owner’s problem is
maxw,g ε (Y− w) + (1− ε) gRw− Cwg
s.t.
εw ≥ (1− g) B
εw ≥W
with Cw ∈ ((1− ε) Rw, (1− ε) Rw + B). This assumption ensures that the
choice of governance is nontrivial. Governance would be always g∗ = 1 if
Cw < (1− ε) Rw and g∗ = 0 if Cw > (1− ε) Rw + B. A case distinction is
necessary to find the optimal contract.
Case i) W > B: In that case the incentive constraint is slack whenever the par-
ticipation constraint is satisfied. Consequently, the incentive constraint may
be neglected and the agent receives a bonus w = W/ε. Since incentives do not
matter and to save on governance costs, the principal leaves all the power to
the CEO and chooses g∗ = 0 (since (1− ε) Rw− Cw < 0).
Case ii) W ≤ B: This case is somewhat less trivial since here it depends on the
121
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level of governance g which constraint will bind. More governance increases
the expected liquidation value ((1− ε) gRw) and rises monitoring costs (Cwg).
Since Cw > (1− ε) gRw, more governance costs the principal. Nevertheless,
there is a positive effect of governance: stricter governance creates incentives
for the agent to behave (exert effort). Suppose that the principal sets gov-
ernance so weak such that g < 1− WB . Then, the incentive constraint would
require that w ≥ (1− g) Bε . Thus, it is inefficient to reduce governance because
it requires a relatively stronger increase in performance pay w. Next, suppose
that g > 1− WB such that only the participation constraint binds. Since gover-
nance bears a cost for the principal, she can improve by reducing g such that
both constraints are still satisfied.
Credibility of CEO Reservation Wages
Suppose the infinitesimally smaller firm with production technology z0 is not
willing to offer a bonus payment that equals the current CEO’s bonus plus
his additional marginal benefit for the firm ∂ (εY (z, s)) /∂s. Then, the CEO
could choose to go to the next infinitesimally smaller firm z00 → z−0 and try
to get an offer there and if not, proceed to the next smaller firm and so on.
The last firm that the CEO could address is the marginal firm with production
technology zc = tsc which pays an expected CEO wage of εw (sc) = w. It
would be unambiguously beneficial for this marginal firm to employ the CEO
with skill s and pay him a little ε → 0 more compared to the bonus of the
currently employed marginal CEO. Then again, the firm that is marginally
more productive than the marginal firm would benefit from paying the CEO
2ε more and so on until we are back at the firm with production technology
z0 that is willing to pay its current CEO’s bonus plus the additional marginal
benefit of the more skilled CEO ∂εY(z,s)∂s |z=z(s) to prevent him from leaving.
Hence, the derived outside option is subgame-perfect and therefore credible.
Closed Economy Equilibrium
The equilibrium in the closed economy is found in two steps. In a first step, the
managerial cutoff skill sc and the aggregate expenditure X are determined. Af-
terwards, the critical cutoff skill s̃ can be found. Firms with managerial skills
CHAPTER A. APPENDIX CHAPTER II 123
s > s̃ choose the weakest level of governance g = 0. Firms with manage-
rial skills s ∈ [sc, s̃] use stricter governance to incentivize their CEOs, instead.
The equilibrium solution (X, sc) is pinned down by the zero cutoff earnings
and the labor market clearing curve: the marginal firm with skill level sc just
breaks even and the aggregate expenditure on production labor must equal
the aggregate production labor earnings.
Closed Economy Price Index
The price index can be restated in terms of the model fundamentals and the
cutoff talent level sc. After exchanging variables and integrating over the skill
distribution, the price index P may be written as follows:
P =
[ˆ ∞
sc
(
σ
σ− 1wt
−κs−(κ+µ)
)
1−σdεL(1− s−1)
]1/(1−σ)
=
σ
σ− 1 t
−κw
(
ψ
εL
)1/(σ−1)
sψ/(σ−1)c ,
where ψ ≡ 1− (σ − 1)(κ + µ). In order to ensure existence of the improper
integral, I need to assume that (σ − 1)(κ + µ) < 1 which intuitively means
that there does not exist any firm that is sufficiently efficient to bring the price
index down to zero.
Zero Cutoff Earnings Condition
The expected operating profits can be written in terms of X and sc such that the
ZCE curve is a decreasing function X(sc): The zero cutoff earnings condition
requires that the marginal firm is indifferent between entering or leaving the
market. Since W (sc) = w < B and thus g (sc) ∗ = 1− wεB we have
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εM
(
tκsκ+µc
w
)σ−1
=
(
1− w
εB
)
(C− (1− ε) R)w + w
X =
σL
((
1− wεB
)
(C− (1− ε) R) + 1
)
w
ψ
s−1c .
X =
σLλw
ψ
s−1c .
Labor Market Clearing Condition
The labor market clearing condition requires that the aggregate expenditure
on production labor is equal to the aggregate earnings of the production work-
ers. The aggregate expenditure on production workers is equal to Lw(1 −
s−1c ). The aggregate demand for production workers can be obtained by inte-
grating up the demand of an individual firm over all producing firms in the
economy. A firm uses 1/ϕj units of labor per unit of output and produces qj
units of output with probability ε. The demand for production labor of an in-
dividual firm can be written in terms of prices since qj = xj/pj = XPσ−1p−σj
and 1/ϕj = σ−1σ pj. Demand for production labor is thus given by
ε
qj
ϕj
= ε
[
σ− 1
σ
XPσ−1p1−σj
]
.
Integrating the production labor demand for the individual firm over all ac-
tive firms of the economy yields
ˆ Ls−1c
0
[
ε
σ− 1
σ
XPσ−1p1−σj
]
dj = ε
σ− 1
σ
XPσ−1
ˆ Ls−1c
0
p1−σj dj
= ε
σ− 1
σ
X.
Setting this expression equal to the aggregate supply from above gives the
labor market clearing condition
X =
L
ε
σ
σ− 1w(1− s
−1
c ).
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Explicit Equilibrium Solution for (X, sc, s̃) in the Closed Economy
Solving for the cutoff skill s−1c by setting the two conditions equal yields
L
ε
σ
σ− 1w
(
1− s−1c
)
=
σLλw
ψ
s−1c ⇔ sc = 1 +
ε (σ− 1) λ
ψ
.
Solving for the expenditure share X by plugging the solution for sc into the
labor market clearing condition yields
X =
L
ε
σ
σ− 1w
[
1−
(
1 +
ε (σ− 1) λ
ψ
)−1]
⇔ X = σLλw
ψ + ε(σ− 1)λ .
The equilibrium market size M of a firm can be stated as follows:
M ≡ 1
σ
(
σ
σ− 1
)1−σ
XPσ−1
=
λ
ε
wσt−κ(σ−1)sψ−1c
Consider next the critical cutoff skill level s̃. This cutoff is implicitly defined
by
εM
(
tκ
w
)σ−1 µ
κ + µ
(
s̃(κ+µ)(σ−1) − s(κ+µ)(σ−1)c
)
+ w = B.
Plugging in M and the equilibrium solution for sc gives
(
s̃
sc
)1−ψ
=
(
1 +
(κ + µ) (B− w)
λµw
) 1
1−ψ
sc.
There is a mass of Ls−1c firms in equilibrium and a mass of Ls̃−1 firms choose
the weakest corporate governance g = 0. Hence, the share of power organi-
zations is given as follows:
θ =
Ls̃−1
Ls−1
=
(
1 +
(κ + µ) (B− w)
λµw
) 1
ψ−1
.
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The Effects of Skill-Biased Technological Change
Consider the effects of an increase in κ in the model. While the labor market
clearing condition is left unaffected, there are two opposing effects on the zero
cutoff earnings conditions: a positive productivity effect and a negative price
index effect. Since an increase in κ disproportionally benefits the productivity
of the competing firms, skill-biased technological change toughens selection.
Consider the selection effect ∂sc/∂κ:
∂sc
∂κ
=
∂ψ
∂κ
∂sc
∂ψ
=
∂ [1− (σ− 1)(κ + µ)]
∂κ
∂
[
1 + ψ−1 (ε (σ− 1) λ)
]
∂ψ
= [−(σ− 1)]
[
−ψ−2 (ε (σ− 1) λ)
]
= ελ
(
σ− 1
ψ
)2
> 0.
Next consider the effect of skill-biased technological change on the expendi-
ture level:
∂X
∂κ
=
∂ψ
∂κ
∂X
∂ψ
=
∂ [1− (σ− 1)(κ + µ)]
∂κ
∂
[
σλL (ψ + ελ(σ− 1))−1
]
∂ψ
= [−(σ− 1)]
[
−σλL (ψ + ελ(σ− 1))−2
]
=
σλL(σ− 1)
(ψ + ελ(σ− 1))2
> 0.
In order to evaluate how skill-biased technological change affects the share of
organizations with weakest governance, the effects on θ needs to be analyzed.
Consider how a change in κ affects θ. The share θ can be restated in the fol-
lowing way
θ =
(
λµw
λµw + (κ + µ) (B− w)
) 1
(κ+µ)(σ−1)
.
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A rise in κ has two effects on θ: a negative bargaining effect and a positive
productivity effect. The negative bargaining effect is captured by an increase
of the denominator such that θ decreases. The positive productivity effect is
captured by the decrease of the exponent such that θ rises.
In order to evaluate the sign of the overall effect, I take the logarithm of θ and
consider its derivative ∇ (κ):
∇ (κ) = ∂ ln (θ)
∂κ
=
∂
(
ln
((
λµw+(κ+µ)(B−w)
λµw
)− 1
(κ+µ)(σ−1)
))
∂κ
=
∂
(
1
−(κ+µ)(σ−1) ln
(
λµw+(κ+µ)(B−w)
λµw
))
∂κ
.
Using the product and chain rule gives
∂
(
1
−(κ+µ)(σ−1) ln
(
λµw+(κ+µ)(B−w)
λµw
))
∂κ
=
1
(κ+µ)(σ−1)
(
1
(κ+µ)
ln
(
λµw+(κ+µ)(B−w)
λµw
)
− B−w
λµw+(κ+µ)(B−w)
)
,
where the term (κ + µ)−2 (σ− 1)−1 ln
(
λµw+(κ+µ)(B−w)
λµw
)
captures the positive
productivity effect while the term − 1
(κ+µ)(σ−1)
B−w
λµw+(κ+µ)(B−w) corresponds to
the negative bargaining effect. The positive productivity effect outweighs the
negative bargaining effect if and only if
1
(κ + µ)
ln
(
λµw + (κ + µ) (B− w)
λµw
)
>
B− w
λµw + (κ + µ) (B− w)
ln
(
λµ + (κ + µ) (B− w)
λµw
)
>
(B− w) (κ + µ)
λµw + (κ + µ) (B− w) ,
which is always true since the left hand side is strictly larger than one while
the right hand side is always strictly smaller than one. Consequently, skill-
biased technological change unambiguously increases the share of organiza-
tions with g = 0 in equilibrium.
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Open Economy Equilibrium
Marginal Exporters and Marginal Local Firms
Since firms face identical demand elasticities in both markets, the operating
profit ratio of a marginal exporter and a marginal local firm can be stated as
εYx(sx)
εYd(sd)
=
ετ1−σ M
(
tκsκ+µx
w
)σ−1
εM
(
tκsκ+µd
w
)σ−1 = f w((1− wεB) (C− (1− ε) R) + 1)w
which yields
sx =
(
τσ−1 f
λ
) 1
1−ψ
sd.
Open Economy Price Index
After exchanging variables and integrating over the skill distribution, the price
index P in the open economy with two identical countries can be written as
P =
[ˆ ∞
sd
(
σ
σ− 1 wt
−κs−(κ+µ)
)
1−σdεL(1− s−1)
+
ˆ ∞
sx
(
τ
σ
σ− 1 wt
−κs−(κ+µ)
)
1−σdεL(1− s−1)
]1/(1−σ)
.
= wt−κ
σ
σ− 1
(
ψ
εL
) 1
σ−1
s
ψ
σ−1
d
[
1 + τ−
1
κ+µ f
−ψ
1−ψ λ
ψ
1−ψ
]1/(1−σ)
.
Next, use the index of bilateral distance ∆ ≡ τ
1
κ+µ f
ψ
1−ψ to restate the open
economy version of P as follows:
P =
σ
σ− 1wt
−κ
(
ψ
εL
) 1
σ−1
s
ψ
σ−1
d
[
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
]1/(1−σ)
.
Labor Market Clearing Condition in the Open Economy
The aggregate earnings of production workers remains unchanged compared
to the closed economy case at Lw(1− s−1d ). The expenditure on production
labor now is comprised of three components: (i) labor expenditure required to
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produce for the domestic market, (ii) labor expenditure required to produce
for the foreign market, and (iii) labor expenditure to cover the fixed export
investment:
ˆ Ls−1d
0
[
ε
σ− 1
σ
XPσ−1p1−σj
]
dj +
ˆ Ls−1x
0
[
ε
σ− 1
σ
XPσ−1τ1−σ p1−σj
]
dj + f wLs−1x .
This term for the aggregate production labor expenditure may be simplified
as follows:
= ε
σ− 1
σ
XPσ−1
[ˆ Ls−1d
0
p1−σj dj + τ
1−σ
ˆ Ls−1x
0
p1−σj dj
]
+ f wLs−1x
= ε
σ− 1
σ
XPσ−1
[(
σ
σ− 1wt
−κ
)1−σ ( ψ
εL
)−1
s−ψd
(
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
)]
+ f wLs−1x
= ε
σ− 1
σ
X + f wLs−1x
Setting supply and demand equal leads to
ε
σ− 1
σ
X + f wLs−1x = Lw(1− s−1d );
and after replacing sx one obtains
ε
σ− 1
σ
X + f wL
(
τσ−1 f
λ
) 1
ψ−1
s−1d = Lw(1− s
−1
d )
X =
σ
σ− 1
L
ε
w
(
1− s−1d
(
1 + λ
1
1−ψ ∆−1
))
.
Zero Cutoff Earnings Condition in the Open Economy
Again, the marginal firm is an incentive organization and just breaks even
such that
εY(sd) =
(
1− w
εB
)
(C− (1− ε) R)w + w.
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The expected operating profits can be written in terms of X and sd such that
the zero cutoff curve is a decreasing function in the X(sd) locus:
εY(sd) = εM
(
tκsκ+µd
w
)σ−1
= X
ψ
σL
[
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
]−1
sd.
Setting this equal to
(
1− wεB
)
(C− (1− ε) R)w + w yields the zero cutoff con-
dition for the open economy
X
ψ
σL
[
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
]−1
sd =
((
1− w
εB
)
(C− (1− ε) R) + 1
)
w
X =
σLλw
ψ
[
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
]
s−1d .
Explicit Equilibrium Solution for (X, sd) in the Open Economy
Solve first for the cutoff sd:
σLλw
ψ
[
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
]
s−1d =
σ
σ− 1
L
ε
w
(
1− s−1d
(
1 + λ
1
1−ψ ∆−1
))
sd = 1 +
ελ (σ− 1)
ψ
+
(
1 +
ε (σ− 1)
ψ
)
λ
1
1−ψ ∆−1
Note that lim∆→∞ sd = sc.
Plug the solution for sd into the zero cutoff earnings condition:
X =
σLλw
ψ
(
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
)(
1 +
ελ (σ− 1)
ψ
+
(
1 +
ε (σ− 1)
ψ
)
λ
1
1−ψ ∆−1
)−1
X =
σLλw
(
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
)
ψ + ελ (σ− 1) + (ψ + ε (σ− 1)) λ
1
1−ψ ∆−1
.
Also the aggregate expenditure level equals the expenditure level in the closed
economy case when the index of economic distance ∆ approaches infinity.
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Additionally, note that ∂X∂∆ > 0 since
∂X
∂∆
=
λLσψw
(
λ
1
1−ψ − λ
ψ
1−ψ
)
(
∆ (ελ (σ− 1) + ψ) + λ
1
1−ψ (ψ + ε (σ− 1))
)2 .
The Size of the Market Share M in the Open Economy Equilibrium
The equilibrium market share M of a firm can again be stated as follows:
M ≡ 1
σ
(
σ
σ− 1
)1−σ
XPσ−1
=
1
σ
(
σ
σ− 1
)1−σ  σLλw
(
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
)
ψ + ελ (σ− 1) + (ψ + ε (σ− 1)) λ
1
1−ψ ∆−1
×
[
σ
σ− 1 wt
−κ
(
ψ
εL
) 1
σ−1
s
ψ
σ−1
d
[
1 + λ
ψ
1−ψ ∆−1
] 1
1−σ
]σ−1
=
λ
ε
wσt−κ(σ−1)sψ−1d
Effects of a Trade Integration
Consider the effect of a trade integration (∆ ↓) on the share of organizations
with no investment in corporate governance θ. I distinguish between two
different scenarios, here:
1. low trade openness: the fix and/or variable trade costs are large that
only the must productive firms choose to serve the export markets such
that the sorting of cutoff skill levels is sd < s̃ < sx.
2. high trade openness: the fix and/or variable trade costs are sufficiently
small that relatively many firms choose to serve the export markets such
that the sorting of cutoff skill levels is sd < sx < s̃.
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Low Trade Openness
The organizational cutoff s̃ can be evaluated as in the closed economy case
εM
(
tκ
w
)σ−1 µ
κ + µ
(
s̃(κ+µ)(σ−1) − s(κ+µ)(σ−1)d
)
+ w = B(
s̃
sd
)1−ψ
= 1 +
(κ + µ) (B− w)
λµw
s̃ =
(
1 +
(κ + µ) (B− w)
λµw
) 1
1−ψ
sd
High Trade Openness
The organizational cutoff s̃ in the open economy case is
εM
(
tκ
w
)σ−1 µ
κ+µ
((
s̃1−ψ − s1−ψd
)
+ τ1−σ
(
s̃1−ψ − s1−ψx
))
+ w = B(
s̃
sd
)1−ψ (
1 + τ1−σ
)
=
(
(κ+µ)(B−w)
λµw −
λ
τ2(σ−1) f
+ 1
)
such that s̃ and the share of organizations that choose g = 0 are equal to
s̃ =
((
(κ + µ) (B− w) + λµw
λµw
− λ
τ2(σ−1) f
)(
1
1 + τ1−σ
)) 1
1−ψ
sd
θ =
((
(κ + µ) (B− w) + λµw
λµw
− λ
τ2(σ−1) f
)(
1
1 + τ1−σ
))− 1(κ+µ)(σ−1)
.
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Figure A.1: CEO Wages, Skill-Intensity and Export Activity across U.S. indus-
tries 1999 - 2001
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A.2 Data Appendix
Preparation of the BoardEx Data
Before equity compensation from BoardEx could be applied in the empiri-
cal models, a number of preparation steps were necessary. Since BoardEx
includes both, executives and supervisory managers, the latter were excluded
from the sample throughout. Furthermore, BoardEx reports several distinct
incomes for some executives that hold different positions within the board
of the same firm. Those incomes have been aggregated at the manager-firm-
year level to obtain the aggregate executive compensation. The next step of
preparation involved the deletion of double entries: Although most data items
stem from annual report data, there is also some reporting from quarterly
announcements included. Those data points from quarterly announcements
have been excluded. Furthermore, reporting periods have been assimilated by
switching from accounting periods which start at different months depending
on each firm in the sample to calendar years. Since job titles are not perfectly
consistent, CEOs were identified as the highest paid executive in each firm in
a given year.
Construction of the Instrumental Variable
The variable that I use as an instrument for trade openness is the weighted
average of real effective exchange rates rt (c) of the top 5 U.S. export destina-
tions c: Canada, Mexico, Great Britain, China and Japan. Each weight αj (c) is
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the average country c’s share of exports relative to the total exports of those
five countries from the U.S. during 1991 - 1995 at the industry level j (at the
SIC 4-digit level):
αj (c) =
Ø exportsj (c)
∑5c=1 Ø exportsj (c)
IVjt =
5
∑
c=1
αj (c) rt (c)
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics
variable observations mean min max std. dev.
Entrenchment Panel
entrenchment index 13732 2.32 0 6 1.34
openness 7588 0.18 -51.64 55.89 1.93
ln openness 7132 2.52 -4.54 8.63 1.59
ICT contribution % 25272 0.94 -0.51 6.44 0.89
employment 17123 12719.22 0 1900000 40318.54
ln employment 17123 8.02 0 14.46 1.76
assets 17561 7305301 1 1460000000 41200000
ln assets 17561 13.84 0.69 21.10 1.82
total investment return 16730 48.26 -99.99 159400.00 1905.39
tfp index 19540 2.26 0.47 44.24 5.91
REER basket 20332 99.48 72.25 157.90 8.80
Equity Compensation Panel
CEO equity compensation 12185 6382.44 0 1322156 18775.78
ln CEO equity compensation 12067 7.64 -1.29 14.09 1.68
openness 4726 0.23 -21.23 13.96 1.34
ln openness 4401 2.66 -3.31 7.24 1.58
ICT contribution % 13528 0.75 -0.51 6.44 0.89
employment 13206 18763.49 0 1900000 58450.28
ln employment 13195 8.33 0.69 14.46 1.82
assets 13380 17203290 3.815 1884318000 87481700
ln assets 13380 14.48 1.34 21.36 1.85
total investment return 13028 26.63 -97.50 159400.00 1406.45
tfp index 5366 4.28 9.98 0.47 44.24
REER basket 5607 100.03 74.97 151.88 7.56
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Table A.2: Description of Variables
variable description
E-index Entrenchment index from Bebchuk et al. (2009). The index ranges from 0 (good
corporate governance - little entrenchment) to 6 (bad corporate governance - large
entrenchment) and counts how many of the following attributes are applied in a
company in a given year: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments,
poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers as well
as for charter amendments. Information on the six different governance attributes is
provided by the IRRC and includes S&P 500 firms and other large U.S. firms.
Data source: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml
ln CEO equity
compensation
Natural logarithm of the equity-linked compensation in 1000 USD of the highest-paid
officer in the firm during a given year.
Data source: BoardEx database
ln openness Natural logarithm of openness in %, where openness is exports/(gross output - imports).
Gross output is approximated as the sum of value added, material costs, energy costs
and labor compensation. All variables are at the 4-digit SIC industry level for the
main industry of each firm in the sample.
Data sources: exports and imports are obtained from the UN COMTRADE WITS
database http://wits.worldbank.org/; gross output is calculated with data from the
NBER CES Manufacturing Industry database http://www.nber.org/nberces/
tfp index Total factor productivity index on the SIC 4-digit level based on 4 factors of
production (production workers, non-production workers, material inputs, capital)
with the base year 1987, where the index takes the value 1.
Data source: NBER-CES Mft. Industry database http://www.nber.org/nberces/
ICT contribution
%
Contribution of information and communication technology (ICT) capital services to
value added growth in percentage points for the main industry of the firm at the ISIC
Rev. 3 level.
Data source: http://www.euklems.net/
ln employment Natural logarithm of the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment
in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment
and other assets in 1000 USD.
Data source: Thomson Worldscope database
ln assets Stock return in % corrected for dividend payments. total investment return = 100% x
((market price year end + dividends p. share + special dividends) / last year’s market
price year end) - 1)
Data source: Thomson Worldscope database
total investment
return
Total factor productivity index on the SIC 4-digit level based on 4 factors of
production (production workers, non-production workers, material inputs, capital)
with the base year 1987, where the index takes the value 1.
Data source: NBER-CES Mft. Industry database http://www.nber.org/nberces/
REER basket weighted average of the real effective exchange rates of top 5 U.S. trading partners
Canada, Mexico, Great Britain, China and Japan. Weights are the country share of U.S.
imports during 1991-1995 at the SIC 4-digit level. REER are domestic prices relative to
the world price (larger REER means greater comparative advantage for the U.S.)
Data source: weights are obtained from COMTRADE WITS; exchange rate from the
BRUEGEL REER database.
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Construction of Export Market Shares
We define the export market share of firm i in country c as the ratio of firm
exports to export competition in destination region K:
mKic =
exportsKic
compKic
,
where exportsKic are firm exports from country c to region K and compKic is
the export competition of firm i in region K. We measure export competition
as a weighted average of industry imports into region K, where the set of
industries considered is firm specific. Note that we only look at competition
by other exporters and do not consider domestic supply in destination K. One
effect of this simplification is that destination specific effects, such as a strong
preference for domestic goods, are partly muted. The ranking we obtain then
resembles a ranking within exporters and not within firms in general.
Export competition is constructed as follows:
compKic = wi
1
N1i
∑
s∈S1i
∑
k∈K\{c}
importsks + (1− wi)
1
N2i
∑
s∈S2i
∑
k∈K\{c}
importsks,
137
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where wi is the proportion of turnover related to firm i’s core business ob-
tained from EFIGE, serving us as a weight for primary industries. N1i and
S1i are the number and set of distinct primary industries respectively and
are obtained from Amadeus. k are the individual countries in region K and
importsks are all industry s imports into country k which we obtain from the
UN Comtrade WITS database. Secondary industry characteristics are defined
analogically.1
When summing up the industry imports in destination region K, we have
to account for the fact that the home country c of firm i might be part of that re-
gion. Thus, when we define the world to be the region of interest, we subtract
imports into country c from the sum of imports over all countries in order
to obtain the relevant export market. Naturally, the world export market is
different for France than it is for Germany.
1Besides the four digit primary and secondary codes, Amadeus provides a three digit core
code for each firm. If no information on primary and secondary industries was provided, we
use the core code information in order to construct the export competition. To avoid scaling
issues, we construct the core code trade flow as an average over all lower-level four digit
trade flows. If firms did not provide information on the share of turnover they relate to the
core business, we use the sample average (90%) for weighting. Note that about two thirds of
the firms in our sample assign all their activity to the core business line. Of those, many still
provide information on distinct primary and secondary industries. As this might cast doubt
on our weighting scheme, we also tried using only the core code industry or only primary
industries for calculations. Our results were robust to such alterations.
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Table B.1: Summary Statistics
variable observations mean min max std. dev.
world export market share 9807 0.0590 0 33.450 0.548
export volume EXPvol 10255 10698.02 0 4827955 105146.4
exports / turnover EXPshare 13988 0.179 0 1 0.263
offshoring (relative to all intermediates
purchased)
14031 0.107 0 1 0.214
offshoring (relative to turnover) 13856 0.0397 0 1 0.102
FDI (relative to turnover) 14146 0.014 0 1 0.085
service offshoring (relative to turnover) 14631 0.003 0 1 0.0231
decentralized management 14138 0.291 0 1 0.454
product quality (relative to highest quality in
the market 100)
14653 87.38 0 100 15.34
product quality (normalized) 14653 0.00 -8.40 1.37 1.00
product innovation 14654 0.491 0 1 0.50
process innovation 14654 0.441 0 1 0.497
employment 14654 92.80838 10 30000 502.1967
turnover 10781 32012.23 0.0266 2.06×107 295586.1
labor productivity 10622 192.9212 0 14524.92 374.312
tfp (avg: 2001 - 2007) 10158 -0.0934 -6.616 2.632 0.454
share of family board members 12522 0.435 0 1 0.418
family CEO 14654 0.623 0 1 0.485
young firm 14654 0.070 0 1 0.256
share of high- and medium skilled employees 12813 0.741 0 1 0.295
EQI 2010 (NUTS-2 level) 13060 0.467 -2.284 1.456 0.654
GDP per capita 14654 27695.83 10500 34000 3890.071
population 14654 59779.06 8322 82120 16964.83
foreign wage per employee (Eastern Europe,
abs.)
13761 6244.87 2158.28 7174.23 383.72
foreign wage per employee (China & India,
abs.)
13761 2585.32 897.58 3105.86 157.69
foreign wage per employee (China & India, rel.) 13761 0.0668 0.0180 0.251 0.0287
low skilled labor share in total compensation 13761 0.116 0.0350 0.145 0.00722
world export supply of intermediates 13190 412723 136306.6 1311349 165574
hierarchical religion 14556 0.729 0 0.997 0.298
religious faith 14556 0.163 0 0.468 0.102
trust 14556 0.346 0.165 1 0.0871
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Table B.2: Descriptions of Variables
variable description
world export market
share
share of firm exports to export market competition in the world in %. See B.1 for
detailed information
export volume EXPvol percentage of 2008 annual turnover represented by exports (EFIGE) × operating
revenue in 2008 in th. USD (Amadeus)
exports / turnover
EXPshare
percentage of 2008 annual turnover represented by exports (EFIGE)
offshoring share of 2008 total purchased intermediate goods (from anywhere) represented by
intermediate goods purchased from abroad (EFIGE)
offshoring /
intermediates
share of 2008 annual turnover represented by purchased intermediates goods (from
anywhere)× offshoring (relative to all intermediates purchased) (EFIGE)
FDI percentage of 2008 annual turnover represented by production activities through
direct investment (EFIGE)
service offshoring percentage of 2008 annual turnover represented by purchased services (from
anywhere)× percentage of 2008 total purchased services (from anywhere) represented
by services purchased from abroad (EFIGE)
decentralized
management
dummy indicating that with reference to strategic decisions the firm is decentralized,
i.e. managers can take autonomous decisions in some business areas (EFIGE)
product quality index indicating how firms would rank their main product in terms of quality, when
the maximum quality available in the market equals 100 (EFIGE)
product quality
(normalized)
index indicating how firms would rank their main product in terms of quality, when
the country average in the market is set equal to 0 and the standard deviation of
individual firms is set to 1 (based on EFIGE)
product innovation dummy for firms that carried out any product innovation in years 2007-2009 (EFIGE)
process innovation dummy for firms that carried out any process innovation in years 2007-2009 (EFIGE)
employment total number of employees in the firm’s home country (EFIGE)
turnover operating revenue in 2008 in th. USD (Amadeus)
labor productivity value added per employee: operating revenue in 2008 in th. USD× (1 - offshoring
(relative to turnover) ) / employment
tfp total factor productivity (EFIGE)
share of family board
members
ratio of entrepreneurs/executives (included middle management) who are related to
the family who owns the company to total number of entrepreneurs/executives
(EFIGE)
family CEO dummy for firms where the chief executive officer (CEO)/company head is the
individual who owns or controls the firm or is a member of the family that
owns/controls it (EFIGE)
young firm dummy indicating young innovative companies (year of establishment less than 6
years before survey was taken) (EFIGE)
share of high- and
medium skilled
employees
ratio of white and skilled blue collars to white, skilled blue, unskilled blue collars and
apprentices (EFIGE)
EQI 2010 European Quality of Government Index 2010, see Charron et al. (2014). Due to data
limitations we use the NUTS-2 level for Austria, Spain, France and Italy and the
NUTS-1 level for Germany, UK and Hungary
GDP per capita gross domestic product per capita (in Euro) at the country level 2008, (Eurostat,
nama_r_e2gdp)
population population in thousand at the country level (Eurostat, nama_r_e3popgdp)
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Table B.3: Descriptions of Variables - Instrumental Variables
variable description
foreign wage per
employee (Eastern
Europe, absolute)
ratio of wage (in USD) to employment from INDSTAT4 2013 at the industry-country
level (average 2005 to 2007). The region East consists of Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary
(this resembles the group "other UE countries" in EFIGE). We use the value at the 10th
percentile of these countries in order to guarantee a low wage value for each industry.
We then connect these values at the ISIC input industry level to output industries via
input coefficients from the IO table (OECD Stan, Germany 2005). This results in IO
weighted average values at the output industry level. Using industry correspondence
tables from Eurostat, we can link these ISIC output industry values to the primary,
secondary and core code industries from Amadeus (US SIC). Then the weighting
applies as for the market share.
foreign wage per
employee (China &
India, absolute)
ratio of wage (in USD) to employment from INDSTAT4 2013 at the industry-country
level (average 2005 to 2007). We use the average of the Chinese and the Indian value
(China and India also define a country group in EFIGE). We then connect these values
at the ISIC input industry level to output industries via input coefficients from the IO
table (OECD Stan, Germany 2005). This results in IO weighted average values at the
output industry level. Using industry correspondence tables from Eurostat, we can
link these ISIC output industry values to the primary, secondary and core code
industries from Amadeus (US SIC). Then the weighting applies as for the market share.
foreign wage per
employee (China &
India, relative)
ratio of wage (in USD) to employment from INDSTAT4 2013 at the industry-country
level (average 2005 to 2007). We use the ratio of the average Chinese and Indian value
(China and India also define a country group in EFIGE) to the value of firm’s home
country. We then connect these values at the ISIC input industry level to output
industries via input coefficients from the IO table (OECD Stan, Germany 2005). This
results in IO weighted average values at the output industry level. Using industry
correspondance tables from Eurostat, we can link these ISIC output industry values to
the primary, secondary and core code industries from Amadeus (US SIC). Then the
weighting applies as for the market share.
low skilled labor share
in total compensation
low-skilled labor compensation (share in total labor compensation) from WIOD
database, February 2012 release at the industry-country level (average 2004-2007). We
use the median of the Austrian and the German value. We then connect these values
at the ISIC input industry level to output industries via input coefficients from the IO
table (OECD Stan, Germany 2005). This results in IO weighted average values at the
output industry level. Using industry correspondance tables from Eurostat, we can
link these ISIC output industry values to the primary, secondary and core code
industries from Amadeus (US SIC). Then the weighting applies as for the market share.
world export supply of
intermediates
intermediate exports by country pair (in million USD) from WIOD, see Timmer
(2012). For each country in our sample, we add up exports from any country in the
world to all other countries, excluding the firm’s home country on both sides. This
gives us the world export supply of intermediates in a specific industry for each of the
countries in our sample. Weight industry export supply of intermediates with IO
coefficients in order to obtain weighted intermediate export supply for a given output
industry. Concordance from NACE to US SIC (by hand). Link these output industry
values to the primary, secondary and core code industries from Amadeus. Then the
weighting applies as for the market share. Compare Hummels et al. (2014).
hierarchical religion share of people belonging to a hierarchical religion (Roman Catholic, Muslim or
Orthodox) in a specific NUTS-1 region (European Value Survey 2008)
religious faith share of people who think that generally speaking most people can be trusted in a
specific NUTS-1 region (European Value Survey 2008)
trust share of people who consider it to be especially important that children are
encouraged to learn religious faith at home in a specific NUTS-1 region (European
Value Survey 2008)
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Figure B.1: Decentralized Organizations and Religious Beliefs Across Euro-
pean Regions
(a) Decentralized Organizations
Decentralized
(b) Religious Faith
Religious Faith
(c) Hierarchical Religions
Hierarchical Religions
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Appendix Chapter IV
C.1 Theory Appendix
A Simple Illustration of Trade in Tasks and Agency Problems
Consider the following textbook hidden action problem of a firm (see for ex-
ample Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)). A risk neutral firm owner employs a
manager with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA). The manager’s prefer-
ences are described by the following negative exponential utility function:
u (w, a) = −e−η[w−ψ(a)],
where w is the manager’s monetary compensation and η = −u′′/u′ > 0 his
constant rate of risk aversion. The manager needs to expand effort a and his
costs to expand effort are quadratic and can be described as ψ (a) = 0.5ca2
(measured in monetary units). The firm owner can only write a linear contract
that takes the following form:
w = f + sq.
The variable f denotes the fixed part of compensation and sq is the variable
part of compensation. Variable s measures the slope of the contract which
indicates how sensitive compensation reacts to changes in performance q. The
148
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performance of a manager is assumed to be equal to effort plus noise:
q = a + ε,
where the noise term ε is normally distributed with zero mean and variance
σ2. As discussed in Section IV.2, trade in tasks t can potentially reduce the
costs of managerial effort (c = c (t), c′ (t) < 0) and can have an influence
on the uncertainty in the performance of the firm either by creating hedging
opportunities or by making production more complex and opaque (σ = σ (t),
σ′ (t) R 0).
The firm owner maximizes his expected profit E (q− w) subject to the
manager’s incentive compatibility constraint and the participation constraint,
where u (w) is the manager’s reservation utility level:
maxa,t,s E (q− w)
s.t.
a a ∈ arg maxa E
(
−e−η[w−ψ(a)]
)
E
(
−e−η[w−ψ(a)]
)
≥ u (w) .
Since the performance signal is normally distributed, maximizing his expected
utility is equal to maximizing the term −e−η[t+sa−0.5ca
2−0.5ηs2σ2], where t +
sa − 0.5ca2 − 0.5ηs2σ2 is the manager’s certainty equivalent. Consequently,
the manager will expend effort a = s/c and if c′ (t) < 0 trade in tasks will
increase his effort level for a given slope s. Given that a = s/c, the firm owner
chooses the slope to equal:
s =
1
1 + ηc (s) σ (s)2
.
This illustrates how trade in tasks can affect the performance sensitivity in
executive compensation. If trade in tasks makes managers more productive
and reduces their effort costs c (s), they will face steeper incentive schemes.
Furthermore, if trade in tasks reduces uncertainty as firms can hedge between
more input suppliers and σ (s) decreases, executive compensation is also likely
to become more sensitive to firm performance. However, if trade in tasks in-
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creases uncertainty, the steepness of compensation contracts is likely to de-
crease.
C.2 Data Appendix
Table C.1: Summary Statistics
variable observations mean min max std. dev.
total compensation 115,388 2,598.2 0.8 3,474,515 15,781.15
ln total compensation 115,388 6.6 -0.2 15.1 1.5
equity-linked compensation 80,730 2,657.8 0.0 3,473,921 18,483.3
ln equity-linked compensation 77,761 6.1 -5.0 15.1 2.3
executive compensation / wage bill
per employee
72,803 99.8 -17,420.2 389,224.2 2,665.3
ln (executive compensation / wage
bill per employee)
72,792 2.3 -6.3 12.9 1.5
task trade 132,306 0.006 -0.2 0.3 0.03
import competition 132,332 0.003 -0.2 0.2 0.02
world export supply of inputs 132,332 219,186.2 34,714.9 1,179,208 117,917.2
market capitalization 129,646 5,536.0 0.03 606,203.2 19,429.52
ln market capitalization 129,646 6.3 -3.3 13.3 2.4
EBIT 130,649 610.1 -72,165.6 96,135.8 2,590.1
ln EBIT 104,043 4.5 -9.6 11.5 2.3
assets 133,999 21,261.8 0.0 3,074,215 113,338.2
ln assets 133,994 6.6 -11.3 14.9 2.7
industry value added 132,332 226,674 24.6 2,096,215 383,081.6
ln industry value added 132,332 11.2 3.2 14.6 1.6
industry employment 132,332 2,606.4 0.3 19,599.5 4,117.1
ln industry employment 132,332 6.9 -1.2 9.9 1.6
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Table C.2: Description of Variables
variable description
ln total compensation natural logarithm of real total executive compensation (the sum of direct and
equity-linked compensation) in 1000 USD (base period: January 2000)
Source: BoardEx and own calculations as described in IV.3.1
ln equity-linked
compensation
natural logarithm of real equity-linked executive compensation in 1000 USD (base
period: January 2000)
Source: BoardEx and own calculations as described in IV.3.1
ln (executive
compensation / wage
bill per employee)
natural logarithm of total executive compensation relative to firm level salary and
benefit payments per employee
Source: Thomson Worldscope, BoardEx and own calculations as described in IV.3.1
task trade share of imported intermediates relative to the total intermediate consumption in
deviations from the country-industry specific mean between 1998 and 2011 at the
2-digit NACE output industry level, averaged over all 4-digit SIC output industries
according to firm business segment sales (see IV.3.1 for details)
Source: trade flows from WIOD, business segment sales and firm SIC codes from
Thomson Worldscope
import competition imports relative to the sum of gross output and imports in deviations from the
country-industry specific mean between 1998 and 2011 at the 2-digit NACE output
industry level, averaged over all 4-digit SIC output industries according to firm
business segment sales (see IV.3.1 for details)
Source: trade flows and output from WIOD, business segment sales and firm SIC
codes from Thomson Worldscope
world export supply of
inputs
total sum of exported intermediates from and to third party countries in million USD
weighted according to fix input coefficients from 1995, data are measured at the
country-industry level for each year at the 2-digit NACE output industry level,
averaged over all 4-digit SIC output industries according to firm business segment
sales (see IV.3.1 for details)
Source: trade flows from WIOD, business segment sales and firm SIC codes from
Thomson Worldscope
ln market
capitalization
natural logarithm of real stock market capitalization in million USD (base period:
January 2000), market capitalization = market price year end × common shares
outstanding
Source: Thomson Worldscope
ln EBIT natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes in million USD (base period:
January 2000), EBIT = pre-tax income + interest expense on debt - capitalized interest
Source: Thomson Worldscope
ln assets natural logarithm of total assets in million USD (base period: January 2000), total
assets = current assets + long term receivables + investment in unconsolidated
subsidiaries + other investment + net property plant and equipment + other assets
Source: Thomson Worldscope
ln industry value
added
natural logarithm of industry value added in million USD weighted according to fix
input coefficients from 1995, data are measured at the country-industry level for each
year at the 2-digit NACE output industry level, averaged over all 4-digit SIC output
industries according to firm business segment sales (see IV.3.1 for details)
Source: value added from WIOD socio-economic accounts, business segment sales
and firm SIC codes from Thomson Worldscope
ln industry
employment
natural logarithm of industry employment in thousands of employees weighted
according to fix input coefficients from 1995, data are measured at the
country-industry level for each year at the 2-digit NACE output industry level,
averaged over all 4-digit SIC output industries according to firm business segment
sales (see IV.3.1 for details)
Source: employment numbers from WIOD socio-economic accounts, business
segment sales and firm SIC codes from Thomson Worldscope
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Table C.3: List of Covered Stock Market Indices
(a) Continental Europe
AEX MDAX
AEX MidCap MIBTEL
BCN GLOBAL 100 MIDEX
BEL 20 OBX
BEL 20 INSTITUTIONAL OMX
CAC 40 OMX 20
DAX PSI 20
EUROTOP 100 SBF 120
FTSE/MIB SMF
IGBM TecDAX
ISEQ OVERALL WIG 20
LUXX
(b) United Kingdom
FTSE 100 FTSE SMALL CAP
FTSE 250 FTSE TECHMARK ALL
SHARE
FTSE AIM JSE ALL SHARE
FTSE FLEDGLING
(c) United States
DOW JONES INDUSTRIAL
AVG
S&P MidCap 400
NASDAQ 100 S&P/TSX COMPOSITE
S&P 500 S&P/TSX 60
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Table C.4: List of Covered Countries
Country Obs. Country Obs.
Austria 524 Netherlands 4,204
Belgium 1,856 Norway 506
Bulgaria 16 Poland 120
Croatia 29 Portugal 1,087
Cyprus 195 Rep. of
Ireland
2,998
Denmark 708 Romania 12
Finland 224 Spain 2,069
France 8,140 Sweden 1,655
Germany 11,126 Switzerland 1,778
Greece 1,245 U.K. -
England
59,669
Italy 3,565 U.K.-
Scotland
2,986
Luxembourg 336 U.K.- Wales 741
Malta 26 United States 44,885
CHAPTER C. APPENDIX CHAPTER IV 154
0 
.1
 
.2
 
.3
 
de
ns
ity
 
-5 0 5 10 15 
ln(compensation of highest paid executive  
relative to average salaries and benefits at the firm level) 
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